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ABSTRACT
Barbary Doves (Streptope/ia risoriet) were tested in two simple foraging
experiments based on concurrent interval schedules of reinforcement, in both
experiments food reinforcement was made available, independently on each
option, for the first response to a schedule after some time had elapsed since
reinforcement had last been delivered by that option. The two schedules were
independent, and the mean interval between reinforcements on each was not
always the same. For one experiment the response required was depressing
one or other side of a floor panel, and the intervals between reinforcements
were drawn from an exponential distribution, so that they were as variable as
possible. In the other experiment the response requirement was a key peck;
and intervals between reinforcements were either drawn from an exponential
distribution; from a semi- variable arithmetic distribution; or from a completely
regular set of fixed intervals.
Results from these experiments are compared to the predictions of optimal
foraging theory, assuming that the subjects are trying to maximize net energy
intake. No agreement with prediction was here found for the floor panel
experiment. For the key peck experiment it was found that visits to the better
key were longer than to the key with the lower rate of payout, but that visits to
the latter key were not instantaneous as had been predicted; nor was the
interval between pecks uniform.
Results from both experiments were also analysed in terms of the matching
relation, though the utility of this procedure is here disputed.
Data from the key peck experiment was tested to see if the Doves were
using either of two 'rules of thumb' (behaviour generating rules) that have been
proposed to account for behaviour on these schedules. No support at all was
found for the notion that the proportion of reinforcements from the two
options in the past was controlling the proportion of responses given to each
option in the future (known as 'melioration'). Evidence for the theory of
'momentary maximising', predicting that each response would be placed on the
option offering the highest momentary probability of reward, was hard to
assess, because of the presence of a changeover delay in the key peck
experiment. It seemed that, in general, responses were not placed so
as to maximize momentary probability of reinforcement, but that a certain
subset of responses, the first response to a new schedule, was well placed in
this respect.
These results are discussed in the context of a theory of the role of
learning and behaviour in evolution known as 'Evolutionary Epistemology' which
was not, however, directly tested.
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Once upon a time, there were two monsters. Instead of
devouring young maidens or destroying New York, they spent
their time worrying about how animals behave. Godzilla put
animals in boxes and gave them electric shocks. His aim was to
establish general laws, and to this end the natural history of the
species in the box was irrelevant. In marked contrast to Godzilla,
the Creature from the Black Lagoon used to dress up in gum
boots and an anorak to crawl around in the mud, watching the
sexual habits of animals with the aid of his binoculars. Godzilla
would attack the Creature's ignorance of statistics and inability to
control any of the important variables; the Creature would retort
with charges that Godzilla's experiments were unnatural.
Houston 1980:297
The aim of this thesis is easier summarized than explained. It is to explore
the implications of evolution for individual behaviour, especially learnt
behaviour. In chapter 2 I criticize some of the approaches that exist in the
literature to the problem of learning. Optimal foraging theory, whilst a useful
component of a study of behaviour, I find inadequate as a theory of what to
expect when looking at behaviour, especially flexible behaviour. To hold that
one should expect to observe optimal behaviour ('literal optimising' as
Herrnstein & Vaughan [1980] call it), is to confuse the aim of a process with
the state actually observed. In human affairs we do not confuse someone's
aims with their actual behaviour, and it is strange that in animal research such
a view has had any support. Of course every extant species must be keeping
up a certain standard of performance in an activity critical to survival, like
foraging, but there is some distance between saying that, and demanding
optimal behaviour. When we consider learnt behaviour within this framework
the situation becomes even more problematic. In principle it should be
possible to identify what appear to be the constraints on behaviour for the
organism under study, and formulate the optimal strategy in a similar way as
for inflexible behaviour. In practice the need to account for the constraint of
gaining knowledge of the environment, makes it too easy to take the observed
pattern of behaviour as a constraint, and then whatever the behaviour
maximizes is what the subject is doing optimally. I admit that this is a
caricature of the way that most researchers proceed, and certainly optimality
analysis has a role to play in helping us to find the constraints under which an
organism is working, and the functions its behaviour serves. None the less its
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utility is limited, and cases where observers record that an organism is
foraging 'optimally' tell us very little, and raise the suspicion that the
investigator has implicitly adopted an 'inverse optimality' approach, and worked
backwards from the observed behaviour to the function it must be optimising.
(Explicit use of an inverse optimality approach is different- to demonstrate the
function that observed behaviour maximizes [or minimizes] can have its uses,
but it would never lead a researcher to conclude that behaviour is optimal,
since optimality of behaviour is one of the premises of such an approach).
A critical attitude to optimal foraging theory prompted the development of
the floor panel experiment described in chapters 3 and 4. In 1981 Houston and
McNamara developed a model specifying optimal behaviour on the popular
psychological paradigm known as a concurrent variable interval schedule. In the
form used in the floor panel experiment this meant that so long as one or
other side of the floor panel was depressed, reward would appear at a certain
average rate; while when the other side of the floor panel was depressed
reward would occur at an average rate associated with that side. Whilst a side
of the panel was not depressed a reward could still come to be set up, ready
to be delivered, but could not be obtained until the relevant side was
depressed. The optimal policy in such a situation can be derived, and
predictions more detailed than had previously been subjected to test from an
optimality account, are explored in chapter 4.
Although it is certainly a fair criticism of this experiment that it is not
obviously like any natural foraging situation, as I argue in chapter 4, it is not
clear that it is so much more unnatural than many of the experimental set-ups
that have produced evidence in favour of optimal foraging theory. None the
less the results of this experiment were so far from those predicted from
optimality considerations that it suggested the Doves were entirely failing to
comprehend what the experiment required of them.
In the latter half of chapter 2 I consider psychological theories of flexible
behaviour, and conclude that they have still to come to terms with the role of
behaviour in evolution, and the so-called 'biological boundaries' to learning that
became apparent twenty years ago. The suggestion that comparative
psychology and ethology could be married by ethology providing the functional
(optimality) theories, whilst psychology provides theories of the mechanisms by
which behaviour is controlled, I do not consider likely to be a very fruitful
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union. Foremost amongst my misgivings is the simple fact that few
psychological theories are, indeed, theories of mechanism. On balance I would
estimate that ethology actually has more theories of behavioural mechanism
than animal psychology.
This dissatisfaction with extant attempts to cope with learnt behaviour
within an evolutionary framework leads me, in chapter 3, to outline a theory of
animal behaviour based on the ideas known as 'Evolutionary Epistemology'.
This account requires a radical reassessment of what we mean by 'evolution'
so that we can see evolution, as it proceeds through 'blind' variation and
natural selection, as itself a learning process. When we see evolution in this
way the evolutionary function of individual learning becomes clearer, and a new
approach to animal behaviour, which I just sketch the perimeter of, can be
developed.
In chapter 3 I claim that this new approach applies to behaviour of all kinds
in all situations; however, this does not mean to say that it is equally easy to
study under all conditions. In order to make as fair a test as possible of
optimal foraging theory it seemed important to test the subjects until I could
be sure that they were fully settled into the experimental conditions. This
required the development and application of a criterion of stability that the
subjects' behaviour had to fulfil. The net effect of this constraint was that the
floor panel experiment took around five months to run. In principle one could
have analysed the variation and selection of behaviour (as the theory developed
in chapter 3 would advocate) over this length of time, in practice the task
would be impossible.
I resolved the dilemma- whether to continue to investigate optimal
foraging, or to explore evolutionary epistemology in more detail, in favour of
optimal foraging. I reasoned that it would be interesting to compare the
predictions of Houston & MclMamara's optimality model with behaviour on an
experiment in which pigeons (at least) are generally considered efficient
foragers, although the predictions of this optimality model had never been
tested. I refer to this as the 'key peck experiment'(set out in chapters 6 and 7).
Its structure is the same as that of the floor panel experiment except that
instead of standing on one side or other of a floor panel, the birds pecked at
two keys. Pecking the keys collected rewards that had set up in the same way
that moving onto one side of the floor panel had done. Obviously there was
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no analogue to standing on the floor panel, so the birds had to keep pecking at
the keys in order to obtain all the available rewards. As I suspected, under
these conditions performance showed some sensitivity to the dimensions
important for efficient responding. At the same time the behaviour was in no
way perfectly optimal.
In chapter 2 I complain that 'rules of thumb' (rules that animals could
actually be using to control their behaviour), in ethology are just "pulled out of
a hat". In chapter 8 I pull two rules of thumb out of my hat. My justification
for doing so was pragmatic. These rules have generated a lot of interest- I
wanted to see if they fitted my data. The results were not uninteresting, I feel,
but they were not clear cut. If it had been possible to say conclusively what
rule of thumb the birds had been using to control their behaviour, it would
then have been possible to try and discover how this rule developed, and this
might have tied in with the ideas of 'variation and selection' in behaviour,
developed in chapter 3. The last point where I thought it might have proved
possible to follow through the ideas of variation and selection was in the
consideration of the fine temporal patterning of pecking in chapter 9. This was
necessary in any case as part of the optimality analysis. Again, however, apart
from being sub-optimal, the pattern of behaviour was not clear, probably
because of limitations in the recording equipment.
Although the theorising in chapter 3 is blatantly incomplete, and, in the end,
was not testable in the experiments described in chapters 4 through 9, I do not
feel the need to apologize for it. Criticism of animal experiments from the
public at large at the present time is very vocal, and not entirely incoherent. If
the study of animal minds cannot be presented as having some semblance of
applicability to our own human concerns, then I am not surprised that people
get impatient with animal researchers. Evolutionary epistemology, though it
may be (in my hands at least) a faltering and incomplete theory, addresses an
important question, How can we understand our own cognitive processes as a




APPROACHES TO ANIMAL LEARNING AND BEHAVIOUR
It is not always easy to explain to people who are not academics why the
field of animal behaviour is made up of two distinct disciplines. In the 'good
old days' when all learnt behaviour progressed through the entirely
even-handed formation of associations, and inflexible 'Fixed Action Patterns'
were triggered by 'Innate Releasing Mechanisms', perhaps the partitioning of
animal behaviour into two disciplines was understandable. But if this
description of the two fields of animal behaviour was ever more than a
caricature, it is most certainly inadequate now. Two recent collections of
papers testify to the enthusiasm of research workers on both sides of the
psychology/ ethology divide to unite in the search for a wholistic science of
behaviour. One of these collections is the set of responses in 'The Behavioural
and Brain Sciences' to Fantino and Abarca's (1985) paper suggesting how their
own (psychological) 'delay reduction hypothesis' could integrate with
(ethological) 'optimal foraging theory'; the other example is the proceedings of
the Dahlem Conference on the 'Biology of Learning' (Marler & Terrace 1984), at
which psychologists and ethologists got together to try and find a common
plan for the study of animal learning and behaviour. I find, however, that I must
agree with Hailman (1985), that enthusiasm is not itself sufficient, and that the
new synthesis 'still remains elusive'.
It is my belief that an integration of all forms of animal behaviour study
into a single conceptual schema can only be achieved by a radical
reassessment of what we mean by learning, and of the role of the acquisition
of knowledge in evolution. The position I advocate here is that known as
'Evolutionary Epistemology', associated in particular with the social
psychologist, Donald Campbell. The purpose of this chapter is to argue the
need for such a reassessment, and in chapter 3 I outline the theory and its
implications.
Firstly let us consider the positions of the psychological and ethological
camps, and the extant attempts at reconcilation.
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2.1 Psychological Approaches
2.1.1 General Process Theory
Tis sufficient to observe, that there is no relation which
produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea
more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect
betwixt their objects
David Hume
The historical development of comparative psychology out of philosophy will
be sketched in chapter 3, section 3.1.3, for now let us simply summarize the
conceptual framework of the traditional behaviourist position, much as one
might find it in any introductory textbook. This is the position known as
'General Process Theory' (Seiigman 1970).
Behaviourism grew out of the British empiricist philosophy of the 18th and
19th centuries. Learning, according to these philosophers, consists of the
formation of associations between causes and effects. The quote from Hume at
the head of this section is actually the frontispiece to a recent text on animal
learning theory (Dickinson 1980). Classical, Pavlovian conditioning showed that
animals could associate stimuli with their effects; operant conditioning showed
that they were capable of associating actions with their consequences.
Classical conditioning was the preferred mode of adjustment of the smooth
muscles and glandular systems under the control of the autonomic nervous
system; while skeletal muscle control was learnt by operant conditioning. In its
strong form behaviourism was a totally environmental' theory - it followed
Locke's doctrine that the mind at birth was a blank siate 'tabula rasd, on which
the chalk of experience then wrote. This view led the behaviourists to uphold
that the environment, through differential reinforcement of different actions,
had complete control of the organism's behaviour. Of course there were
behaviours to which this description did not apply - these were the instincts,
and they were not the domain of psychology because they were stereotyped
and uninfluenced by the environment. If a behaviour was at all influenced by
environmental feedback its conditioning would follow the same associative
rules as the conditioning of any other behaviour the organism (or any other
organism) was capable of; and it could be associated with any reinforcer.
As for the fitness value of behaviour, comparative psychologists of the old
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school adopted a progressive, anagenetic view of evolution (Gottlieb 1985).
Once the ability to learn (by association) had appeared in the evolutionary tree,
all animals above that point had got it. Associative learning (or at least
classical and operant conditioning considered separately) was inherited as a
package - if you had it, you had all of it, otherwise you had to make do with
instincts, which, being unresponsive to environmental feedback, were clearly
second best.
2.1.2 Limitations of General Process Theory
2.1.2.1 Biological Constraints
In the 1960s a number of chinks appeared in the all encompassing armour
of general process theory. These 'biological constraints' (Shettleworth 1972)
have been extensively reviewed many times before (Staddon 1983; 1986; Bolles
1985; Garcia, Clarke & Hankins 1973; Shettleworth 1972; Seligman 1970; Terrace
1984; McFarland 1985) and so they will only be discussed here very briefly.
The Brelands (Breland & Breland 1961; 1966) set up in business to train
animals by operant methods to perform tricks for commercial purposes -
typically advertisements. They found that although their subjects would initially
perform as expected, after a period of training they might begin to engage
persistently in behaviours that had never been reinforced, and that destroyed
the performance they were being trained towards. An oft repeated example is
the story of the pig that was being trained to pick up tokens and deposit them
in a piggy bank. At first all went well but over a period of weeks the pig
developed the tendency to drop and root the tokens repeatedly instead of
simply putting them in the bank. The Brelands termed this phenomenon
'Instinctive drift'.
The notion that all stimuli were equally associable with all responses was
refuted by the work of Garcia & Koelling (1966; see Garcia et al 1973 for
review). They demonstrated that rats would learn very much more readily, and
over longer delays, that sickness was associated with flavoured water, than that
it was associated with water accompanied by flashing lights or sounds.
However when the consequence of drinking the water was electric shock, the
relationship was reversed, and the flavouring was a poor cue compared to the
presence of lights or noise with the water.
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Similar conclusions as to the selective importance of certain cues for
particular consequences can be drawn from the work of Bolles (1970;1971) in
aversive conditioning. Bolles concluded that rats can only learn to terminate an
aversive electric shock if the response they are required to make contains
elements of flight (moving to another chamber from where shocked), simulated
flight (running in wheel), or a partial sort of flight (moving across to the other
side of a shuttle box). To train a rat to avoid shock by pressing a bar could
only be achieved by three out of twenty four subjects, at even a moderate level
after 1000 trials (D'Amato & Schiff 1964 in Bolles 1971). Bolles coined the term
'Species Specific Defence Reactions' to describe the set of responses which
could be conditioned to electric shock.
The third problem to arise for general process theory was the procedure
known as 'auto-shaping'. Traditionally pigeons had been trained to peck keys in
Skinner boxes by a process of reinforcing successive approximations to the
required key peck response - this was known as 'hand shaping'. The
experimenter would initially operate the food hopper when the bird was
anywhere near the key that it was to peck. For the next reinforcement the
experimenter would wait until the bird was slightly closer to the key, and so
on; reinforcement each time contingent on a slightly closer approximation to
the required key peck response. Brown & Jenkins (1968) performed an
experiment presenting pigeons with regular food reinforcement in a Skinner
box, quite independent of their behaviour. This Skinner box also contained a
response key that was illuminated just before food was delivered. It was found
that the pigeons quickly developed the habit of pecking the illuminated key,
despite the irrelevance (from an external viewpoint) of this act. The situation,
clearly, had been changed from an operant conditioning one, to a classical
conditioning experiment. The lit key was acting as a conditioned stimulus,
producing key pecking as a conditioned response. Although this went against
the prevailing beliefs as to the type of responses that could be classically
conditioned, at least it could still be accommodated with the general process
account. The work of Williams & Williams (1969) however, put an end to that.
They adjusted the auto-shaping procedure so that now, instead of being just
irrelevant, pecking the key actually stopped the delivery of reinforcement. The
scenario had been changed back to operant conditioning. Contrary to the
plentiful evidence that key pecking was an easily conditioned response,
Williams & Williams found that autoshaping under these conditions still
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occurred. The pigeons still developed the tendency to peck the key; the
response contingent omission of reinforcement slowed responding, but did not
abolish it.
These examples from the psychological laboratory, plus the burgeoning
literature on learning from field studies that could not easily be incorporated
into the associationist program (e.g. imprinting, Lorenz 1969; Bird song learning,
Marler 1970; Bee learning, von Frisch 1967) led some authors to demand
additional principles beyond those in standard behaviourism. These principles
would take account of the special demands that adaptation to different
environments put on different organisms. It was argued that animals had
"species' specific reaction patterns" (Bolles 1971); that different behaviours had
different 'preparedness' to be associated with different consequences (Seligman
1970); or that there were a 'multiplicity' of learning processes for a multiplicity
of species and niches (Shettleworth 1972).
2.1.2.2 Computational Constraints
An additional set of problems that has not received any attention in the
animal literature are the epistemological shortcomings of associative learning
theory. Associationism has not had any support in philosophy since the turn of
the century (Russell 1914 was the last work to use associationism, according to
Oldroyd 1980). The problem with associationism is that without any additional
rules to restrict search it must lead to an overloading of the subject's memory
system. The injunction to 'associate' is impossible to obey - what should one
associate with what? (Compare Popper's discussion of the injunction to
'observe', 1972:259). We must either accept that deciding what would be
associated is as important a part of a learning process as the procedure of
association itself, or give up the attempt at developing an associative account
of learning. Seligman's suggestion that a certain preparedness exists for certain
actions to be associated with particular consequences, is therefore by no
means peripheral phenomenon - a footnote to behaviourism - but rather a sine
qua non for a functioning associative theory. It was no surprise, therefore to
find that Thorndike (1911; 1932) recognized a concept of 'belongingness' to
describe the prepotency of certain actions to be associated with certain results.
The notions of preparedness and belongingness will be returned to in chapter
3, section 3.2.3.2.
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Riedl (1985) points out that if we were to assume that there were only 16
synaptic junctions between the auditory nerve of a dog and the nerve ending
activating the salivary gland, then the number of possible permutations of
connection is 161, about 2 * 1013. This is about 105 times longer than the
lifespan of a dog in seconds - so the chance of the correct association, from
sound to salivation, being hit by chance once in a whole lifetime is
insignificant.
2.1.3 More Modern Approaches
Contemporary psychological approaches to animal behaviour can be
distinguished by the positions adopted on two main dimensions of
disagreement. These are specialization versus generalization (Plotkin &
Odling-Smee 1979) and associationism versus selectionism. Since it is a form
of selectionism that is to be advocated here, discussion of theories scoring
significantly on this dimension will be delayed until after the exposition of the
principles of Evolutionary Epistemology in chapter 3. Specialization versus
Generalization refers to whether the authors concerned see particular instances
of learning in individual behaviour as special adaptations to particular
environmental features, or as a generalized ability to learn from experience.
2.1.3.1 Neo-behaviourism
There is no shortage of researchers tracing their conceptual allegiances
back to Skinner, Hull or Guthrie, with little attempt to take stock of the
discoveries of the intervening years sketched above. This 'head in the sand'
attitude does not lead to an enthusiasm for theoretical statements, and so it is
difficult to point to references. Any recent issue of the 'Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior' contains a number of papers whose pedigree
is impeccable general process theory - Wearden (e.g. 1983); Herrnstein (e.g.
1982) and Davison (e.g. 1985) are some of the most prolific authors of this
school at the present time. To these theorists the biological constraints are a
very peripheral phenomenon. Domjan 8t Galef (1983) suggest that the impact of
the 'biological constraints' on general process theory is not great, and that
these phenomena can be incorporated into general process theory by the
addition of the principles of 'belongingness' (Revusky 1977), and by including
stimulus similarity as a factor in Pavlovian conditioning (Rescorla & Furrow
1977; Testa & Ternes 1977). Long delay learning, potentiation in classical
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conditioning, and constraints on punishment and avoidance learning, do not
require the addition of any new postulates according to Domjan (1983). The
holders of this view argue that since the laws of association still hold in a
great many cases, that is quite good enough for them, they are happy to
experiment in contexts where general process theory still holds true without
particular anxiety over the need for ad hoc principles to encompass the
biological constraints literature.
2.1.3.2 Ecological Psychology
At the alternative extreme of the specialization - generalization continuum
to the neo-behaviourists are those who adopt a position emphasizing the many
sided nature of the interface between organism and environment, and
proposing a multitude of learning mechanisms to parallel this (e.g. Shettleworth
1972; Johnston 1981; 1985; Gottlieb 1985; Reed 1985; Miller 1985; Kalat 1985).
The ecological approach can be distinguished from the biological
constraints viewpoint (to be discussed next) on a number of points. Firstly
theorists of an ecological persuasion resent the implication that biology sets
limits on an otherwise unfettered learning process (Johnston 1985). The
ecological approach borrows ideas from ethology and Gibsonian ecological
psychology to formulate a program of research emphasizing the need for (at
least) three phases to animal learning research. Initially they stipulate a phase
of naturalistic observation of organisms in their natural habitats (Johnston
1981; 1985; Miller 1985). Johnston advocates that this description should follow
Gibson's (1977; 1979) plan of specifying the 'affordances' of the ecosystem for
the organisms concerned. Here we see also the influence of ethology, where
naturalistic observation has always been considered very important. This initial
phase would lead into the specification of a 'task description' - What has to be
learned by an animal in its daily life in the natural habitat? Only after this
second phase is complete are they willing to countenance experimental
manipulation of parameters in order to investigate how the particular examples
of learning proceed.
The possibility that some general principles might come out of this
enterprise is not ruled out of court, but the question is considered an open
one, that must await the results of empirical investigation.
The problem with this approach to animal learning is simply that an
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empirical program does not constitute a theory. Domjan & Galef (1983) have
pointed out, and Kalat (1985) has conceded, that the ecological critiscms of
general process theory have not led to a theory of their own. 'Belongingness',
for example, does not seem to be specifiable a priori, it, "is not... a precise
theory that allows one to predict new results with any confidence" (Kalat 1985).
Although Johnston (1985:16) argues that, "it is unlikely that associative
principles will contribute as broadly to an ecological view of learning
mechanisms as they do to the non-ecological view, because so many of their
fundamental assumptions are explicitly opposed to the ecological perspective",
he is forced to concede that, "on the other hand, it is unlikely that associative
mechanisms play no role in learning under natural circumstances...".
Shettleworth (1984) is surely right to be suspicious of the ecological program's
ability to deliver when she writes "Johnston... seems to suggest that it [the
ecological approach] can be productive in the absence of any pre-existing
system for classifying and analysing examples of learning". It does not seem
clear to me why we should accept the ecological psychologists' faith in their
method to deliver a new paradigm for animal learning research, when after two
decades of more ecologically minded investigation on animal learning,
associationism remains the only conceptual framework available to order our
knowledge of animal learning.
2.1.3.3 Biological Constraints Theorists
A small group of theorists (Bolles 1971; 1985; Lea 1984; Revusky 1977;
1984; 1985; Terrace 1984; and perhaps Shettleworth 1984) whilst fully cognizant
of the impact of the biological constraints research on learning, retain none the
less, the opinion that learning is a general process. This group therefore lies
between the ecological school, and neo-behaviourism, and merges at the
edges with both of these. Plotkin & Odling-Smee (1979) point out that to
jettison the idea of there being something that makes all instances of learning
similar is to jettison parsimony in a big way. Bolles (1985), Revusky (1984;
1985), Terrace (1984) and Shettleworth (1984) are agreed that there is not yet
sufficient justification to take this step. Shettleworth expresses well this
reluctance to throw out the baby with the bathwater when she suggests the
two different ways that learning could come to be a general process:
Associative learning capabilities may at first operate only on
certain ecologically relevant combinations of
events..[and]...gradually the ability to form associations becomes
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more general...An alternative view is that pain-avoidance learning
and other examples of association learning with specialized
functions are manifestations of a generally accessible associative
mechanism, although it has to be granted that the general
mechanism is more responsive to some combinations of events
than others
Shettleworth 1984:423
Either way associationism remains the general principle into which the
biological constraints must be fitted. In contradistinction to the
neo-behaviourists however, Shettleworth, Terrace and Bolles (at least)
emphasize the importance of the organism's habitat in understanding instances
of selective association. They see the niche as important to understanding
behaviour, but not as something from which predictions can be made. Bolles
(1985) asks, "How can a description of the niche enable us to specify anything
about the psychology of an animal?". This is the most marked difference
between the biological constraints approach and the ecological viewpoint.
Johnston (1985) and Reed (1985) argue, not just that the environment can tell
us something about the organism, but that (following Gibson 1977) the only
useful description of the environment is in terms of the affordances it offers to
the organism.
2.1.3.4 Selectionist Accounts
Discussion of a fourth type of theory - selection theory - which is similar
to the theoretical viewpoint to be developed in chapter 3, will be deferred until
after the principles of Evolutionary Epistemology have been put forward.
2.2 Ethological approaches
An important part of the role of ethology in the development of the present
situation in animal behaviour science has already been discussed in section
2.1.2.1, in the context of the problems of behaviourism. Ethology, however, has
an independent existence as well. The ethological approach to behaviour
emphasizes painstaking observation of animals in their natural settings. Where
comparative psychology has focused on environmental factors, ethology has
emphasized innate, heritable behaviours. The most important explanatory
principle to ethologists is that "as biologists thinking in terms of evolution
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through natural selection, they are aware that an understanding of the diversity
in the animal kingdom, requires that the behaviour of each species be seen in
relation to the environmental context to which it has been adapted", Hinde
(1982).
In his seminal work The Study of Instinct' Tinbergen (1951) distinguishes
two forms of explanation of importance to ethologists. These are the
functional and the mechanistic forms of analysis. Functional analysis refers to
the teleonomy of behaviour - the (ultimately evolutionary) ends towards which
it is directed. A functional analysis addresses the 'Why?' question in behaviour.
A mechanistic analysis is directed at finding the immediate causal factors that
are controlling a behaviour pattern. The question being addressed here is that
of 'How?' the behaviour is controlled.
The major difference between ecological psychology and ethology seems to
be that, as I mentioned above, ethologists emphasize both functional and
mechanistic analysis, whereas the Gibsonian school of psychology argues that
all behaviour can be explained in functional terms (Reed 1985). In practice this
difference of opinion is not great, because with the success of optimality
theories, functional analysis has come to dominate behavioural ecology over
the last twenty years (see, for example, Krebs & Davles 1984).
2.2.1 Functional Analysis
The entire modern deification of survival per se, survival
returning to itself, survival naked and abstract, with the
substantive excellence in what survives, except the capacity for
more survival still, is surely the strangest intellectual
stopping-place ever proposed by one man to another
William James (quoted without reference to source in
Hofstadter 1955:201)
In a post Darwinian age, functional explanation of behaviour is synonymous
with a discussion of the fitness or adaptedness of behaviour. This has meant
that ethologists have run straight into the problem of how to define individual
fitness non-tautologically. Darwin himself preferred to talk of 'Natural
Selection' and only adopted Herbert Spencer's phrase 'Survival of the Fittest' on
the prompting of Thomas Huxley, who argued it would overcome the problem
some of their contemporaries had in coming to terms with the idea of nature
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doing something so apparently purposeful as 'selecting' (Gould 1980; Reid
1985). The above quotation (probably from one of James' many tirades against
Spencer) draws attention to the tautology that arose once one started to speak
of the 'survival of the fittest' - where 'the fittest' could only be defined as
'those that survive'.
The neo-Darwinian redefinition of natural selection as differential survival
solved the tautology, but produces a criterion of fitness that can only be
applied at a multi-generational timescale. At a certain perspective, it might be
possible to observe that a certain group of animals behaving in a certain way
had become extinct, or, conversely, had come to dominate a new habitat at the
expense of other groups. But this perspective would require research over
eons; at a day to day level differential survival does not offer much for the
scientist interested in the behaviour of organisms with lifespans over half an
hour. This may well be one of the reasons why comparative psychology has
been happy to stand outside evolutionary theory till recent years.
2.2.1.1 Optimality Theory
In 1966 MacArthur and Pianka published a paper suggesting that because
foraging was an activity that was critical to survival and reproduction (and
hence inclusive fitness), a selection pressure existed such that competition
between individuals would lead to a state where the observed behaviour would
maximise energy intake, in a manner corresponding to what would obtain if the
animals concerned had been built by an omnipotent designer. The incorporation
of the mathematical maximization models of economics into ethology appears,
at least superficially, to have been a massively successful enterprise. Review
after review has praised the effectiveness of 'Optimal Foraging Theory' (as this
approach is known) to produce a framework for the functional study of
behaviour (Krebs 1973; 1978; Krebs 81 McCleery 1984; Pyke, Pulliam & Charnov
1977; Kamil & Roitblat 1985).
Do we really expect evolution to produce organisms whose behaviour
conforms to what would be chosen by an omnipotent designer? Some
evolutionary theorists have argued that this is the case (e.g. Oster & Wilson
1978; Maynard Smith 1978); on the other hand the point is not uncontroversial.
D'Arcy Thompson recognized the strangeness of rejecting a supernatural
designing deity for a process that had the net effect of producing the same
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results as the deity would have done:
To buttress the theory of natural selection the same instances
of adaptation are used, which in an earlier but not distant age
testified to the wisdom of the Creator.
D'Arcy Thompson (1917:672) cited in Reid (1985:34)
Gould and Lewontin (1979; Lewontin 1979; Gould 1982) have recently reopened
the old sore of what they term the 'Panglossian Paradigm'. (Dr Pangloss was
the character in Voltaire's 'Candide' who believed that everything is made for
the best possible purpose). Gould's argument (1980:27) is that the historical
nature of living things means that the designer's optimal solution is precluded.
He points to the opportunist nature of the evolutionary process, cobbling
today's survival together out of the parts left over from yesterday's. Natural
selection does not set goals, it sets criteria - 'pass marks' if you like. So long
as an individual does better than some minimum it will survive to reproduce,
and its progeny will form the next generation. Evolutionary theory does not
postulate an overseer who inspects ecosystems to make sure they are up to
scratch. The view that individuals need only do just well enough to get by is
known as 'satisficing' (Simon 1956), and it is an argument many theorists want
to distance themselves from. Dawkins (1981), for example, concedes that the
designer's optimal solution is ruled out by the opportunist nature of selection.
("Nature does not have the foresight to put together a sequence of mutations
which, for all that they may entail temporary disadvantage, set a lineage on the
road to ultimate global superiority" [ibid:46]). On the other hand he argues that
'satisficing' is not strong enough. "Living things are not selected for their
capacity simply to stay alive'; he writes (ibid:45), "they are staying alive in
competition with other things". Dawkins proposes the term 'meliori2ing'
(meaning 'bettering') to cover this viewpoint. I feel that this additional term is
unnecessary. Simon's formulation predates the recent discussions of optimality
in behaviour and seems to confuse the issue we now understand as
'satisficing' with what are now known as 'rules of thumb'. Rules of thumb are
proximate behavioural mechanisms that could be aimed towards achieving
either an optimal, or a 'satisfactory' goal state. I see no reason therefore why
we should not simply recast 'satisfying' to allow that organisms must do
satisfactorily in the context of competition from other organisms. We could call
this 'satisficing under competition', to show that we are thinking in terms of a
base line exceeded, rather than a goal attained (as is implied by optimisation).
Dawkin's new term is unfortunate, at least within the context of this thesis,
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because it is also the accepted name of a theory of behaviour on concurrent
variable interval schedules (Herrnstein & Vaughan 1980), discussed in chapter 8.
The distinction between satisficing and optimising is in some ways
equivalent to the physicist's concepts of stable and unstable equilibria. An
optimal policy might be expected to become dominant in a population because,
being by definition the best possible balance of costs and benefits for each
individual, it cannot be beaten by any mutant strategy (Houston 1986; though cf
Harley 1983). This is equivalent to the physicist's concept of a stable
equilibrium. There is another form of equilibrium, however, the unstable form.
This describes systems that are not in their most stable situation, but that,
nevertheless, may endure for a very long time. In biology this is equivalent to
saying that a population may be vulnerable to invasion by a mutant strategy,
but that such a mutant either does not arise, perhaps because variation
including the possibility of such an individual does not occur; or that the
mutant's improved efficiency on the dimension under study entails an
unacceptable loss of efficiency on some other fitness-related parameter. Even
if the new mutant thrives, its increased fitness may have such a small effect
that it takes an indefinitely long time to invade the population. This time scale
could be slower than the rate of exogenous environmental change, and so our
chances of observing optimal behaviour in all but a minority of a population
will be nill.
One of Ollason's (1986) arguments against optimal foraging is that since
Hume has shown that it is not possible to demonstrate divine design in the
functioning of living things, it must be equally impossible to demonstrate
design by natural selection - even if we conceded that natural selection could
be a designing agent.
One further argument against observing optimal behaviour can be
developed from Plotkin & Odling-Smee's (1979) discussion of the distinction
between adaptedness and adaptability. In a stable environment, they suggest
specialization will be selected for, and optimal adaptedness to the
contemporary environment becomes a possibility. In a changing environment,
however, the generalist ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances
(adaptability) will be at a premium. The alternative strategy of possessing
multiple specializations, would involve expensive redundancy. In a sense there
must be interference between adaptedness and adaptability such that an
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individual cannot be both at once. The net effect of this argument is that if we
expect to find optimal foraging anywhere it must be amongst evolutionarily
conservative organisms that have specialized in niches that have remained
steady and predictable across evolutionary time. On the other hand we can
predict that opportunist organisms, consuming a varied diet, in a continuously
changing environment would have been selected to have sacrificed optimality
in any one situation for behavioural flexibility in a variety of contexts.
Organisms that follow man, such as feral pigeons (Columba //V/'a) and rats
(Rattus rattu$ would fit into this latter category.
Even if we accept that natural selection could tend to optimise behaviour,
there are a number of reasons why we could not expect to observe optimal
behaviour (cf Pierce & Ollason 1986; Ollason 1986; McFarland & Houston 1981;
Staddon 1983:493).
An animal may be marginalized by competitor pressure, evolutionary lag
following environmental change, or some other factor, out of the environment
in which its foraging strategy is optimal to a niche in which its foraging is less
efficient. McFarland & Houston (1981) refer to this as the case where the
animal's objective function (the function it is maximising) is distinct from the
cost function (the function it ought to maximise to get maximal fitness in this
environment). McFarland & Houston further point out that it will rarely be the
case that these two functions are the same.
A point that has not been emphasized in the foregoing account of optimal
foraging theory is that, although evolution might be assumed to design
optimally behaving fitness maximisers, our investigation of this phenomenon
can only commence once we have identified a more proximate currency to
stand in for fitness in our calculations. Typically in foraging studies net energy
gain is used, but there are other possibilities - e.g. minimisation of the
probability of starvation, levels of certain critical nutrients, minimisation of
exposure to predation etc, etc. In general we can never be certain that the
currency we have chosen to maximise is the same as that being maximised by
the subject of our studies. And, more problematic still, except in (very) simple
restricted environments, it must be the case that our subjects will be obliged
to maximise all these functions at once. Foragers must not just maximise
energy intake, but minimise risk of predation and maintain water balance and
the levels of critical nutrients etc, etc all at the same time. I'm not sure if such
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an analysis is impossible in principle, however, in practise it must be.
An approach that inverts the logic of the argument sketched above is the
'inverse optimality approach' (McFarland & Houston 1981:153ff). For an inverse
optimality analysis, optimality of behaviour is assumed, and the investigator's
interest lies in deducing the objective function which the behaviour maximises.
This approach offers the possibility of uncovering the function the organism is
really maximising, as opposed to the function the investigator assumes is being
maximized. Such an approach is dangerous for a number of reasons.
McFarland & Houston (1981) consider two possibilities. Firstly, there is no
guarantee that the function obtained is actually governing the organism's
behaviour. Houston (1986) goes further and states "The first law of model
building is that for any set of data there is at least one model (Kalman 1968).
The relevant question is therefore not 'can a model be found?' but 'what do I
want from a model?"' The danger here is that even if the animal in question
does not proceed by maximising a function, it will none the less be possible to
deduce a function it could be maximising.
The second problem with the inverse optimality approach is that the
mapping from behaviour to functions may not be continuous (McFarland &
Houston 1981:154). The gist of this is that small changes in behaviour can
require massive changes in the function assumed optimized.
If optimal foraging theory has so many conceptual problems the question
naturally arises How come it is so successful? One line of defence of optimal
foraging theory has been that its utility justifies its use. Ollason (1986) argues
that the success of optimal foraging theory is due to it having been set up in a
tautological and therefore unassailable position. He suggests that combination
of prior optimality analysis with inverse optimality analysis has allowed a
situation to develop where an investigator (Ollason's 1986 example is Cowie
1977) can initially perform an optimality analysis, and then measure some
relevant parameters of the behaviour. Finding a discrepancy between
prediction and observation, the investigator then works backwards from the
behaviour to the function it must be maximising, and/or simultaneously adding
in constraints to the prior optimality analysis until the two directions of
optimality analysis meet up. This creates a circularity in the argument, and
produces optimality as the inevitable result.
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The other way that optimality tends to be an .assured result is that the prior
predictions have often been so weak.
Unfortunately, most of the predictions thus far derived from
optimal foraging theory are merely qualitative. For example, a
forager with a choice of different quality prey should prefer the
better ones and should be more selective when the rate of
encountering good prey is higher. A forager searching for
patchily distributed prey should stay longer in patches with more
prey and should be more reluctant to leave a patch of given
quality when overall prey density is lower or travel time is
longer. These predictions are so weak that they can hardly fail to
be correct.
Green 1985:338
Although optimal foraging theory may have been abused, is it still possible
that it might have a legitimate function? Although its predictions have been
weak, is it possible they might be made stronger? I think the answer to both
these questions is a qualified 'yes'. The second question is the easier to deal
with so I will take it first. True, the marginal value theorem (Charnov 1976;
probably the first optimal foraging theory to tested widely), does make fairly
intuitive predictions, but in principle optimal foraging theories may be as
complex as we care to imagine. It is more the case that researchers have
tended to water down the predictions of optimal foraging theories in order to
increase the apparent agreement between observation and theory (this is
discussed in the context of laboratory test of optimal foraging in the
introduction to chapter 4). The optimal foraging analysis presented in chapter 5,
for example, is fairly complex and precise in its predictions.
To the first question above (does optimal foraging theory have a legitimate
function?) the answer is a more qualified affirmation. I do not believe that
optimal foraging theory is a theory of behaviour. I think there are enough
reasons why we cannot expect animal behaviour to be optimal with respect to
any prior definable function, that we must concede that predictions about
behaviour cannot be drawn from optimal foraging theory. There may be some
restricted conditions where optimality might be expected (species specializing
in very conservative habitats), but I am not convinced that we can specify in
detail what these conditions are. On the other hand I do see a function for
optimal foraging theory (there is no paradox here - many theories that are not
theories of behaviour have a role to play in the study of behaviour; theories of
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physics, biochemistry, physiology etc). To ask, 'What should this animal be
doing, if it is going to maximise energy intake?' is an informative question. The
discrepancy between optimality and actual behaviour is an interesting one, and
one that should not be brushed under the carpet, but brought out and
examined. In some cases an inverse optimality analysis may help to define the
difference between the observed behaviour and that which seemed a priori to
the investigator to be optimal. This could provide insight into the functions of
the behaviour and raise suggestions as to the mechanisms of the behaviour.
In fact, optimality theory was used implicitly in this way in early psychological
experiments. In maze running, for example, the notion of the most direct path
was always defined before ever a rat was run.
From this perspective then the important thing is to set up optimaiity
analyses with as few constraints as practicable, and work out the predictions of
the analysis prior to observation. What we must not do is to incorporate
knowledge of our subject's behaviour as constraints into the optimaiity
formulation without first attempting an unconstrained optimality analysis. The
informal incorporation of constraints makes the subjects behaviour seem much
more optimal than it really is (Houston & MclMamara 1985). In analysing the
results of subsequent experiment or observation it is important to emphasize
the differences between theory and observation. Similarity tells us very little; it
is the departures from optimality that raise questions as to how the organism
is actually controlling its behaviour (Staddon 1983:6). It is this form of
optimality analysis that is attempted in chapters 5 and 7.
2.2.2 Mechanistic Analysis
Although, as mentioned above, ethology recognizes two forms of analysis,
it is functional analysis, in the form of optimality theory, that has dominated
behavioural ecology in the last decade. It is only quite recently that it has
been recognized that an optimality analysis leaves unaddressed the mechanistic
question as to How the behaviour is controlled (Harley 981; Houston 1980). A
number of 'rules of thumb' (as theories of mechanism that could approximate
optimal foraging are known), have been proposed to account for behaviour in
particular situations (e.g. Ollason 1980; McNamara & Houston 1985; McFarland 8i
Houston 1981; Ydenberg 1984). Rules of thumb can be subdivided into those
that do not change strategy with increasing experience (which I shall call 'static
rules'), and rules that do so change ('learning rules'). These can both be dealt
with fairly briefly because there is only one theory of rules of thumb. This is
the hypothesis that the rules constitute the optimal solution to the problem of
finding the best overall return of benefits on costs, after allowing for the
cognitive costs of calculating a more perfect solution, as opposed to some
simple rule.
2.2.2.1 Optimal Rules of Thumb
Considering static rules of thumb first, a typical pattern, unfortunately, is
for the experimenter to incorporate the observe patterning of behaviour into an
optimality model as a constraint, and thereby the behaviour becomes optimal
by fiat (Ollason 1986). Since there is no way of estimating the cognitive cost to
the subject of evaluating alternative strategies of behaviour which it is not
capable of, there is no non-tautological way that optimality considerations can
be applied to static rules of thumb. All that can be done is to argue that an
alternative strategy that the subject is not performing, but appears capable of,
would offer better returns than the behaviour observed. This could be
interesting, particularly where behaviour in the situation observed follows a
more or less optimal rule than behaviour in some other, apparently similar,
situation (say, in cases where choice between patches of water was more
optimal than between patches of food). It should be emphasized, however, that
such an approach could never be prescriptive.
For learning rules the situation is very similar. If the observed learning rule
is incorporated as a constraint into the optimality analysis, then the behaviour
is almost inevitably optimal. Learning rules could be ranked in terms of how
close they come to the globally optimal behaviour. This could be a worthwhile
exercise, though since different rules might assume different amounts of prior
knowledge, a fair comparison may not be possible. Since we have no
knowledge (nor could we have), of the relative cognitive costs of different
learning rules to any particular subject (except, perhaps, ourselves), it is
necessarily impossible to do a full cost-benefit analysis to calculate the truly
optimal learning rule.
Ollason (1986) has argued that optimal foraging theory should be scrapped
in favour of simply generating and testing rules of thumb. Most authors,
however, seem to prefer a flawed conceptual schema to no schema at all.
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2.3 Attempts at Reconciliation
As noted at the beginning of this chapter there is now evidence of a
willingness on the part of both psychologists and ethologists to unite together
in a search for a wholistic science of animal behaviour. I am aware of only
two ways in which this has been attempted. The first lies in the development
of ecological psychology.
Many of the concepts and approaches advocated by the ecological
psychologists (section 2.1.3.2 above) are not alien to ethology. The early
ethologist Jacob von Uexkull defined an organism's 'Umwelt' as that part of its
environment to which it is receptive. He wrote;
The sum of the stimuli affecting an animal forms a world in
itself. The stimuli...form certain indications, which enable the
animal to guide its movements, much as the signs at sea enable
the sailor to steer his ship. I call the sum of the indications the
world-as-sensed [Umwelt].
von UexktJI 1926:123
This emphasis on the econiche, combined with Lorenz's advocation of some of
the principles of Gestalt psychology (Lorenz 1971/1959), generates a position
having many points of contact with the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson
(compare Gibson's notion of 'affordance' with Koffka's 'valences'. Gibson 1977).
Difficulties for this approach include the absence of any suggestion on the
part of the ecological psychologists to cover the inadequacies of the theory of
optimality in ethology. Ecological psychology can be characterized as ethology
without any theory.
The other approach to reconcile ethology and psychology is less an attempt
at integration, as at demarcation.
Fantino & Abarca (1985) proposed that a psychological theory (such as their
'delay reduction hypothesis') represented a rule of thumb that could account
for observed behaviour at a more proximal level of explanation than the equally
valid functional explanation of optimal foraging theory ("A model of natural
selection for foraging efficiency makes several predictions consistent with a
hypothesis of a more proximate phenomenon (reduction in time to
reinforcement)"; Fantino & Abarca, 1985:319). The majority of commentators on
their target article agreed with this view (Barnard 1985; Gass 1985; Green 1985;
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Houston 1985; Lea 1985; McNair 1985; Mellgren 1985; Shettleworth 1985a).
If psychological and ethological theories did occupy different levels of
description then it would be possible that they could be simply sandwiched
together. I do not think that the resulting composite would be a very
satisfying, conceptually integrated, theory of behaviour, but it certainly might be
a possibility. The problem here is that, in fact, the delay reduction hypothesis,
like the matching law and most psychological accounts of behaviour, is a
functional theory - not a mechanistic one. Fantino 8i Abarca concede this at
one point in their article, and two of the commentators (Branch 1985; Kruse
1985), also pick up on this. Staddon (1983:503) writes, "Fantino's model and any
optimality analysis, is parameter free, but says nothing about the means
animals use to adapt to these procedures".
The absence of a tradition of explicitly distinguishing functional and
mechanistic theories of behaviour in psychology has meant that theorists have
been able to switch between the two levels at will. The delay reduction
hypothesis is a good example. Stated in words it appears to be a mechanistic
hypothesis - a statement as to How behaviour is controlled vis:
A stimulus correlated with a greater reduction in time to food
presentation will be a stronger reinforcer (as measured in a
choice test) than one correlated with a longer reduction in time
to food.
Fantino & Abarca 1985:316
When formulated mathematically, however, it simply represents a functional
generalization that could be attained by many different true rules of thumb.
The delay reduction hypothesis is not unique in this respect. Herrnstein's
'matching law' (discussed in detail in chapter 6), was initially formulated as a
principle sounding like a rule of thumb (Herrnstein 1961). Matching stipulated
that the subject should distribute it's responses across a number of options, in
proportion to the reinforcements it obtained from those options. From this
proximate principle an equation was derived stating that the ratio (or
proportion) of reinforcements at the end of a session should equal the ratio (or
proportion) of responses made to the available options. Herrnstein (1982;
Herrnstein 8t Vaughan 1980) now concedes that matching as originally
formulated is not a mechanistic theory of behaviour. Two examples of
mechanistic theories are discussed in more detail in chapter 8. My purpose
here has simply been to argue that psychological theories are not in general,
though in particular cases they may be, mechanistic theories; and so the
suggestion that they could provide the mechanistic side of a demarcation of
theorising between psychology and ethology, is not tenable.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has been largely negative. I have argued, on the one hand,
that comparative psychology has not succeeded in absorbing the 'constraints
on learning' that became apparent in the 1960s; but that, at the same time,
ethology has no adequate conceptual framework to cope with behaviour that
responds flexibly to the environment. Although optimal foraging has a role to
play in helping us to understand behaviour, it does not, in and of itself,
constitute a theory of behaviour. This shows itself most acutely in the absence
of any viable theory of rules of thumb. At present rules of thumb in ethology
are simply pulled out of a hat.
What I feel is required, and what I shall argue for in the next chapter, is a
functionally transparent theory of rules of thumb. By 'functionally transparent' I
mean that it should be possible to see function through it. Although it will not
be a functional theory of behaviour (predictions about behaviour will not be
made from solely functional considerations), it will shed light on the
evolutionary function of behaviour. This will become clearer (I hope) once the









A NEW WAY FORWARD
The idea I want to explore in this chapter is not original. It has come
largely from the minds of two men; Donald Campbell- social psychologist, and
Sir Karl Popper- philosopher. The notions I will explore here may seem at first
to be at an altogether too general level to have anything to do with animal
behaviour. In the previous chapter I attempted to show that none of the extant
theories of flexible animal behaviour were fully satisfactory, and, in so doing, to
prepare the reader for the idea that a radical reassessment of basic principles
was in order. The latter half of this chapter will come back down to a more
directly applicable level of theorising.
3.1 Outline of Evolutionary Epistemology
Let us consider three basic questions. What do we mean by evolution?
What do we mean by learning? How are these two processes related? Consider
Campbell's answer:
Hypothesis: All knowledge gain is by Blind Variation and
Selective Retention (BV&SR).
Corollaries:
1. A BV&SR process is fundamental to all inductive achievements, to
all genuine increases in knowledge, to all increases in fit of system
to environment.
2. In such a process there are three essentials; (a) Mechanisms for
introducing variation; (b) Consistent selection processes; and (c)
Mechanisms for preserving and/ or propagating the selected variants.
3. The many processes which shortcut a more full BV&SR process are
in themselves inductive achievements, containing wisdom about the
environment achieved originally by BV&SR.
4. In addition, such shortcut processes contain in their own operation,
a BV&SR process at some level, substituting for overt locomotor
exploration or the life- and- death winnowing of organic selection.
from Campbell (1974)
Campbell's schema, then, is for a universal biology of knowledge. One
process. Blind Variation and Selective Retention, is not only responsible for
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individual learning, but for 'all increases in fit of a system to its environment',
in other words for evolution itself.
I will attempt to make this proposal clearer by exploring some of the
objections that may be raised to it. I will consider the following: How can
evolution be considered a learning process? (section 3.1.1). What entitles us to
call 'Blind Variation and Selective Retention' a knowledge gaining process?
(section 3.1.2). Can a psychological theory be built from a philosophical theory?
(section 3.1.3). Finally I consider; How can such a global schema have any
implications for individual learning? (section 3.2).
3.1.1 How can evolution be considered a learning process?
A remarkable parallel which I think has never been noticed,
obtains between the facts of social evolution on the one hand,
and of zoological evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the
other.
James 1979/1890: 163
William James appears to have been the first of a string of writers who
have noticed parallels between individual and/ or social learning, and the
primary process of "zoological evolution as propounded by Mr. Darwin".
Campbell (1974) cites 42 sources of this idea; some of the more recent
advocates include Pringle (1951); Russell (1962); Staddon (1975; 1983); Popper
(1972/1961; 1972/1965); Lorenz (1975/1941; 1977)/ Riedl (1984/1981); Vollmer
(1975); Wuketits (1986).
It seems fairest to follow James' account, since he has historical
precedence.
I shall try to make plain....that the features of our organic
mental structure cannot be explained at all by our conscious
intercourse with the outer environment, but must rather be
understood as accidental in the first instance ([James' footnote:]
'Accidental' in the Darwinian sense, as belonging to a cycle of
causation inaccessible to the present order of research), but then
transmitted as fixed features of the race.
James 1981/1890:1212 (p613 of earlier editions)
James makes these remarks in the context of a discussion over where our a
priori knowledge comes from. 'A priori' is the term used by the german
philosopher Kant for knowledge of the world that cannot be deduced from
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experience of the world. A priori knowledge was considered to cover such
things as the axioms of geometry and logical principles which appeared to be
true even though no experience could prove them so. James argued that
human knowledge of this kind had become fixed 'in the race' by the same
Darwinian process of blind variation and selective retention as any other
adaptation.
Fifty years later Konrad Lorenz considered the same question and came to a
very similar conclusion.
One familiar with the innate modes of ... reaction of subhuman
organisms can readily hypothesize that the a priori is due to
hereditary differentiations of the central nervous system which
have become characteristic of the species, producing hereditary
dispositions to think in certain forms. One must realize that this
conception of the a priori as an organ means the destruction of
the concept: something that has evolved in evolutionary
adaptation to the laws of the natural external world has evolved
a posteriori in a certain sense, even if in a way entirely different
from that of abstraction and of deduction from previous
experience. We believe we can demonstrate the closest
functional and probably genetic relationship between these
animal a prions and our human a priori.
Lorenz 1975/1941
Lorenz, I feel, weakens his argument by his insistence that the learning of the
species in evolution is 'entirely different' from the learning of individuals 'by
deduction from previous experience'. This demarcation stems from the need
he felt to distinguish clearly between the field of ethology and that of
comparative psychology (e.g. Lorenz 1971/1935 cited in Hailman 1985).
The reader may perhaps be surprised by the absence of scare quotes round
the word 'learning' in the previous paragraph, where I have spoken of 'species
learning'. The reason for this is that I accept Hull's (1982) argument that
species are not 'natural kinds' (a philosophical abstraction characterized as
eternal, immutable, discrete and important); but rather are better considered as
spatio-temporally localized individuals - historical entities which exist only in
one time and place (Hull 1982: 279ff). If the reader does not agree with this
view, and objects to the idea of an abstraction like the genome 'learning', he or
she may simply imagine scare quotes round the word 'learning' when it is
applied to species.
Plotkin & Odling-Smee (1979) formulate a distinction which is useful in this
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context. They talk of the 'order' possessed by an environment to which the
'organization' of an organism is an adaptation. To the extent that an
individual's organization matches elements of the order of the environment
that individual can be said to have knowledge of the environment. To the
extent that the process of evolution by natural selection consists of the
tracking of environmental order by biological organization, it can be considered
a knowledge gaining (learning) process.
Now that we have reconsidered evolution as a knowledge gaining process
this provides our first clue that evolutionary epistemology might help us to
integrate individual learning into the evolutionary synthesis.
3.1.2 What makes BV&SR a knowledge gaining process?
To those familiar only with learning within an associative paradigm, the
idea that 'Blind Variation and Selective Retention' could be called a learning
process may seem foreign. In the previous section we have noted that
evolution may be considered a knowledge gaining process; and of course it is
well known that evolution proceeds by the production of variants, from which
the survivors are selected. There are other theoretical reasons why we can
consider BV&SR to be a knowledge gaining process.
The philosopher Karl Popper set out in his classic 'Logic of Scientific
Discovery' (1980/1934) a novel principle for scientific progress.
According to my proposal, what characterizes the empirical
method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every
conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save
the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the
one which is by comparison the fittest by exposing them all to
the fiercest struggle for survival,...We choose the theory which
best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one
which by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive
Popper 1980/1934:108 my emphasis
Popper, at this time, was highly critical of evolutionary theory (see Popper
1972:241), and so the fact that he used an evolutionary analogy in his original
exposition of his theory of knowledge is all the more striking evidence for the
homology between inductive progress and evolution.
The critical components of a Popperian learning system can be summarized
in three points. Firstly the learner must generate the widest possible range of
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hypotheses concerning the nature of the problem under investigation.
Secondly these hypotheses must be subjected to the strongest possible
attempts at refutation (not confirmation). And thirdly, from those theories that
survive our sternest efforts at refutation a new range of hypotheses must be
generated, in the manner of the first stage- but this time informed by the
attempted refutations of the second phase. This process, clearly, is iterative
and can be repeated ad infinitum; each cycle producing slightly more complete
knowledge than the cycle before.
It is conventional to emphasize the 'refutational' aspect of Popper's theory
of knowledge, as opposed to the principle of 'confirmation' that had previously
been advocated in theories of scientific progress. There are two additional
points I wish to draw attention to.
Popper's development of an evolutionary epistemology out of his theory of
knowledge gain gives a certain legitimacy to the claim that BV&SR can be
considered as a learning process, but there are distinctions between Popperian
epistemology and evolutionary epistemology. It is important to draw attention
to these in order to be able to argue that the evidence that individual and
social learning in scientific communities and elsewhere does not process in a
Popperian manner, is not relevant to a discussion of the merits (or otherwise)
of evolutionary epistemology. The first of these is simply that Popper's theory
of scientific progress is a normative theory of how scientists should behave;
not a sociological description of how they actually act. In so far as they are
solving problems. Popper claims that his method is the only one they can be
using; but they may be doing this only a small proportion of the time, and
quite unconsciously. Evolutionary Epistemology, on the other hand, is held to
apply to evolving entities at all times- it is not a normative theory, but a
prescriptive theory of what is actually going on.
3.1.2.1 Learning From Mistakes
A second point, which I do not think has been previously emphasized
sufficiently, is that a Popperian epistemology requires a learner to 'learn from
its mistakes'. Although Popper's epistemology is often characterized by the
phrase 'conjectures and refutations', in the development of his evolutionary
epistemology the importance of refutation- or learning from one's mistakes-
has been diluted. I emphasize this point because Popper himself has
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advocated ari evolutionary epistemology very similar to Campbell's, in three
essays; 'Of Clouds and Clocks' (1972/1965'; 'Evolution and the Tree of
Knowledge (1972/1961); and 'Evolutionary Epistemology' (1983). Popper argues
that organisms are continuously involved in problem solving by trial and error.
Error elimination proceeds by killing off unsuccessful forms and so the living
organism is always at the spearhead of its phylum (accounting for the
'progressive' appearance of evolution). The pattern Popper envisages parallels
the three phases of induction outlined above. A problem is followed by a set
of tentative solutions (in the form of a variety of organisms); this is followed
by a phase of error elimination (selective death and failure to reproduce of
some organisms); and then a new problem presents itself; and so the cycle
continues. Popper integrates his evolutionary epistemology with his theory of
human knowledge with the thesis:
Our schema allows for the development of error-eliminating
controls (warning organs like the eye; feedback mechanisms);
that is, controls which can eliminate errors without killing the
organisms; and it makes it possible, ultimately, for our
hypotheses to die in our stead.
Popper 1972:244
But this does not allow the different between zoological and individual
learning- that individuals really can learn from their mistakes, whereas, as
Lorenz (1977/1973) points out, the genome learns from its successes. In order
to learn from one's mistakes it is necessary to keep some kind of record of
previous hypotheses that failed the test of refutation. The genome only keeps
copies of successful alleles, no record is kept of failures (except so far as they
become recessive- and then no record is kept of the fact that they were once
refuted). The genome can and does make the same 'errors' repeatedly. This
difference is not problematic for evolutionary epistemology; it is simply a point
on which it does not offer a prediction, and on which it differs from a truly
Popperian epistemological system.
3.1.3 Can a psychological theory be built from a philosophical one?
Although I have tried to show in the above two sections that changes have
had to be made to Popper's epistemology before it could be considered a
viable theory of biological knowledge (although these are largely
unacknowledged); the idea of tapping a philosophical theory as the basis of a
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biological theory may still seem strange. This has however, happened once
before, when learning theory in psychology was formed out of British empiricist
philosophy. A brief consideration of that history (drawn, almost entirely from
secondary sources) may firstly serve to legitimize the present exercise, and
secondly accentuate the inadequacies of associationism.
John Locke (1632 to 1704) and David Hume (1711 to 1776) are generally
considered to be the originators of associationism.
Locke maintained that knowledge consists of simple ideas
which are not analysable into other ideas and complex ideas
which are composed of simple ideas linked in temporal trains or
in synchronous complexes. In this proposition Locke asserted the
central tenet of associationism.
O'Neil 1968:26
Hume's view of the importance of the relation between cause and effect
has already been cited in chapter 2, section 2.1.1.
David Hartley's (1705 to 1757) role was also important.
Hartley, in his "Observations on Man" (1749) had worked out a
psychological theory - associationism - which depicted the
human mind and human knowledge as being built up by the
operation of a few psychological laws upon the materials
presented in sensation. Not at first creating any stir,
associationism was kept alive by a few, although ardent,
supporters until James Mill seized upon it and developed it in his
"Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind" (1829), which
his son was later (1869) to edit and annotate.
Passmore 1957
James Mill's (1773 to 1836) filling out of this plan begins to sound like
Watson's Behaviorism (1924).
With procrustean efficiency (James) Mill fitted all mental
phenomena to this frame. Language is the association of words
with ideas of objects; predication is the association of subject
and predicate; memory is the evocation, in accordance with
associations, of ideas of formerly sensed objects; and so on.
O'Neil 1968: 32
Boakes (1984), Thomson (1968), Flugel (1951) and O'Neil (1968) recount how
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this continuous philosophical tradition was absorbed into the fledgeling
empirical science of psychology. The Scots philosopher Alexander Bain (1818 to
1903) was a student of John Mill's, and adopted his associationism into a set of
strictly psychological principles. Herbert Spencer did something similar in his
'Principles of Psychology' (1855).
William James summarized these ideas in his "Principles of Psychology"
(1981/1890). James' position was a subtle one. As we have seen, for the
genesis of ideas he adopted what we may call an Evolutionary Epistemologicai
position and was scathing of the notion that ideas could be constructed by the
Spencer- Bain law (as the principles of associationism were known).
Mr Spencer's opinion that our consciousness of classificatory,
logical, and mathematical relations between ideas is due to the
frequency with which the corresponding 'outer relations' have
impressed our minds, is unintelligible.
James 1981/1890:1268
However, he was perfectly happy to consider habits to be learnt in this
way. His reformulation of the 'Spencer- Bain' law into a physiological language
was the key to applying these ideas to other species than mankind.
When two elementary brain-processes have been active
together or in immediate succession, one of them, on
re-occurring, tends to propagate its excitement into the other....
The amount of activity at any given point in the brain cortex is
the sum of the tendencies of all other points to discharge into it,
such tendencies being proportionate (1) to the number of times
the excitement of each other point may have accompanied that
of the point in question; (2) to the intensity of such excitements;
(3) to the absence of any rival point functionally disconnected
with the first point, into which the discharges might be diverted.
James 1961/1896: 123-4.
A large part of what made Associationism useful to early psychologists was
that it could be considered to work at many different levels. James made a
move away from mentalistic structures by referring to "Brain-Processes", even
though he talked of them in much the same way as James Mill had talked of
ideas. The influence of the purely speculative theory of associationism on
Thorndike is very clear in the introduction to his original puzzle box paper:
"Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in
Animals"
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The importance to comparative psychology in general of a
more scientific account of the associative process is
evident....The main purpose of the study of the animal mind is to
learn the development of mental life down through the phylum,
to trace in particular the origin of human faculty. In relation to
this chief purpose of comparative psychology the associative
powers acquire a role predominant over that of sense powers or
instinct, for in the study of associative powers lies the solution
of the problem...the cognitive side of consciousness has changed
not only in quantity but also in quality...The association of ideas
proper, imagination, memory, abstraction, generalization,
judgement, inference, have here their source...For the origin and
development of human faculty we must look to these processes
of association in lower animals.
Thorndike 1967/1898
Thorndike summarized his work in the famous "Law of Effect", which can be
seen as the foundation stone as behaviourism. Although he claimed that this
was a generalization from empirical evidence, Boakes (1984) points out that
many of the experiments for such a generalization were not to be done for
many years after Thorndike's work; but that his law is a clear repetition of the
associative laws of Spencer, Bain and James, whose pedigree goes back to
Locke and Hume.
3.2 Evolutionary Epistemology and individual learning
We have now a theory of sorts. But does it mean anything? Can anything
be predicted from such a vague and general principle? Let us go over the main
points of evolutionary epistemology once more, and then consider these
questions.
3.2.1 Recapitulation of Principles of Evolutionary Epistemology
Although evolutionary epistemology is encapsulated in just one principle -
that all knowledge gain is by a process of BV81SR- it is easier conceptualized
as three principles.
Firstly, that evolution is itself a learning process.
Secondly, that ail learning processes operate by initially proposing a set of
variants, from which survivors, representing the best fit with environment, are
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selected.
Thirdly, therefore, that evolution in its dealings with the environment
through BV&SR is learning in exactly the same sense as an individual learns,
and that the individual's knowledge and ability to learn have not only evolved
in primary zoological evolution, but also operate in the same manner as
zoological evolution.
This third point is clearly critical to understanding individual learning within
an evolutionary epistemology framework.
3.2.2 Levels of knowledge gain
The question of levels of knowledge gain is important, but I will not go
into much detail here because the question has already been thoroughly
discussed by Plotkin & Odling-Smee (1979; 1981a; 1981b). They argue that
individual learning evolved as an information gaining 'sub-routine', out of the
action of BV8tSR at the primary level of the genome. This in itself is not novel
(e.g Tinbergen 1951). What is original is that, within an E.E framework,
emphasizing the organism's need to match its organization to environmental
order, they are able to identify, in broad terms, the form of environmental
changes that would require the evolution of such subroutines. Such
environmental changes are "predictably unpredictable ... changes that are
pegged within certain limits, but within these limits can vary randomly" (Plotkin
& Odling-Smee 1979:31). Plotkin & Odling-Smee (1981a 8< b) go on to
investigate the different levels at which the learning process operates. They
consider three different sources of variants which form four levels of
knowledge gain (called 'referents'); the genetic source; the phenotypic source
as it proposes variants that are selected through variable epigenesis; the
nervous system as it proposes behavioural and cognitive variants selected
through individual learning; and the nervous system as it interacts at the
cultural level. I am not sure that a listing like this is, or could be, exhaustive.
The source of variation and selection for the learning of fine temporal control
of movement would seem to be the cerebellum (Eccles 1977; which, by the
way, is itself a theory of learning by selection). It may prove to be the case
that every individual instance of learning has a unique source of variants (or
unique combination of sources), and that a simple schema with a small number
of levels may be untenable. The important lesson from Plotkin 8i
Odling-Smee's plan is the manner in which the higher levels (be they many or
just a few) stand on the shoulders, so to speak, of the more basic levels. The
pattern of individual behaviour we expect from evolutionary epistemoiogy is
not a clear demarcation between instinct on the one hand, and associative
learning on the other, but a continuum of degrees of flexibility of variation and
selection. At the simplest level, an organism may produce a single, inflexible
response to a problem situation. The only source of variation here is the
genetic variation between individuals; and the only selection that of natural
selection. A second case covers an organism possessing a small restricted set
of responses to a situation, from which the most effective is selected by
feedback sensors within the organism. This could cover imprinting where
following a variety of objects rapidly reduces to following one- and, as we will
see below- bird song learning. At the most flexible extreme are organisms
whose set of variants is very wide, and whose selection mechanisms are
elaborate and keep track of past errors to inform future production of variants.
We like to think of ourselves in the way, solving problems by hypothesizing a
potentially unlimited set of variants form which we select the correct one by
an elaborate empirical testing process. This is also the behaviourists'
conception of the organism, able to associate any action with any
consequence. Of course no organism actually works this way. BV&SR at
higher levels is always constrained by more basic levels. We can't hypothesize
'anything' because, as James said 'features of our organic mental
structure...[are] transmitted as fixed features of the race' (1981/1890:1212).
3.2.3 Variation & Selection as an empirical program
An empirical program is not just a set of predictions, it is also a way of
viewing the world. The theory that all knowledge gain is by BV8tSR may be
wrong (to be self-consistent, it must acknowledge itself to be at most a step
on the road to truth); it might be (though I don't think it is) tautological; but
even if it were both these things I think it would still be a very useful way of
viewing behaviour, because it emphasizes some interesting aspects of the way
that organisms interact with their environment through behaviour, that extant
theories, both psychological and ethological, have overlooked. Let us consider
briefly the questions that an analysis of behaviour prompted by the
evolutionary epistemoiogy paradigm would have to address.
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3.2.3.1 Questions of Variation and Selection
1. What is the nature of the variants here? Are they variants of simple action
(form of movement, muscle groups utilised, temporal patterning of
movement etc, etc); of object oriented towards (e.g in imprinting, early
phase of shaping of operant behaviour etc, etc); hypothesis of cause (e.g in
classical conditioning); hypothesis of effect (e.g in operant conditioning)?
2. What is the source of the variants? Are they genetic; morphological; or
from the central nervous system? (or a combination?)
3. How are the variants generated? This will be related to the previous
question, but in cases where the variants are produced by a nervous
system, this question will direct research to the effects of prior experience
on the production of new variants.
4. What is the locus of selection? Natural selection; cognitive selection;
developmental selection?
5. What is the nature of the selection process? Does the selection mechanism
keep any records; are failures recorded; is the context of the failure
recorded? How does the feedback influence the next stage of variation?
This last point is the one where the most striking differences are to be
expected. As Lorenz (1977:24) points out, primary genetic learning differs from
(some) individual learning because the genome only learns from its 'success'.
In so far as a learning system keeps a record of its errors it will be able to
learn faster, and cope better with new information. A BV&SR model becomes
similar to an associative model if a learner keeps a record of each variant
paired with the consequence of its use. Associationism, then, is a limiting case
of BV&SR, but evolutionary epistemology recognizes a wider range of ways of
proceeding, and does not for a moment suggest that associationism is a
general process. All a learner might associate are variants and the effect of
selection on them, selection mechanisms could employ other forms of 'record
keeping' than association, and much may be learnt without any record keeping
at all.
n
Mike Harris (in preparation) has developed a computer simulation that can
learn the relative ordering of a set of items presented two at a time. On any
trial one item only is rewarded, such that a consistent pattern of which item is
better than which others may be deduced. Initially the model possess no
hypotheses, and it chooses items simply by guessing. Harris' simulation learns
the series by initially guessing which item to take. From the results of a guess
it generates a hypothesis about the item taken, of the form 'take x', or 'avoid x',
depending on whether taking the item was rewarded or not. Hypotheses
become ordered in a stack so that the first successful hypothesis gets tested
first on each trial, the second hypothesis to be generated is tested in second
place, and so on. The learner searches the stack from the top and applies the
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first rule that relates to one of the items presented on the trial. If no rule
applies it guesses as it did when it had no rules in the stack. If a rule fails, the
newest rule to have been added in the bottom of the stack gets thrown out,
and a new rule relating to the object just taken, gets added onto the bottom of
the stack. Such a model keeps no record of its failures. If a rule is always
incorrect it will sooner or later fall off the bottom of the stack, but this in no
way stops it reappearing again if other rules fail. The variants here are of the
form of hypotheses as to whether to take or leave objects. Their source is the
computer's 'central nervous system'. This is also their- sight of storage. The
generation rule for variants is that they are deduced from the consequence of
taking an time (if x is rewarded then generate rule 'take x'; if x is not rewarded
then generate rule 'avoid x'). The selection rule for variants is 'If rule fails
jettison last rule from bottom of stack'.
The point I want to draw from this model is that the form of learning it
achieves is considered quite complex (transitive inference learning, as it is
known, is considered unique to primates). Nevertheless Harris' model learns the
ordering of items implied by the repeated pair wise comparisons, by a simple
variation and selection rule, without having recourse to associations at any
stage.
3.2.3.2 Belongingness and Prepardness
With respect to associationism two points should now be clear. Firstly
association is not necessary for learning. Although we may notice organisms
learning 'associations' (that is to say, relations between causes and effects),
this may often proceed without the need for association on the part of the
subject. Secondly association, where it does occur, will be just one of a
number of ways that a learner could log the fates of its variants, and will
always necessarily be constrained by the set of variants generated. Since the
set of variants produced in response to a problem situation will itself be a
product of BV&SR in the past, qualities of 'belongingness' and differential
'prepardness' to associate certain causes and consequences are inevitable. We
can predict that an organism can only learn the relationship between a cue and
its consequence (classical conditioning) if the cue enters the set of cues the
subject 'hypothesizes' as the cause of the event. The set of causes a subject
will hypothesize for an event will be those cues that have in the past (including
evolutionary past), been good predictors of events of the type under
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consideration (where the event has a significance in the subjects natural
habitat for its inclusive fitness). For a very flexible organism with an advanced
nervous system those qualities of cue that make it a good predictor may be
solely formal ones (qualities leading to Bayesian inference; Staddon 1986). For
an organism adapted to a less varied environment the set of suitable cues may
be much more restricted. This prediction is open to empirical test.
In an operant learning context we can predict that an organism will learn to
link its behaviour with consequence if that consequence is a member of the set
of consequences that such behaviour could have generated in evolutionary
history in the natural habitat. Again, if the organism has a very flexible nervous
system the set of consequences for any one behaviour may be very large. A
comparison of organisms from different habitats would be predicted to find
that only those possessing flexibility of response in the natural ecosystem
would be able to form wide ranging associations in the operant laboratory. A
proviso has to be made here to acknowledge that some organisms may have
redundant flexibly of responsiveness. I am not arguing here that a subject
would never learn to associate production of food (say), with a behaviour not
normally related to food acquisition in its natural environment. Again, as for
classical conditioning, the temporal relationship of an action and environmental
effect may be enough of a cue to ensure the relationship is learned.
3.2.3.3 Ecological Studies
BV8<SR provides a focus for interrelating psychological studies with field
work. As mentioned above, predictions from evolutionary epistemology depend
on the behaviour observed in the natural environment. If a subject needs to
recognize a variety of cues for a certain consequence in its daily life, then we
expect it to demonstrate that in laboratory conditions. To that extent
evolutionary epistemology coincides with the ecological approach to animal
behaviour. The BV&SR approach to behaviour does not suggest, however, that
atheoretical observation of organisms in their natural habitats will ever lead to
a science of behaviour. It would be internally inconsistent if it did.
3.2.3.4 Definition of learning
An intentional oversight in the above account has been an avoidance of
defining learning. Revusky (1985) has reviewed the problems that attach to
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customary definitions of this process. I propose that BV&SR, as an all
encompassing description of learning, be used as a definition. Such a
definition would exclude the passive modifications with experience that are
difficult to leave out with other definitions. It would bring in evolution as a
learning process, and also other knowledge gaining processes, like the immune
system, that are typically left out.
3.2.4 Theories of Variation and Selection
Rather than attempt here to develop a complete theory covering ail extant
instances of learning within a framework of BV&SR, I will briefly discuss the
theoretical positions of a number of authors who show a strong affinity with
BV&SR.
3.2.4.1 Krechevsky
Over fifty years ago Krechevsky (1932; 1967/1932) noticed that rats in
discrimination maze learning tasks seemed to possess 'hypotheses' about the
nature of the correct solution to the problem, and work through these until
they found the right one. The task they were set involved walking along a
maze alleyway which was punctuated by a number of choice points at which
the rat could attempt to go left or right. Of the two alternative alleyways
confronting the subject, one was a cul-de-sac, and the other, identified by a
hurdle, was the through route onto the next choice point, and ultimately the
goal box. Krechevsky found that many rats (36 out of 40) made repeated
attempts at what appeared to be incorrect, but feasible, solutions to the task.
A typical such 'hypothesis' was consistently taking the right fork at each choice
point. Krechevsky (1967/1932) concluded that "the tendency to build up a
systematic series of responses during the so-called period of chance is
characteristic of most of the rats studied in this experiment".
Krechevsky attempted to incorporate his results into Tolman's schema of
'means-end readiness' (Tolman & Krechevsky 1933). Levine (1967/1959) later
incorporated Krechevsky's ideas into Harlow's learning-set theory. Unfortunately
nobody thought to consider these experiments as paradigmatic in their own
right. Krechevsky's observation, of a set of hypotheses getting selected down
to one successful strategy, is exactly the kind of experiment evolutionary
epistemology would treat as a paradigmatic case of learning.
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3.2.4.2 Staddon
Staddon (1975) has noted that when first placed in a Skinner box, and
particularly after first delivery of reward therein, a subject's behaviour will be
highly variable. This post-reinforcement variability remains even when the
subject is highly experienced in the experimental chamber. Activities closer in
time to the reward (assuming reward delivery is temporally regular), become
much more stereotyped. Staddon argues that a biologically meaningful stimulus
creates a range of behaviours. Increasing experience of the environment
causes the subject to select from amongst its behaviours those that most
efficiently fulfil the response contingency laid down by the experimenter. This
selection of behaviours includes not just what to do, but also when to do it. In
this way, at times when food is likely, relevant behaviours are concentrated, but
when food is unlikely a greater variety of behaviours are engaged in to keep
the animal responsive to its environment.
3.2.4.3 Angermeier
A model possessing many points of contact with Staddon's (1975), has
been developed by Angermeier (1984). Angermeier considers the simplest
operant experiment, where a subject learns to operate a manipulandum to gain
a reward. Angermeier and his co-workers studied a number of species and
noted the wide range of behaviours initially displayed, and the process of
selection of the relevant, rewarded, behaviour from the initially variable set of
possibilities. A parametric model, capable of accounting for the rate of decay
of irrelevant behaviour, was developed.
3.2.4.4 Marler
A source of optimism for evolutionary epistemology is that, as well as
being able to account for associative learning, the theoretical account put
forward by Marler (1984) for bird song learning, is also compatible with BV8tSR.
Marler envisages an interaction between auditory templates and the auditory
input to a juvenile song bird. As I understand it, these innate templates guide
the selective attention and selective memorization of the auditory input by the
bird. This selective learning guides the shape of the bird's own song.
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3.2.4.5 Physiology and Anatomy
I am getting even deeper out of my depth here, but I am excited to find
that a number of authors in the neurosciences have emphasized the selective
nature of learning and memory mechanisms. These include Young (1976; 1979),
Changeux, Heidmann & Patte (1984) and Mountcastle & Edelman (1978). These
models ail share the property that it is selection, from the myriads of possible
interconnections between neurons, that constitutes learning. Variation does not
seem to be mentioned explicitly, but is implicit in the multitude of possible
connections potentially existing in a nervous system. Mountcastle 8i Edelman's
notion of 'microcolumns' of neurons may well fulfil the requirement of
'reverberatory circuits of neurons' that Pringle (1951) postulated would generate
variation and selection in behaviour.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter and the preceding one I have tried to set the ground for,
and very briefly outline, a theory which I believe has the potential to be a
complete theory of animal behaviour. This exposition has been blatantly
incomplete, and further, the experiments that follow were much to slow for
analysis of variation and selection of behaviour to be a reasonable proposition.












METHOD AND MOLAR RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
This experiment has three aims. Firstly I test the predictions of a
particularly rigorous optimal foraging model (Houston & McNamara 1981).
Secondly I hoped that it might prove possible to develop a conceptually simple
two patch foraging environment which would lend itself readily to being
employed by a variety of species and subjects at different developmental
phases. In addition to providing opportunities for future ontogenetic and
phylogenetic research it was considered important that the paradigm should
possess as much external validity as could be made compatible with
computerized control and consequent detailed event recording.
The first reports of the use of continuous choice procedures in operant
chambers (concurrent scheduling) appeared in the late 1950s (Ferster & Skinner
1957; Findley 1958). Although it is not easy to claim that this form of
experiment is an obvious analogue to any form of foraging normally performed
by columbine birds, it would be short-sighted to ignore the evolution of the
operant chamber as experimental environment that had occurred since, at least,
Skinner (1938). A standard dual key experiment will be discussed in chapters 6
to 9; the present experiment utilised a floor panel that could rest in two
positions to collect reinforcements that had been set up by two independent
variable interval schedules.
A variety of simple experimental set ups have been developed in ethology
in the last decade, mainly to test the predictions of optimal foraging theory -
though 'rules of thumb' that could be governing the observed behaviour have
also been considered. Interestingly many of these have given subjects choices
between sources of food which payed out with different probabilities; this form
of choice paradigm had a period of popularity in psychology, but has largely
fallen from favour in the last ten years (see e.g. Bitterman 1965; Warren 1974;
Mackintosh 1974 for reviews; and Couvillon & Bitterman 1985 for a recent
study).
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Some ethological studies have, as one would expect, possessed greater
face validity as foraging environments for bird subjects than the little boxes
used by psychologists. Krebs & McCleery (1984) and Kamil and Roitblat (1985)
are recent reviews of this field.
Krebs, Ryan & Charnov (1974) initiated the use, in an aviary, of a number of
small 'trees' (made of wood), each containing 'pine cones' (small blocks of
wood drilled with holes), filled with either a small (1) or high (3) number of
meal worms. Chickadees (Parus atricapillus) were used individually in this
apparatus to test Gibb's (1962) hunting by expectation hypothesis, and the
predictions of the marginal value theorem of optimal foraging (Krebs et al 1974;
and see Charnov 1976). Hunting by expectation predicted that because there
were many more 1-prey than 3-prey patches, the predators would develop the
expectation of finding only 1 prey item in each patch, and therefore would not
bother to look for and remove the other two meal worms in the richer 'pine
cones'. From the marginal value theorem it was predicted that the predator
should leave a patch when its rate of food intake from this patch fell below the
average level for the environment as a whole. Since all prey were of similar
handling time this led to the prediction that there should be a constant giving
-up time for each patch. Contrary to Gibb's hypothesis, but broadly in line with
the marginal value theorem, the Chickadees' time spent in searching each patch
was independent of the number of prey in any particular patch, but was
constant for all patch types within an environment, and inversely related to the
average capture rate for the environment.
A similar set up was subsequently used by Cowie (1977) on Great Tits
(Parus majot) to test optimal foraging with different 'travel times' (simulated by
putting lids on the 'pine cones'). It was predicted that with longer travel times
the subjects would spend longer in each patch so that the patch was still
depleted to the average rate available within the environment as a whole.
Increasing the 'travel times' effectively reduces the average rate of prey intake
available in the environment. Cowie found that when the 'travel time'
requirements were longer, the subjects spent longer in each patch as predicted,
but that he could only get a good quantitative fit to his data by adding in the
relative metabolic costs of flying and feeding as post hoc parameters to the
model.
Zach & Falls (1976) found results that contradict Krebs et al (1977) and
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Cowie (1977). In their study oven birds (Aves: Paralidadi foraged over a patch
containing many holes, some of which hid freeze-killed flies. No evidence was
found for hunting by expectation, but neither was there any sign that giving up
time depended on overall prey density, as would be predicted from the
marginal value theorem.
Other studies have used simpler two choice environments more akin to
typical operant studies. Krebs, Erichson, Webber & Charnov (1977) presented
Great Tits with prey of two different values passing by them on a conveyor
belt. With this arrangement it was possible to alter the encounter rate with
each prey type and compare the subjects' choice with optimality predictions.
Krebs et al (1977) found that choice of prey depended on the encounter rate
with large prey as predicted by optimal foraging, but that the change from a
mixed distribution to an all or none pattern of choice was not a step function
of encounter rate as had been predicted.
A paradigm intermediate between using the Krebs et al (1977) conveyor belt
and the use of 'trees' in an aviary is the employment of two food hoppers in an
aviary (Krebs, Kacelnik & Taylor 1978; Kacelnik 1979; Kacelnik & Krebs 1985;
Kacelnik, Krebs 8i Ens 1986 in press). This has been used as a probability
choice experiment to test optimality predictions and to investigate the balance
between sampling of an environment and exploitation thereof. This paradigm is
discussed in chapter 8; section 8.3.
Larkin (1981) tested Barbary Doves (Streptopelia risorid\ in a variety of
choice experiments, one of which was very similar to the experiment described
in chapter 6. Larkin's birds foraged on two depleting schedules in a Skinner
box. The longer that was spent responding to a schedule the less it paid out.
When a bird returned to a schedule after a period of time on the other one, the
newly chosen alternative would reset to its highest rate of reinforcement.
Larkin found that when the travel time requirement (imposed by a partition in
the chamber) was large, the birds spent less time in each visit to each patch
than was optimal; and when the travel time was short, the birds spent a longer
than optimal time in each patch. These results were found for both food and
water reinforcement.
An entirely different approach to testing accounts of foraging in the
laboratory, has been adopted by those researchers who believe that Skinner
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box scheduling is substantially comparable to 'real world' foraging. On this
assumption elaborate multiple concurrent schedules of reinforcement have
been constructed, containing a number of phases, each with its own
completion requirement and named after some component of natural foraging.
The first experiment of this type was performed by Lea (1979). A pigeon
(Columba livi£\ in a Skinner box was confronted with two keys. Initially only
one of them was illuminated (white), but after completion of a fixed interval (Fl)
requirement on this key (named 'search phase') the other key would come on.
The probability was /?that this key would be red, 1-/7 that it was green. During
the next phase, cailed the choice state, the original white key was still
illuminated, but the new, coloured key was also lit. The subject had to choose
whether to peck either the white key and return to the search phase again, or
respond to the coloured key and proceed to the 'handling' state. The handling
phase was another Fl schedule, which differed in magnitude depending on the
colour of key light that had preceded it. At the end of the handling phase a
reward phase was instituted during which the subjects had access to grain.
This type of procedure enables the systematic variation of each particular
component of the foraging cycle. By varying the duration of the Fl search
requirement, with varying proportions of good (short handling requirement) and
less good (long handling requirement) prey, Lea (1979) was able to show
qualitative agreement with the marginal value theorem. Choice of prey types
depended on the density of better prey only. Following Krebs et al (1977),
however this change in preference for' prey requiring a longer handling time,
was not found to be a step function.
This procedure has been modified and extended by Abarca and Fantino
(1982). In the handling phase they replaced Lea's FIs with variable interval (VI)
schedules, and following Lea (1979), varied the length of the Fl requirement in
the search state. Their results paralleled Lea's (1979). Fantino & Abarca (1985)
review the results of a variety of modifications of Lea's (1979) procedure
performed in Fantino's laboratory. These include the effects of changes in
search and handling times and different reward quantities (Ito 8i Fantino 1983
cited in Fantino 8t Abarca 1985), and comparing performance of subjects
maintained on closed and open economies (Fantino & Abarca 1985).
Lea's (1979) concurrent chains procedure has also served as the basis for
research by Collier (1983; Collier & Rovee-Collier 1981), who used ratio instead
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of interval schedules for the various components. Peden & Rohe (1984) did
likewise, having first recorded the baseline levels of responding and eating in
their subjects, to test whether they minimized number of pecks per food
delivery and maintained their baseline intake of food. Although baselines of
eating were maintained during the experiment, this was not done with a
minimum expenditure of effort.
The major problem with studies of this type, concerns the meaningfulness
of assigning names, taken from the foraging literature, to components of
schedules operating on two keys in a Skinner box. Shettieworth (1985a) asks
whether "signalled delays to reinforcement are psychologically equivalent to
handling times, and thus whether performance in a situation where handling
times are simulated by signalled delays differs in any important way from
choice among real items requiring real handling (husking, killing, chewing, etc)."
This problem seems to have been largely overlooked by the advocates of these
schedules. The simplest and most common form of discontinuity built into a
typical concurrent schedule experiment is the changeover delay (COD). This is
usually referred to as a 'time out', because nothing is programmed to occur
during it. There is plenty of evidence, however, that although we may call this
phase a 'time out', subjects certainly do not take 'time out' from responding
during it. In fact reports that have studied responding during COD in detail,
have found higher rates during COD than when the schedules are operative
(Silberberg 8* Fantino 1970; Pliskoff 1971; Scoun 1983). If this is true of a
relatively simple schedule manipulation, what grounds are there to accept that
these more elaborate structurings of the options confronting a subject are
perceived by it in the manner the experimenter intends? In other words, the
fact that we as experimenters recognize a formal equivalence between, for
example, a delay before reinforcement presentation, and the time a bird spends
handling a food item before eating it in the wild, does not imply that a
functional equivalence exists between the two states, nor therefore that the
responses they produce from a hungry subject will be equivalent.
For present purposes recourse to solely formal equivalences between the
world outside the laboratory and the experiment will be avoided, so far as
possible, subject to the aims already stated above. No changeover delay, for
example, is here programmed.
The experimental chamber to be described here is similar to that used by
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Baum & Rachlin (1969). The floor of that chamber was roughly twice as long as
it was deep, such that a pivot point across the middle split it into two
equally-sized segments that would tip (,5cm) when the subject stood on them.
At each end of the chamber were hoppers that were controlled by two
independent VI schedules that ran continuously, but would only pay out when
the subject depressed the respective side of the chamber (concurrent variable
interval; VI:VI). The major difference between Baum and Rachlin's (1969) design
and the present experiment is that here a single, centrally placed food hopper
is employed. In this respect it is more akin to Wheatley & Engberg (1978). They
used a similar treadle manipulandum which could be moved around in the
chamber by the experimenter so that two treadles could be presented, or one
treadle and one key. Results from both Baum & Rachlin's and Wheatley &
Engberg's studies, however, were only assessed in terms of the ratios of time
spent on each option compared to the ratios of reinforcements from each
option. Both sets of results confirmed to the prediction of Herrnstein's
matching law (Herrnstein 1961; 1974; Baum 1974) in that these ratios were
approximately equal. Matching is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
Shettleworth (1985b) utilised a shuttlebox very similar to that of Baum 81
Rachlin (1969) to test pigeon's choice between a few large food items and
many small items of the same total weight (and nutritional value). Initially
concurrent VI schedules were used, as will be here; in a subsequent experiment
Shettieworth employed variable ratio (VR) schedules. In both cases she found
that the birds preferred many small items over a few large ones, even when
schedules were programmed such that choosing the items with the longer
handling time (literally- many small items) substantially reduced the rate of
food intake.
A matching analysis will be presented below, solely to verify the
compatibility of these data with previous studies. My real interest lies in the
opportunity to test a rigorous optimality model which makes very clear
quantitative (rather than just qualitative) predictions (Houston 8t McNamara
1981). I had intended to also investigate the 'rules of thumb' that the subject
might be using, but from the results of the optimality analysis it will become
clear that such an analysis would be rather pointless. The experiment
described in chapters 6 to 9, though more of a traditional psychological
paradigm, and less amenable to optimality analysis, in fact offers better




Six Barbary Doves (Streptope/ia risorid) from the departmental colony
started the experiment. They were all over 18 months old, were caged singly
with water and grit continuously available; lights were kept on 14 hours a day.
Prior to the experiment they were maintained on a diet of 50% wheat, 25%
millet and 25% cut maize, and the same mixture of grains served as
reinforcement and additional feeding where needed after testing to maintain
their weights at 90% +/- 5% of free feeding levels. All had been hopper trained
9 months previously. Two (Birds 88 and 96) had some experience of concurrent
key peck interval schedules in a Skinner box (as described in chapter 6) but had
been removed after they developed a manner of using the food hopper that led
to them damaging their wings.
4.2.2 Aooaratus
Figure 4.2 (p58)
shows the experimental chamber. It was a locally constructed box made of a steel
tubular frame with a chipboard base and ceiling, and sides of wire mesh
covered by paper. The floor was 35 cm square, and the roof was 60 cm above
the floor. The floor itself was raised 8 cm above the base to accommodate the
pivot and microswitches. The 5 cm square hopper opening was situated 9cm
above the floor in the centre of the back wall (i.e. above the pivot point). A
mass of 140g (the mean 90% free feeding weight of the birds in this
experiment), at a distance of 10 cm from the pivot point was sufficient to
depress the floor panel the 2 cm required to activate the microswitch. All panel
and hopper movements were recorded, to the nearest .Olsec, by a Acorn BBC
Model B micro-computer, for subsequent transfer to the university's ICL 2988
computer for analysis. Illumination of the experimental chamber was provided
partially by the lighting in the laboratory and also by four 24V bulbs within the
chamber itself. A white light in the centre of the ceiling was illuminated at all
times; a red light came on in the left centre of the ceiling when the left side of
the floor panel was depressed; and likewise a red light illuminated when the
right side of the floor panel was depressed. During reinforcement the hopper
opening was lit by a white bulb. White noise to mask extraneous sounds was
broadcast around the experimental chambers during the experiment.
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4.2.3 Procedure
Without additional pre-training subjects were entered onto the first
condition of a concurrent variable interval schedule. Timers for each side of the
panel ran independently of each other, and of the bird's position throughout the
experiment, but reinforcement could only be collected from a schedule when
the side of the floor panel associated with the schedule was depressed. The
schedules were designed such that the minimum interval between
reinforcements followed a negative exponential distribution. A set of 1000
intervals was constructed according to the approximation of Flescher &
Hoffman (1962). After reinforcement, an interval was selected at random from
this set, and the next reinforcement to the same side was then delivered once
this interval had timed out, and the respective side of the floor panel was
depressed. No COD was programmed, the only delay in changing over was the
time required by the subject to swing the floor panel across from one
microswitch to the other. Reinforcement was 3.5sec access to mixed grain.
Sessions of approximately 45 min each were run six days a week,
approximately 90 mins after lights on. (Programming problems made it difficult
to ensure the duration was always exactly as intended). Supplementary feeding,
if necessary, was given immediately after the experiment. Each subject was
run 6 days a week until a stability criterion was fulfilled. A new criterion was
used in this experiment to overcome three problems.
Firstly that a criterion should stipulate a condition for consecutive days of
testing (Davison 1972, for example, does not) - it is not clear in what sense a
criterion can be considered to be testing stability of choice if this condition is
not fulfilled. Secondly the response ratios were logged (to base 10) to
normalise them. Ratios were used because it is from them that the matching
equation is calculated. Thirdly, spectral analysis of early results suggested a
weekly cycling, so the criterion was calculated on 6 day groups to control for
this weekly effect. The criterion was that the coefficient of variation (mean/
standard deviation) of the logged (base 10) response ratios should exceed 5 (or
in cases where the log mean was small, that the s.d. be less than .10) on six
consecutive occasions. The value of 5 was chosen after analysing some early
data to maintain comparability with other methods of calculating stability (e.g.
Davison 1972)
Bird 88 was removed after 20 sessions when it damaged its wing. Birds
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105 and 269 were removed from the experiment after failing to fulfil the
stability criterion after 48 and 46 sessions respectively. Three conditions were
run, concurrent VI 120s: 120s; VI 240s: 30s; VI 60s: 180s (in the rest of the
thesis the 's' for seconds will be omitted when identifying schedule values.
Conditions and numbers of sessions for the three remaining subjects (Birds 92,
96 and 120) are shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Conditions and numbers of
session for floor panel experiment
Subiect Condition- VI:VI 120:120 240:30 60:180
92 26 16 28
96 24 32 33
120 29 16 14
4.3 Results
Table 4.2 shows in seconds the length of time each side of the panel was
depressed (Tn, n=1..2); the number of times each side of the panel was
depressed (Nn); the time spent without either side of the panel depressed (CO
time- X); and the number of reinforcements from each side, for the last five
sessions of each condition. In cases where the actual duration of the
experiment differed by more than 5s from that intended (2700s), the actual
session duration is given in brackets.
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Table 4.2: Number and duration of visits to each side of floor panel
Subject Condition Ti NjL 12 N2 X Rf 1 Rf 7
92 .120:120 109 222 554 597 1920 7 22
(duration) 76 246 425 519 2083 12 17
68 248 418 465 2096 13 16
33 240 533 455 2017 14 15
30 182 .276 387 2278 11 18
92 240:30 20 217 810 655 1638 8 50
44 200 804 702 1615 1 58
12 118 816 550 1651 4 51
22 168 756 676 1754 5 57
3 105 557 537 1936 6 50
92 60:180 268 386 612 210 1704 24 5
54 567 186 224 2308 33 5
33 395 168 170 2347 32 6
171 613 277 247 2086 36 5
135 346 406 201 1999 35 5
96 120:120 27 97 741 334 1816 15 14
66 97 805 228 1760 7 20
15 174 716 343 1813 18 21
13 85 273 159 2306 11 16
62 113 860 273 1661 11 18
96 240:30 142 141 1199 322 1119 2 58
92 138 921 262 1499 1 46
45 112 967 286 1348 10 75
45 112 950 272 1509 5 44
7 42 616 128 1933 5 31
96 60:180 708 416 99 164 1777 25 4
(3325) 695 492 108 196 2406 25 4
701 583 62 189 1769 32 10
(3291) 1009 624 113 209 1997 39 4
555 278 15 79 2014 21 8
120(2514)120:120 535 864 638 747 1185 18 21
(2421) 495 850 591 760 1175 19 21
554 872 548 722 1434 21 20
590 855 648 584 1350 11 17
460 779 536 365 1560 20 16
120 240:30 33 256 729 698 1638 10 66
37 249 662 679 1650 11 78
76 282 745 730 1575 6 70
134 522 674 809 1588 4 72
72 576 652 982 1624 11 77
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Table 4.2: continued
Subiect Condition h Ni 12 N2 X Ml Rf 7
120(1973)60:180 365 911 306 695 1126 33 11
(2236) 495 870 440 741 1145 30 9
(1757) 364 831 387 799 926 13 7
(1842) 258 785 415 828 1021 30 7
(1907) 386 868 446 759 983 21 2
Figure 4.1 shows the log ratio of time spent on each side of the chamber,
against the log ratio of reinforcements obtained from each side of the chamber.
Table 4.3 shows the parameters of the best fitting (matching) lines to these
data. (These are slightly non-standard in format, because each of the last five
sessions is treated independently, compared to the normal practice of
averaging over sessions before plotting).
Table 4.3:














96 -.212 1.021 < .2% .574
120 -.295 .606 < .1% .655
Group -.485 .746 < .1% ..484
Matching is discussed in chapter 6; for now I note the following points. With
the possible exception of subject 96 these values of the bias (b) and sensitivity
(c) parameters (Baum 1974), are within the range to be expected in concurrent
operant experiments (see Baum 1979; Wearden & Burgess 1982; Taylor &
Davison 1983 for empirical reviews). If there is any departure here from
standard linear matching, this is probably due to treating each of the last five
sessions as a separate data point.
One consideration that is not apparent from these graphs is that the
number of visits to the more preferred side of the floor panel is often double
that to the less preferred side, implying a large number of 'dithers', i.e. visits
to the centre zone followed by returns to the same side of floor panel. It can
be seen that the subjects spend approximately half of each experimental
session in the centre of the experimental chamber (not including time required
to collect reinforcement). Considering that reinforcements can only be obtained
whilst one or other side panel is depressed, this represents a substantial
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inefficiency. This supports the impression gained from informal observation of
subjects whilst in the experiment, that they tended to base themselves in the
centre of the chamber - near the hopper, and rather gingerly depress one or
other side of the floor panel briefly, before returning to the centre to check the
hopper. At this point it seemed, very informally, that they were just as likely to
return to the side of the panel they had previously depressed, as to continue
on over to the other side of the chamber.
Mean times in each area of the experimental chamber will be investigated
in more detail in the next chapter, and discussion of these results will be held





FLOOR PANEL EXPERIMENT: OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction and Method
As outlined in chapter 4, part of the rationale behind the present experiment
was that a very thorough optimality analysis has been performed for it that
makes predictions that are not only quantitative, but also precise enough to be
unlikely from any other account. This optimality analysis (Houston & McNamara
1981) is of the unconstrained form advocated, as a preliminary to further
analysis, in chapter 2. There have been previous attempts to deduce the
optimal response pattern on concurrent variable interval (VI) schedules, but
these have concentrated on key pecking experiments and are therefore
discussed in chapter 7.
Houston and MclMamara's analysis considers the allocation of time between
the two alternatives that will maximise reward rate. It ignores, therefore the
relative costs of different behaviours within the experiment and the
contribution to inclusive fitness from activities servicing other needs. For
deprived animals in brief experiments of this type this assumption is probably
reasonable. The account below follows Houston & McNamara (1981) except
where stated otherwise. References given are additional sources.
On a schedule constructed from inter-reinforcement intervals forming a
negative exponential distribution (as used here), the probability of a reward not
having set up after some time, t in which the schedule has been left running
unattended is e"^1, where X is the mean rate of reward on that schedule (= 1/
programmed mean interval between rewards). Therefore the probability that a
reward has set up after a time t is 1-e (Flescher 8t Hoffman 1962; Cox 8i
Lewis 1966; Staddon, Hinson & Kram 1981). This is true for both schedules at
once because the timers for the two schedules are independent and run
concurrently. When a reward is due the timer for that schedule stops, and the
hopper will be activated immediately, if the bird is on the correct side of the
floor panel, or as soon as it next visits that side of the chamber.
When the subject switches from one side of the panel to the other it
necessarily experiences a delay of duration T seconds during which it cannot
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collect rewards from either schedule. We are assuming that the subject knows
the values of the mean rates of payout on both schedules, and the value of t.
This is another reason why in this study the change over delay was simply the
time the subject needed to traverse the central area of the chamber, and a
rigorous stability criterion was enforced.
Houston & McNamara consider a cycle of behaviour in the experiment
starting on schedule 1, moving directly to schedule 2, (thereby experiencing a
delay (t)), staying on schedule 2 for a period a2, then returning to schedule 1,
again experiencing the delay t, and finally staying on schedule 1 for time a-|,
before the cycle starts again. They do not consider the case of a bird entering
a changeover phase and then returning out of it back to the same schedule,
but since by definition the changeover delay is a period when reinforcement is
impossible, it is obvious that this can only reduce net reward rate.
Firstly Houston & McNamara demonstrate (1981 appendix 1) that the reward
rate for variable values of a-| and a2 will always be bettered by fixed values of
these parameters. This then leaves two possibilities, either never switch (i.e.
stay all the time on the better option); or stay for fixed times a! and a2 on the
two schedules.
Returning to the cycle described above, it is clear that during the times
spent on each of schedules 1 and 2 the reward to be expected is simply the
reward rate of the schedule multiplied by the time spent on it: and \2a2
respectively. The probability of no reward having set up at the point of
-X (a 2t)
returning to schedule 2 after a period away from it of a^ 2t is e 2 i so
the probability that a reward has set up is 1 - e 2(V 2T)- Similarly at the end
of the cycle, when the subject returns to the first schedule, the probability of a
reward having set up is 1 - e'VV 2T)- 0ver the total cYcle of two staY times





(1 - e-\(V2T)) + (1 - e-VY2T>) + Xl3l + X2a2
At this point the mathematics can be simplified by taking the mean rate on the
better schedule (say X-j) to be the unit of time. The rate on this schedule
therefore becomes 1, andX2 becomes equal to Xt/X2 which we can call simply
X. t must be rescaled as a proportion of the mean interval between
reinforcements on the better schedule.
To find the extreme values of R we must differentiate equation 5.1 with
respect to a-| and a2 and put both equal to zero. After the above substitutions
equation 5.1 becomes:
Equation 5.2
(a! +a2 +2t)R = 2 - e_X(ai+2T) - e"(a2+2T) + a-, +a2X
differentiating with respect to a-| gives
Equation 5.3
(a-| +a2 +2T)(6R/6a1) + R = 1 + Xe~X(V2T)
and for a2
Equation 5.4
(a1 +a2 +2T)(5R/<5a2) + R = X + e"(a2+2T)
setting SR/Sa-, = 6R/6a2 = 0 in equations 5.3 and 5.4 gives:
Equation 5.5
R = "1 + Xe'X,Y2T) = X + e-(a2+2T)
Houston and McNamara investigate the consequences of equation 5.5 in detail.
When the schedule values are equal they show that the optimal stay time on




for small T (keeping in mind that T is scaled in terms of the better schedule
value) (Houston & McNamara 1981 appendix 2).
When the schedule rates are unequal it is fairly intuitive that the subject
should spend longer on the better schedule. Houston & McNamara
demonstrate this analytically in their appendix 3. They go on to show that for
the majority of conditions the optimal policy involves staying for time a^f on the
better schedule, and just switching (a^ = 0) to the other schedule
instantaneously. Only if X is greater than about .84 (decreasing with increasing
T above T= .92), is it optimal to stay for a time greater than zero on schedule
2. At the other extreme, if the COD is very large, never switching to the
second schedule will be optimal. They show that for this to be the case T has
to be larger than .92 (increasing with increasing X above X= .84). In order
therefore, for anything but 'Stay-switch' to be the optimal policy, the schedules
either have to be very similar (e.g. VI 60: 61 with 4s COD) for stay-stay to be
optimal; or possess an enormous changeover delay (e.g. VI 30:240 with 28s
COD) in which case never switching is optimal. It is immediately clear,
therefore that no experiments have ever been run (with unequal schedule rates)
where anything but stay-switch would be the optimal policy. Unfortunately a]
for different values of T and X cannot be calculated directly from any one
equation. However Houston 8t McNamara (1981 table 6) provide a number of
values, and also their figure 3 enables the estimation of values of a] for three
values of X.
In conclusion, there are two types of prediction we can make, depending on
the assumptions we are willing to entertain about the subjects' knowledge of
the experimental conditions. If we assume only that they are attempting to
maximise net reward rate, and that they are aware that this is a typical
concurrent VI experiment, then we can predict they should:
1. Minimize the duration of each change over. This is not considered in the
above analysis, but follows simply from the fact that the COD is a period
during which reinforcement is impossible.
2. Constrain visits to constant durations. (Houston 81 McNamara 1981 appendix
1)
3. Minimize the duration of visits to the schedule with the lower rate.
If we are also willing to assume that they are aware of the value of T
(which does not seem unreasonable given that it is a consequence of their own
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behaviour); and that they know the value of X (which may not be unreasonable
when the stability criterion is fulfilled) we can additionally predict the exact
duration of visits to the preferred schedule.
The rest of this chapter will test these predictions.
5.2 Results
Table 5.1 contains the means and standard deviations of the times spent
by each subject in each phase of the experiment, for each of the last 5
sessions of each condition. The phases consist of: right side of the panel
(microswitch 1) depressed (t|); left side of panel (microswitch 2) depressed (t2);
neither microswitch depressed, where microswitch just released differs from
microswitch next depressed (true changeover; CO); neither microswitch
depressed, where microswitch just released is the same as the microswitch
next to be depressed (dither; di).
Table 5.1: Mean and standard deviations of time in each component
Subi Cond ii sdi 12 sd? CO sdrn di sdr1i
92 120:120 .49 1.51 .93 1.40 2 .12 3.10 2.50 2.06
.31 1.61 .82 1.32 2.48 2.73 2.95 3.57
.28 1.37 .90 1.58 2.69 2.63 3.16 2.86
.14 1.36 1.17 2.68 2.47 4.37 3.36 2.64
.16 1.32 .71 1.39 3.52 3.65 4.24 4.38
240:30 .22 .51 1.15 1.84 1.81 1.36 1.78 2.11
.10 .78 1.48 2.03 1.82 3.32 2.65 8.20
.13 .81 1.12 1.66 1.66 1.23 2.09 3.64
.03 .96 1.04 1.73 2.46 2.40 3.09 4.39
.09 .84 1.20 1.80 1.80 1.46 1.76 1.98
60:180 .69 1.45 2.92 21.86 1.87 2.02 1.75 3.21
.10 .98 .83 .95 3.87 9.58 2.43 4.36
.08 1.21 .99 1.24 5.27 9.37 3.48 7.18
.24 .98 .74 1.18 3.25 2.55 1.93 3.36
.69 1.54 1.85 2.90 4.21 2.75 5.72 19. 52
96 120:120 .28 1.57 2.22 2.03 3.65 5.88 4.73 5.76
.68 2.17 3.53 9.46 3.23 7.78 3.18 5.79
.09 1.40 2.09 2.59 3.57 5.94 3.55 3.12
.16 1.85 1.72 2.29 9.17 19.93 9.73 14.91
.54 4.62 3.15 5.28 3.70 3.56 4.74 4.85
240:30 1 .01 .95 3.73 4.90 2.04 2.02 2.68 2.93
.67 .73 3.52 4.79 1.42 1.31 2.03 2.41
.40 1.33 3.38 5.03 2.61 2.26 3.22 3.05
.40 1.12 3.49 4.81 2.01 1.86 3.54 15.52
.18 1.62 4.81 5.92 4. 54 12.49 16.32 96.82
60:180 1 .70 2.76 .60 .82 1.47 1.53 2.23 3.41
1 . 41 2.12 .55 .73 1.56 1.51 1.84 2 .07
1 .20 1.87 .33 .99 1.62 1.67 1.97 2.81
1 .62 2.49 .54 .71 1.64 2.06 1.73 2.25
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.62 .88 .85 1.08 .95 1.18 .42 1.18
.58 .92 .78 1.04 .89 1.02 .51 1.49
.64 .99 .76 1.00 1.06 1.34 .66 1.61
.69 .92 1.11 1.26 1.06 1.26 .75 1.66
.59 .97 1.47 1.40 1.24 1.45 1.49 2.46
.13 .89 1.04 1.53 1.43 1.75 1.95 2.71
.15 .95 .97 1.57 1.61 2.80 1.89 2.26
.27 .78 1.02 1.55 1.35 1.69 1.72 2 .13
.26 .48 .83 1.34 1.18 1.28 1.21 1.98
.13 .58 .66 1.30 1.18 1.43 .91 1.54
.40 .91 .44 .63 1.02 1.23 .36 .90
.57 .92 .59 .68 .92 .90 .46 1.16
.44 .64 .49 .58 .83 .82 .25 .62
.33 .87 .50 .56 .85 .81 .37 1.15
.45 .75 .59 .82 .87 1.17 .33 .80
Comparison of each mean stay time in this table with its corresponding
standard deviation shows that, in the vast majority (89%) of cases, the standard
deviation is larger than the mean. In no case is the s.d. less than 65% of the
relevant mean value, and all cases with smaller s.d.s than means are for
changeovers and dithers. The very large values of many s.d.s suggest that
these stay times may well follow an exponential distribution; a method that
could be used to investigate this question is presented in chapter 9. However,
for present purposes sufficient has already been presented to refute the
hypothesis that these subjects are operating a policy of fixed stay times on
each panel.
5.2.1 Stay times on VI 120:120
Next I consider whether the mean stay times on each panel are close to
optimal despite being highly variable. Table 5.2 is constructed from the
session means of time spent on each panel (ignoring therefore within session
variability), and gives the means and standard deviations of time spent on each
panel for each subject under concurrent VIVI 120:120. Table 5.3 shows the
results of an analysis of variance for repeated measures on these data. It can
be seen that there is a significant difference in stay times between birds
(p<.5%) and also between panels (p<.1%), despite the programmed rates being
the same. There is also a significant interaction between these factors
(p<.1%).
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Table 5.2: Mean and standard deviations of mean times
on each panel under VIVI 120:120
Cell Means
Bird- 92 96 120 Mean
Panel
1 0.276 0.350 0.624 0.417
2 0.906 2.542 0.994 1.481
Mean 0.591 1.446 0.809 .949
Standard deviations
1 0.140 0.252 0.044
2 0.170 0.763 0.301
Table 5.3: Analysis of Variance on mean stay times
under cone VIVI 120:120
Source sum of d.f. mean F tail
squares square prob
Mean 27.00 1 27.00 140.98 <.1%
Bird 3.95 2 1.98 10.31 <.5%
1 Error 2.30 12 0.19
Panel 8.49 1 ■ 8.49 120.00 <.1%
Panel-Bird 4.86 2 2.43 34.32 <.1%
2 Error 0.85 12 0.07
Inspection of table 5.1 shows a consistent preference on the part of all
three subjects for panel 2 over panel 1, though post hoc comparisons
(Scheffe's method) only found the difference for subject 96 to be significant
(p< 5%).
The combined existence of dithers, substantial within session variability in
stay times, and significant differences in mean stay times across panels,
implies that there is almost certainly no validity in calculating theoretical mean
stay times from equation 5.6. None the less, the differences between subjects
might conceivably be elucidated by such a procedure, so in table 5.4 I present
the derivation of values of a*, the optimal stay time on the better panel.
Remember that in equation 5.6 a" and T are measured in terms of the schedule
value, and so in table 5.4 the average T for each subject must first be scaled in
terms of that value; and the value of a" must, after calculation, be scaled up
into seconds.
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Table 5.4: Derivation of a* (=2/3t2)
Bird T/s T/120S a*/120s a*/s
92 2.656 .525 .000326 .0391
96 4.614 .0385 .000986 .118
120 1.040 .00867 .0000500 .00601
It can be seen by comparing tables 5.4 and 5.2 that the optimal stay times are
orders of magnitude different from the obtained values, and that they do not
even form the same rank ordering.
There does not seem to be any aspect of responding on concurrent VIVI
120:120, therefore, that is consistent with the predictions of optimality
considerations.
5.2.2 Stay times on VI 240:30 and VI 60:180
Table 5.5 gives the mean and standard deviations of the session average
stay times for each panel on VIVi 240:30 and VIVI 60:180. It was predicted
above that visits to the side of the panel with the lower rate should be
constrained to a minimal duration. From table 5.1 an operational definition of a
minimum duration could be about .5s.
Table 5.5: Means and standard deviations of time on each panel
under cone VIVI 240:30 and 60:180
Cell Means
Condition -240 :30 60 :180
Bird- 92 96 120 92 96 120 Mean
Panel
1 0.106 0.532 0.198 0.356 1.586 0.430 0.546
2 1.194 3.782 0.955 1.458 0.434 0.518 1.405
Mean . 0.650 2.157 0.576 0.907 1.010 0.474 0.976
Standard Deviations
Condition -240:30 60:180
Bird- 92 96 120 92 96 120
Panel
1 0.075 0.319 0.080 0.310 0.302 0.094
2 0.173 0.587 0.100 0.932 0.176 0.073
Inspection of table 5.5 suggests that under VIVI 240:30 reduction of minor
schedule visits to a minimal duration might be taking place, but only subject 96
spends longer on the major schedule for cone VIVI 60:180.
Table 5.6 presents the results of an analysis of variance for repeated
measures on the data summarized in table 5.5.
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Table 5.6: Analysis of Variance on mean stay times
under VIVI 240:30 and 60:180
Source sum of d.f. mean F tail
squares square prob
Mean 53.35 1 53.35 320..63 <.1%
Condition 1.58 1 .1.58 9..47 <1%
Bird 11.77 2 5.89 35..38 <.1%
Cond-Bird 5.29 2 2.64 15..90 <.1%
1 ERROR 3.83 23 0.17
Panel 10.54 1 10.54 95..04 <.1%
Panel-Cond 10.23 1 10.23 92 . 24 <.1%
Panel-Bird 1.30 2 0 .65 5..87 <1%
P*C*B 3.98 2 6.99 63..00 <.1%
2 ERROR 2.55 23 0.11
It can be seen that the effects of Bird, Experimental Condition, and Panel
are all significant (at least p< 1 %), as are all possible interactions (p<1% or
better).
With the same provisos as were made when optimal stay times were
calculated for VIVI 120:120, the optimal stay times for the better schedule (a^)
are presented in table 5.7. The values for VIVI 60:180 were read off Houston &
McNamara's 1981 figure 3 (this figure gives t^ which is = a^j + T), and the
approximate values for VIVI 30:240 were obtained from their table 6. Because,
as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter these values cannot be
calculated directly, Houston & McNamara give a selection of values of for
different T and X. However since T in this experiment was set by the subject's
own behaviour they are not exactly equal to any value given by Houston &
McNamara. Values of a^j in table 5.7 are therefore only given to the nearest
second.
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Table 5.7: Optimal stay times on cone VIVI 240:30 and VIVI
60:180
Bird Cond T/s T t*/s a*/s
92 240:30 1.91 .064 1 30
60:180 4.49 26 21
96 240:30 2.52 .084 1.21' 36
60:180 2.83 15 12
120 240:30 1.15 .038 .47 14
60:180 .90 4 3
This is quite sufficient to demonstrate that, as for VIVi 120:120 the predicted
values are an order of magnitude different from those observed. This time, in
contradistinction to the values found when the schedule values were equal, the
predicted values are larger than the obtained ones. Under VIVI 240:30 the rank
ordering of the predicted and obtained values are the same, but this is not the
case on VIVI 60:180.
5.2.3 Reward Rates
Taking 1.5s as a value of T that all subjects should be able to attain (see
table 5.1), table 5.8 takes the nearest value to this available in Houston &
McNamara (1981) and calculates the maximal reward rate (R ) obtainable by
adopting the optimal panel stay times. For equal schedule values R* is
calculated from their equation A2.7 and 10. For VIVI 240:30 and VIVI 60:180 the
two nearest values to 1.5s were obtained from Houston 8i McNamara's table 6.
Table
5.8: Maximal reward rates for 1.5s COD
Condition T/s T R_ R*/s
120:120 1.5 .0125 1.975 .0165
240:30 1 .0333 1.117 .030
240:30 2.5 .0833 1.105 .030
60:180 1 .0166 1.322 .0126
60:180 2 .0333 1.312 .0219
From table 5.8 we can see that R* changes so slowly with increasing t for
VIVI 240:30 that the value of .030 is clearly good for t=1.5s. For VIVI 60:180 the
position is slightly less clear, but a value of R = .020 would appear to be a
reasonable approximation for a 1.5s COD. Table 5.9 presents the actual reward
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rate, R/s averaged over the last five sessions of each condition (calculated
from the number of reinforcements and durations given in table 4.2), compared
with the optimal rate of reinforcement (R ), and the number of rewards lost in
each 45min session by not using the optimal stay times.
Table 5.9: Obtained reward rates compared to optimal values,
assuming T =1.5s
Bird Cond R/s R /s Lost Rfs/Session
92 120:120 .011 .017 44.6- 29.7= 14.9
240:30 .021 .030 81 - 56.7 = 24.3
60:180 .014 .020 54 - 37.8 = 16.2
96 120:120 .011 .017 44.6- 19.7= 24.9
240:30 .021 .030 81 - 56.7 = 24.3
60:180 .012 .020 54 - 32.4 = 21.6
120 120:120 .014 .017 44.6- 37.8= 6.8
240:30 .030 .030 81-81 0
60:180 .017 .020 54 - 45.9 = 8.1
This table shows that the losses to the subjects are real and substantial, even
after allowing a rather generous CO time. Only subject 120 loses less then 10
reinforcements per session, and this is simply because his actual T was less
than the 1.5s allowed here (see table 5.1).
5.3 Discussion
The results presented here have shown a substantial failure to optimise on
the part of Barbary Doves foraging in a simple experimental environment. The
subjects fail to maximise their returns in five ways.
1. Stay time on each side of the floor panel are highly variable, rather than
being constrained to single values.
2. Many trips to the centre of the panel are concluded by returns to the same
side of the panel (dithers).
3. The amount of time spent changing over is not restricted to a minimum.
4. Average stay times on each side of the panel are orders of magnitude
different from those predicted. For VIVI 120:120 observed times are too
long; for VIVI 240:30 and VIVI 60:180 the stay times are too short.
5. Stay times on the less good schedule do not appear to be as vanishingly
brief as was predicted; on VIVI 60:180 they are not shorter than visits to the
better schedule.
A number of explanations of this failure to optimise are possible.
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Firstly it might be suggested that the system is so unresponsive to changes
in subjects allocation of time within the experiment that even the substantial
deviations presented here do not lead to sufficient losses of reinforcement, or
excess effort on the subjects' part, to be worth worrying about. In table 5.9
above it was demonstrated that two out of three subjects were obtaining
between 15 and 25 fewer reinforcements per 45 min session than was possible;
and that this involved the additional costs of more rapid changing over implied
in the existence of dithers and excessively short stay times. 20 reinforcements
in 45 mins is a rate of ,074Rf/s or VI 135s. This is within the range of the
schedules programmed in the experiment and cannot be considered trivial.
A popular argument to dismiss unpleasant results from experiments using
operant scheduling is to point out that the experimental environment is
unnatural. I am immediately willing to concede that this experiment was
'unnatural'. It is, however, important that we should be able to identify what it
is that makes the experiment unnatural, apart from the fact that the subjects
did not forage optimally in it. What is it that makes an experiment in which a
dove (that was reared in a cage), has to walk around a rather similar cage in
order to operate a reward producing mechanism, so much more unnatural than
an experiment in which a feral born great tit chooses food items off a
conveyor belt? (Krebs et al 1977). That different spatial locations should be
associated with different densities of food, even in a small area is trivially
obviously a feature of the world outside the laboratory; whereas, outside a few
university canteens, conveyor belt food delivery systems are not reported.
On reflection, however, there is a substantial artificiality to this experiment
that appeared, from informal observations of subjects (as noted in chapter 4) to
lead to the birds structuring the task differently than was assumed in the
optimality analysis. There are two components to this. Firstly, that the hopper
was situated centrally; and secondly that the doves appeared to be unsettled
by the movement of the floor panel. The net effect of these two factors was
that the birds stopped in the centre of the apparatus to examine the hopper
regularly, and only rather gingerly and briefly depressed one side of the panel
before returning to the middle of the chamber again.
If this explanation is correct then we can predict that a functionally
equivalent set up, but using a separate hopper at each end of the chamber to
pay out rewards collected for standing at that end of the chamber, and a stable
floor, would improve performance.
Shettleworth (1985b) ran an experiment using a chamber possessing a floor
panel with hoppers at each end and only tilting ,5cm (as per Baum & Rachlin
1969). The purpose of her study (discussed in the introduction to chapter 4)
was to investigate the preference of pigeons for different numbers of food
items under different delays. She also ran two conditions (first and last
conditions of experiment 1) of concurrent equal VI schedules (90:90 and 60:60
respectively) without any other complicating factors. Unfortunately it is not
clear whether the schedule values were constant throughout the three sessions
of the first of these conditions. That leaves a set of data averaged over the last
three of ten sessions on cone VIVI 60:60. Table 5.10 presents the mean time
per session on the left (TL) and right (TR) sides of the floor panel, the mean
numbers of reinforcements (Rr and RJ and the mean number of changeovers
(Nco) per session, extracted from Shettleworth 1985b table 1. From these data,
and the information that the experiment used a 4s changeover delay the
optimal stay times (a*) and maximal reward rates (R*) were constructed. These
are .178s and ,0312Rf/s respectively.
Table 5.10: Responding on cone VIVI 60:60 from Shettleworth 1985b
Bird Session Means Nrr> duration Rf/s Lost
Tj_ Tg Rj_ Rfi Rfs
2 210.5 199.7 20.3 19.6 194 1312.7 .0305 1.8
5 195.7 167.3 18.6 21.3 247 1481.5 .0270 11.3
9 117.2 157.9 21.0 19.0 238 1349.3 .0296 4.2
10 157.4 144.9 19.0 21.0 241 1390.3 .0288 6.4
Assuming there were no 'dithers' (no mention is made of this possibility)
the mean stay times per visit were calculated and these are presented in table
5.11.
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It is clear that although the stay times are again longer than the optimal value,
the number of reinforcements that would be lost as a consequence of this over
a 45 min session (sessions were in fact run until 40 reinforcements had been
received) is much smaller.
Although the use of a different subject species is a confounding variable in
comparing Shettleworth's results with the experiment reported here, some
independent support is provided for the idea that the central location of the
food hopper, and rather large swing of the floor panel, were factors restricting
the efficiency of the doves' behaviour. This underlines the point made in
chapter 2 that the way the experimenter parses an environment is not
guaranteed to be the way the subject conceives of that same environment. It
also emphasizes the importance of recognizing that although subject species
may not have evolved to live in operant experiments, these experimental
environments have evolved to be efficiently utilizable by the subjects. It was
mentioned in the introduction to chapter 4 that it had been hoped that the
experimental chamber described here, by virtue of its apparent simplicity and
ease of operation, might provide a useful basis for research involving
phylogenetic and ontogenetic comparisons - that promise has not been
fulfilled. The simple modification of providing two food sources and an
electronic position-sensing system might well create an environment in which
such research could be conducted.
The experiment to be described in chapters 5 to 9 employs a more






INTRODUCTION AND EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
6.1 Introduction
The behaviour of animals searching for food rewards in an operant chamber
by responding on two manipulanda, each of which reinforces the first response
after some time interval has passed since it last payed out, (concurrent interval
schedules) has been the subject of at least twenty or more studies over the
last thirty years (see Taylor & Davison 1983; Baum 1979; Wearden & Burgess
1982; Myers & Myers 1977 for references). Most work within this paradigm has
followed Herrnstein's (1961) demonstration of a simple relation between the
ratio of the total numbers of responses to each option over a session (or
usually pooled across several sessions), and the ratio of reinforcements
obtained due to this responding. This result, known as Herrnstein's 'Matching
Law' can be expressed:
where P and R are the numbers of responses and reinforcements respectively,
and the subscripts identify the two manipulanda.
Baum (1974) generalized this relation thus:
where b (known as bias) and c (sensitivity) are constants close to unity. In this
form it has been found to account for data from a wide range of studies on
concurrent interval and ratio schedules with a number of subject species (Baum
1979; Wearden & Burgess 1982). Clearly, when b and c are both unity, this
equation reduces to equation 6.1. Baum (1974) argued that bias represented a




assymmetries in the experimental conditions and that only changes in the
sensitivity parameter (c) were of theoretical interest. Houston & McNamara
(1981, appendix 7) have demonstrated that optimal behaviour on concurrent
exponential Vis can require a non unity bias parameter without the need to
assume any unobserved sources of reinforcement.
It is my contention that the generalized matching law is at least in part
artefactual, and that its apparent success has been a hinderance to
understanding both the mechanisms and functions of choice in the Skinner box,
and to foraging studies in general.
Criticisms of the matching law have been of two types. Firstly it seems that
matching is dependent on the techniques that have evolved to produce it
(Scoun 1983). The use of a changeover delay (COD; dead time following first
response to a new schedule during which no response can be reinforced) was
found by Herrnstein (1961) to be necessary for matching to occur; he argued
that it served to prevent reinforcement of chains of responses across the two
keys. But far from abolishing responding, Silberberg & Fantino (1970); Pliskoff
(1971) and Scoun (1983) have found that responding is more rapid during the
COD. Scoun (1983) reports that with a 2sec COD on concurrent VI 120:60
around 25% of responses occur during the COD. Brownstein & Pliskoff (1968)
ran a preliminary experiment with a variety of CODs and chose for their main
study the value that had given the clearest matching.
The procedure for estimating the parameters of the generalized matching
equation (Equation 6.2.1) is also questionable. Taking logs of that equation
yields a linear relation:
To find estimates of b and c the log response ratios are regressed against log
obtained reward ratios. This procedure is not strictly legitimate because neither
log ratio constitutes a dependant variable. Furthermore data are usually pooled
over the last five sessions before being plotted, which reduces the variance in




The second set of problems with the generalized matching equation is that
it does not determine a pattern of behaviour. That is to say, as a molar
generalization, matching could be produced by a wide variety of behaviour
generating mechanisms; it is, as noted in chapter 2, a functional theory, not a
mechanistic one. Early expositions of matching (e.g. Herrnstein 1961) carried
the implication that molar matching in totals of responses and reinforcers was
necessary and sufficient evidence of a process whereby obtained reinforcement
proportions controlled response choice by the subject. It is now widely
understood that this is not the case (e.g. Herrnstein 1982). Not only can
matching be produced by mechanisms other than active equalizing of response
proportions to reinforcement proportions by the subject, but it can also be
produced by optimal responding (consisting of fixed inter switch times;
Houston & McNamara 1981 and see below chapter 7); by momentary
maximising (Staddon, Hinson & Kram 1981 and see below chapter 8);and even
by random responding as would be performed by a perfectly elastic ball thrown
into a Skinner box (Shimp 1982c).
These two shortcomings of molar matching theory are, I submit, responsible
for the ubiquity of generalized matching with values of c (in equation 6.2; slope
of matching line) close to unity on concurrent interval schedules. The only
systematic difference in matching parameters that has been observed in 4
review papers is a suggestive difference in values of the c parameter between
research performed in New Zealand by Davison and his associates (c=,9); and
work in the United States by Herrnstein, Baum, and others (c = 1.0). Baum (1979)
first pointed out this difference and suggested it was due to unrecorded
systematic differences in procedure. Taylor and Davison (1983) have
re-analysed concurrent VI data from 18 studies to suggest that this difference
may be due to the use of VI schedules built on different forms of progression.
Davison's group use schedules based on an arithmetic progression of intervals,
whilst American investigators use Vis based on an exponential progression
creating an approximation to a Poisson distribution of inter-reinforcement
intervals (Flescher & Hoffman 1962; Cox 8t Lewis 1966). Only one prior study
has included both arithmetic and exponential VI schedules (Trevett, Davison and
Williams 1972); this study was not designed to compare the different forms of
schedule, and unfortunately the exponential VI was based on just 14 intervals,
probably presented repeatedly in the same order. Subjects were tested on the
exponential VI for just two conditions and these were not at the same schedule
values as for the arithmetic schedules. Both types of schedule were pooled in
the results presented and the authors make no reference to any differences
between the schedule types.
More recent work has emphasized that an analysis of mechanisms of
behaviour requires a more fine grained level of data analysis than the totals of
responses and reinforcements used in assessing matching. Real (1983; Real 81
Dreyfus 1985) and Hinson & Staddon (1981,1983) have analysed intact time
series of events (switches and responses respectively) to test 'melioration' and
'momentary maximising' respectively (see chapter 8). However it is not just
theories of mechanism that require more detailed data to be effectively tested.
Recent functional analyses (Staddon, Hinson 8i Kram 1981; Houston 8<
McNamara 1981) also argue that optimality in behaviour can only be effectively
tested by considering the absolute lengths of visits to each alternative and not
just the ratios of visit durations.
The present study on barbary doves compares performance on concurrent
exponential VI, (VIVIE), concurrent arithmetic VI (VIVIA) and concurrent Fl
schedules (FIFI) to attempt to answer three questions.
1. Is there any support for Taylor 8< Davison's (1981) suggestion that different
forms of VI schedule produce different forms of matching? (this chapter)
2. How well does the behaviour of ring doves approach optimality on different
forms of concurrent interval schedules? (Chapters 7 & 9)
3. Can the behaviour be accounted for by either of two theories of mechanism
in the literature ('melioration' and 'momentary maximising') ? (Chapter 8)
A variety of forms of interval schedule were tested here because, as well as
being the only variable implicated in altering the c parameter in the matching
equation, it seemed intuitively reasonable to expect the temporal patterning of
food occurrences to have an impact on the temporal patterning of responding.
The different effects of fixed and variable interval schedules of reinforcement
on response patterning were first recorded in the work of the Skinnerian school
(Ferster Skinner 1957; Catania 1966). Although arithmetic and exponential
V.I. schedules are normally considered equivalent, the temporal patterning of
inter-reinforcement intervals created by each is quite different. A well
randomised exponential VI schedule gives intervals that follows a Poisson
distribution. No segment of such a sequence can provide information about
the time to the next event because the probability of an event is always
constant (Cox 8t Lewis 1966). Typical arithmetic Vis on the other hand, are not
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only constructed from a progression that would not ensure a constant
probability even if well randomised, but also only usually employ a small set of
intervals presented repeatedly in the same order (Flescher & Hoffman 1962;
Ferster & Skinner 1957).
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Subjects
Six experimentally naive Barbary Doves (Streptopetia risorid) housed under
the conditions described in chapter 4, aged approximately 9 months at the start
of testing, served as subjects. They were maintained at 90% +/- 5% of free
feeding weight throughout the experiment by supplementary feeding when
required. Birds were assigned randomly to two groups of three: birds 100, 130
and 144 forming group A; birds 65, 106 and 149 formed group B.
6.2.2 Apparatus
All conditions were run in locally built standard two key operant chambers
of internal dimensions 35.5 by 35.5 by 30 cm. Two side walls and the ceiling
were made of Perspex, and the back was constructed of wire netting to
facilitate video analysis; the front wall was sheet metal and contained two keys
1.5 cm in diameter (requiring a minimum force of .05N to operate), 11cm above
the floor and 18cm apart, each trans-illuminated by a light emitting diode. The
hopper opening (a 5cm square window with hopper of radius 1.25cm at a depth
of 2.5cm) was situated in the centre of the back wall, equidistant between the
keys and 9.3cm above the floor. Figures 6.1 - 6.3 show the experiment in situ.
Reinforcement was 3.5 seconds access to mixed grain during which a hopper
light came on. Each experimental chamber was kept in a separate room
(approximately 170 by 300 by 200 cm, illuminated by 80-Watts of fluorescent
tubing), visually and auditorially isolated, with an Acorn BBC model B
micro-computer alongside it for experimental control and recording of every
peck and hopper movement to the nearest .01s, subject to a minimum
interpeck time of .3s. Data was later transferred to the university's ICL 2988
computer for analysis.








A changeover delay of 2 sees was used for all schedules.
Exponential variable interval schedules (VIVIE) were constructed according to
the method of Flescher and Hoffman (1962) and intervals were selected as
required at random from a virtual set of 1000.
Arithmetic VI schedules (VIVIA) were constructed from a set of twelve
intervals from a progression of the form a + n.r where a was 1/12th the mean
inter-reinforcement interval (iri), r was 1 /6th the mean iri, for n = 1 to 12. The
order of this twelve interval series was randomised before any testing
commenced but subsequently always presented in the same sequence. The
series was therefore equivalent to a loop of tape. Due to a programming error
no pecks were recorded during COD.
6.2.4 Procedure
Experimental conditions and numbers of sessions are shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1:
Conditions and Number of Sessions
Group B: Schedule - VIVIE
Conditions - 120:120 240 : 30 180 : 60
Number Major Number Major Number
Bird Sessions Key Sessions Key Sessions
65 57 2 25 1 36
106 51 1. 46 2 56
149 44 2 54 1 89
Group B: Schedule - VIVIA(B)
Conditions - 120:120 240 : 30 180 : 60
Number Major Number Major Number
Bird Sessions Key Sessions Key Sessions
65 31 2 12 1 17
106 34 2 11 1 12
149 19 2 12 1 25
Group A: Schedule - FIFI
Conditions - 120:120 240 : 30 180 : 60
Number Major Number Major Number
Bird Sessions Key Sessions Key Sessions
100 53 1 29 2 43
130 35 1 19 2 53
144 54 2 34 1 42
Group A: Schedule - VIVIA(A)
Conditions - 120:120 240 : 30 180 : 60
Number Major Number Major Number
Bird Sessions Key Sessions Key Sessions
100 36 2 15 1 13
130 17 2 19 1 13
144 18 2 11 1 13
Each subject was tested on a condition six days a week so far as possible
until it fulfilled a criterion of stability. The rationale behind this criterion was
described in chapter 4. It stipulated that the coefficient of variation (mean/
standard deviation) of the logged (to base 10) response ratios should exceed 5
(or in cases where the logged mean was small, that the s.d. be less than .10)
on 6 consecutive occasions.
Pre-training consisted of sessions lasting 15 hours each. Each subject
received 5 sessions of irregular unconditional reinforcement, followed by up to
5 sessions of autoshaping and one 15 hour session where reinforcement was
obtained for the first peck after crossing over from one key to the other.
The first 8 sessions of VIVIE 120:120 lasted 240mins and involved a 4sec
change over delay (COD) (signalled by extinguishing key lights and sounding a
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buzzer on the micro computer) and 6sec access to grain as reinforcement.
These sessions have been excluded from the analyses. All other conditions
used a COD of 2secs. Reported sessions lasted 45 mins except for a few early
ones of VIVIE lasting 60 mins.
Group A experienced three conditions of FIFI, followed by three conditions
of VIVIA. Group B first received three conditions of VIVIE followed by the same
three conditions of VIVIA. Group A were therefore progressing from completely
stable interval schedules to moderately variable interval schedules, whilst
Group B experienced firstly completely random schedules before moderately
variable ones. This partial crossing over was designed to make it possible to
look at the effect of prior experience of temporal variability on present
performance.
Video tapes of 18 early sessions were analysed for the occurence of the
following 9 behaviour patterns. These were chosen with the aim of estimating
the extent to which a subject was directing its behaviour towards the
experiment.
1. Proximity to - Back Wall
2. " - Left Wall
3. " - Front (hopper) wall
4. " - Right Wall
5. Head oriented to - Left Key (Key 1)
6. " - Hopper
7. " - Right Key (Key 2)
8. Wing Flap
9. Preening
6.3 Molar Results and Discussion
Video analysis was too sporadic to be considered separately but will be
mentioned below where it illuminates results from other data.
Time series results will be presented and discussed separately for each
method of analysis in the following chapters. This chapter address molar
results (totals of events at the end of a session) only.
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6.3.1 Sessions to Stability
One unexpected effect I wish to draw attention to is the difference in
numbers of sessions required to fulfill the stability criterion under different
experimental conditions. An analysis of variance on the durations of each
condition, presented in table 6.1, found an overall significant difference between
the means (F= 21.6, df 3,8; p<.1%) and post hoc comparisons (Scheffe's
method) showed differences at the same level of significance in each pair-wise
comparison of different schedule types, but no difference between the two
groups of subjects on the VIVIA condition.The trend of the mean number of
sessions required for stability is VIVIE > FIFI > VIVIA (means 50.9, 40.2, and
18.2 respectively). (11 sessions are required to fulfill the stability criterion.) I
am not aware of any published research that has reported differences in
numbers of sessions required to reach stability under different schedule
conditions. It is of note however that all the work from Davison's laboratory
(where arithmetic VI schedules are used exclusively) makes use of a relatively
rigorous criterion of stability (that the median response proportion of the last
five sessions should fair within 5% of the median of the previous five sessions
on 5, not necessarily consecutive occasions, for the whole group of subjects in
an experiment; Davison 1972), whilst work by other authors utilizing exponential
schedules is more variable in the methods employed to determine when to
change conditions. Some decide arbitrarily the number of sessions they wish
to run (Hinson & Staddon 1983; Green, Rachlin 8t Hanson 1983); others choose
by inspection of the choice proportions (Baum 1982; Moore 1984; Pliskoff,
Cicerone & Nelson 1978; Vaughan & Miller 1984; Baum 1976; Bradshaw,
Szabaldi & Bevan 1976). Where criteria have been employed these have tended
to be weaker than that of Davison (1972). The method of McSweeney (1975;
Norman & McSweeney 1978), that the overall rate of responding in the last five
sessions should fall within the range set by the earlier sessions, fails to relate
to response allocation at all. Heyman (1979) required that both the relative
response rate and the overall probability of a change over should not show an
extreme value for five sessions. Although this relates to the right variables it is
not clear how firm a criterion is set by simply insisting that data do not exceed
the previously defined range. On balance therefore, it seems possible that a
difference in the number of sessions required to reach stability when using
different types of schedule, has been obscured by the different practices
routinely used in different laboratories to ascertain when response choice
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should be considered stable.
That choice in a randomised environment (VIVIE) takes longer to stabilize
than in less variable environments would be expected from any account of
behaviour that stresses an organisms active searching for regularities in its
environment to guide patch selection. However from this perspective it would
seem strange that the FIFI condition requires longer for stability to be attained
than the VIVIA condition. Two explanations can be put forward for this. Firstly
the results presented here could be contaminated by order effects. For both
groups of subjects the VIVIA was the last schedule type run and so the birds
may have been getting quicker at reaching stability independent of the
schedule type presented. Inspection of the data for each condition in table 6.1
does not suggest any trend in sessions required within the schedule types.
Alternatively the critical factor in the VIVIA could be that because the twelve
component intervals were shorter than the Fl value, and their relative sizes and
order of presentation did not vary from condition to condition - possibly this
may have provided an opportunity for cognitive set learning (Harlow 1959). This
possibility will be explored further in chapter 7.
6.3.2 Matching Parameters
The parameters of the best fitting generalized matching equation (Equation
6.2.1) were calculated by the standard method of a linear regression of the log
ratios of pecks on log ratio reinforcements pooled over the last five sessions;
the analysis was also performed including each session's ratios as separate
points. Figure 6.4 shows pooled data and regression lines. Table 6.2 gives the
parameters of the regression equations for both pooled (type 'P') and separate
('S') analyses.
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Parameters of Matching Regressions
Conditions Intercept Gradient Tail r2 Type
& Groups (loq bji l£l Prob
TOTAL .0395 . 586 < .1% .508 S
II .0421 .729 < .1% .588 P
FIFI .163 .687 < .1% .679 s
II .158 .659 <1% .650 p
VIVIE .140 .668 < .1% .686 s
II .135 1.071 < .1% .996 p
VIVIA (A) -.071 . 362 < .1% .280 s
II -.066 .402 NS .311 p
VIVIA (B) -.059 .797 < .1% .468 s
II -.053 . 825 <5% .481 p
Performing regressions on the data from separate sessions increased the
number of data points five fold from the usual methods of estimation and
made it feasible to perform an analysis of variance to compare the regression
lines. The F statistic used was the ratio of the mean square deviations over
groups divided by the mean square deviance within groups (BMDP Program 1 R.¬
Dixon et al 1983). For pooled data F6 2a ~ 1-392, NS; but for each session
separately F6 172= 3.494, p<5%. The results of analyses of variance for each
pair-wise comparison of groups counting each session separately are shown in
table 6.3;
Table 6.3:
ANOVAs on regression equations
Conditions & F- stat 2- Tail
Groups d£7 86 Probability
FIFI, VIVIA(A) 5 .121 <1%
FIFI, VIVIA(B) 3.971 <5%
FIFI, VIVIE .038 NS
VIVIA(A),VIVIA(B) 3.660 <5%
VIVIA(B), VIVIE 2 .977 <10%
In table 6.2 the gradient of the regression lines (sensitivity parameter c in
equation 6.2) were usually closer to unity for pooled than for separate data,
similarly the r2s were greater for pooled data. This confirms Scoun's (1983)
argument that the methods of assessing matching are predisposed towards
producing linear matching.
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In terms of the sensitivity parameter c the resuits can be ordered thus:
IMS *
VIVIE > VIVIA(B) > FIFI > VIVIA(A)
1 07 .83 .66 .40
(where '*' indicates a difference significant at the 5% level; '**' significance at
1%.)
These differences in the sensitivity parameter run in the counter direction
to those found by Baum (1979) and Taylor 8< Davison (1983) by comparing
results from different studies. Slight over-matching (c>1) is here found with
the exponential VI schedules, and under-matching (c< 1) with the arithmetic VI
schedules. The analysis of variance used here is a relatively robust form of
comparison compared with the non-parametric test used by Taylor Si Davison
(1983) which made no allowance for the enormous differences in intra-study
variance (Taylor & Davison 1983; table 1). I suggest that the differences found
between the studies from different laboratories are more likely to be due to
unrecorded differences in the manner of measuring matching (e.g. extent to
which data are pooled before calculation), or in the manner of signalling
change over delay, than to any difference in schedule types. One way in which
matching parameters can be altered by changing the method of analysis has
been demonstrated above. Scoun (1983) found that responding during COD is
indifferent to the schedules, and that this responding is abolished if the operant
chamber is blacked out during COD. The manner of signalling the COD is
therefore a factor that differs between laboratories, and would be likely to
affect matching parameters.
Over-matching implies that the subject's preference for a schedule is in
excess of the proportion of reward gained from it - such behaviour is
equivalent to what is termed 'Win Stay' behaviour in spatial choice conditions
(Oiton 1978). Arithmetic VI and Fl schedules contain periods during which the
probability of reward is zero (see chapter 7); this may provide an affordance
(Gibson 1977) to which the subjects are sensitive, that enables them to
interweave responding on the two keys efficiently, and even respond
disproportionately on the less good schedule without losing much
reinforcement. On an exponential VI condition the subjects, lacking any clear
affordance to guide choice may revert to a simpler 'win-stay' type strategy
tending to move preference disproportionately to the better schedule. This
interpretation is consistent with the finding that preference took longer to




KEY PECK EXPERIMENT: OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS
7.1 Introduction and Analysis Methods
Optimal foraging theory has been discussed in chapter 2, and experimental
tests of it in chapter 4. In brief it is an attempt to find the best returns in
terms of a fitness related parameter (typically net energy gain) available to a
predator searching for food. The classical optimal foraging model considers a
forager searching for prey in discrete patches which deplete as the food items
are removed from them (Charnov 1976). Concurrent interval schedules differ
from this pattern in that the 'patches' or schedules do not deplete as 'prey' or
reinforcements are removed.
7.1.1 Concurrent Exponential VI
The first attempts to deduce optimal responding under VIVIE (Rachlin 1978;
Rachlin & Burkhard 1978; Staddon & Motheral 1978; Staddon 1980) involved
assuming a schedule feedback function to relate average reinforcement rate to
response rate on each key. These two schedule functions were then combined
into a single utility function which was maximized mathematically to find the
best possible return of reinforcements on responding. Since the analysis was
couched in terms of relations between mean molar rates of responding and
reinforcement it lent itself readily to being expressed in terms of the matching
relation. For schedules of the same type simple linear matching (Equation 6.1)
was supported (Rachlin 1978; Staddon & Motheral 1978).
Critiscms of this form of analysis fall into two groups. Firstly in specifying a
priori a relation between response rate and reinforcement rate it is already
assuming part of what is under test. How are we to know that the assumed
relationship is itself optimal? Houston & McNamara (1985) discuss the
limitations of prior constraints in optimal foraging analyses. The schedule
feedback functions also incorporate nothing to distinguish different forms of
interval schedule. We shall see below that the different forms of concurrent
interval schedule demand, in fact, quite different optimal strategies. The second
problem with this form of analysis is that in combining the two schedule
functions it makes no allowance for the change over delay and implicitly allows
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responses to occur on both keys simultaneously (Houston & McNamara 1981).
The optimality analysis of Heyman & Luce (1979) deals explicitly with the
two ways in which reinforcements can be obtained - by staying on a key or
crossing over - but still does not allow for the COD. Their model also assumes
that the rate of responding is high enough for reinforcements to be collected
as soon as set up; and takes the observed constant probability of switching
(Heyman 1979; Hinson & Staddon 1983) as a constraint on possible strategies.
The approach presented above for concurrent VT schedules (chapter 5 from
Houston & McNamara 1981) imposes no prior constraints on the behaviour.
However, that analysis cannot be extended to response dependant VI schedules
without assuming that the rate of responding is high enough to pick up each
reinforcement as soon as it is set up. To assume this, as Houston & McNamara
(1981) point out, is to assume that the organisms are behaving optimally -
thereby invoking an inverse optimally argument (McFarland & Houston 1981),
and assuming what we are trying to test. This nullifies any attempt to extend
the length of stay component in the analysis of chapter 5 to response
dependant schedules. The prediction that visits to the minor schedule should
be instantaneous, however, can still be upheld because the question of
response rate cannot apply to an instantaneous visit. The duration of visits to
the minor key is therefore our first measure of optimality on VIVIE.
MclNamara & Houston (1983) consider the optimal response rate on an
exponential VI. They demonstrate firstly that the optimal policy involves a
constant response rate. Figure 7.1 (from McNamara 8t Houston [1983] fig 1)
shows this graphically. Time since last response is plotted against
reinforcement probability. The solid line shows the relationship between the
two (y=1-e~^*). It is clear that the convexity of this curve implies that the net
gain from a mixed strategy of, say, equal proportions of inter-response times
x+£ and x-£ can always be improved upon by a pure strategy of
inter-response times x. McNamara & Houston (1983) go on to demonstrate





from McNamara & Houston (1983)
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Equation 7.1
Rx = M 1-e~Xx -c,
x
where M is the value of a reinforcement, c is the response cost as a
proportion of reinforcement value, and X is the programmed rate of








where c0 is the absolute response cost. From this it can be seen that the
optimal response rate for a constant response cost and reinforcement value is
directly proportional to the programmed rate of the VI schedule. Patterns of
responding are analysed in detail in chapter 9 but in so far as these results
relate to the optimality analysis they will be discussed in this chapter.
7.1.2 Concurrent Fixed Interval
Fixed interval schedules differ in kind from the exponential VI schedules
described above. Whereas the probability of reinforcement on an exponential VI
is a continuous function in time (Rx = 1 - e~Xx where x is the time since last
response; see figure 7.1); on an Fl schedule the probability of a reinforcement
is zero until the programmed Fl has elapsed, it then becomes unity until the
reinforcement is collected, when it returns to zero again. The probability
function is therefore discontinuous. The optimal strategy on such a schedule is
trivial: wait until the fixed interval has elapsed, respond once, and then wait
again. When two independent Fl schedules are running concurrently the optimal
policy remains similar, fitting the COD and response on one schedule into the
interval during which no responding is required on the other. In practice the
perfect timing required by this strategy is never found and responding begins
before the inter-reinforcement interval has expired (Ferster & Skinner 1957).
Schneider (1969) defined a post reinforcement pause on Fl schedules as the
intersection of the two best fitting straight lines on a plot of response rate
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against time since reinforcement. He found that the value of the Fi schedule
was the almost exclusive determinant of the duration of post reinforcement
pausing. Here I will use a simpler criterion - the interval between a
reinforcement and the first response after it to the same schedule - as a
measure of the sensitivity of the subjects to the duration of the programmed
inter-reinforcement intervals.
7.1.3 Concurrent Arithmetic VI
An arithmetic VI schedule lies somewhere between the two forms of
schedule described above. McNamara & Houston (1983) considers the case of
an arithmetic VI constructed of sufficient intervals to create a continuous
probability function. Unlike an exponential VI, where the probability of
reinforcement is a function of time since last response, on an arithmetic VI the
probability of reinforcement is an exponentially increasing function of time
since last reinforcement. The precise form of the schedule used in this
experiment (following Ferster & Skinner 1957:327 and all subsequent research)
does not contain enough intervals to justify being considered a continuous
schedule. Instead, since it is composed of twelve intervals presented
repeatedly in the same order, I consider that it is more a set of FI schedules
chained together - hence the reinforcement probability on this schedule is a
discontinuous function. For a time interval t-| the probability is zero; at the end
of this interval it is unity; at the first response after this interval it falls to zero
again for a time t2; and so on through the twelve intervals until the cycle
repeats. To assess the optimality of responding on VIVIA the
post-reinforcement pauses (as defined above for FI schedules) will be
calculated for each of the twelve component inter-reinforcement intervals of
the schedules and tested for sensitivity to this dimension.
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7.2 Results
7.2.1 Concurrent Exponential VI
7.2.1.1 Key stay times
For the first and last ten sessions of each condition the stay times on the
two keys were assigned to one of three classes.
1. Shorter than COD (ineffective on either key).
2. Exceeding the COD by one peck (optimal on the minor key).
3. Exceeding the COD by more than one peck (sub-optimal on the minor key;
optimal on the major key).
Figure 7.2 shows the proportion of visits to the minor key (shaded) and
major key (unshaded) falling into these categories pooled over all three
subjects. For the first condition, VIVIE 120:120, there is of course no major or
minor key, so the shading here identifies key 2.
It can be seen that at the beginning of this condition approximately half of
the visits to both keys were shorter than the COD and therefore had no effect.
By the end of VIVIE 120:120 the proportion of ineffectively brief stay times had
fallen to around 30% with approximately equal gains to each of the other two
classes. This effect is consistent across the subjects.
At the beginning of VIVIE 30:240 the proportion of ineffectively short visits
to the major key has already begun to drop - a fall which by the last sessions
of that condition has reduced these visits to less than 10% of the total for that
key. Most of the visits to the major key (around 80%) are now in class 3. On
the minor key the proportion of visits in class 1 actually rises consistently
across subjects at the beginning of VIVIE 30:240. For two subjects it continues
to rise to the end of this condition (Birds 65 and 106) while subject 149 shows
a small drop. The proportion of intervals for the minor key in class 2, the
optimal class, shows no consistent movement over this condition; most of the
gains to class 1 are made up from class 3.
For VIVIE 60:180 the order of the keys (in terms of major versus minor) was
reversed (see table 6.1). None the less the profile for the beginning of this
condition differs little from that at the end of VIVIE 30:240, implying a rapid
crossing over of preference. The exception is that for subject 65 - minor key -
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Proportion of Runs In Different Duration Classes: Ail Birds
figure 7.2

























Duration classes. 1: Shorter than C.O.D.
2: C.O.D. plus 1 peck.
3: C.O.D. plus over 1 peck.
Unshaded: Major key. Shaded: Minor key.
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the proportion of visits in class 3 increased substantially. By the end of this
condition almost all (>90%) of responses to the major key were falling into
class 3 - the optimal class on that key, for ail subjects. The minor key shows
slightly greater inter-individual differences but it is still the case that class 2
contains an insignificant proportion of visits for all subjects. For two subjects
(65 and 149) class 3 holds the largest number of minor key stay times, while
for Bird 106 class 1 still holds the longest proportion of visits.
Table 7.1 shows the mean number of pecks per visit (excluding COD) for
the last five sessions of each condition for each subject. Due to the unintended
exclusion of responses during COD, a visit shorter than the COD is recorded as
1 peck. The results of an AIMOVA for repeated measures on these data for VIVIE
240:30 and VIVIE 60:180 are summarized in table 7.2. The effects of subject,
condition (240:30 vs 60:180) and key (major vs minor) are all significant at 5%,
as are all possible interactions. Post hoc comparison (Scheffe's method) found
the mean number of responses per visit were significantly greater (at the same
significance level) for the major than the minor key for every subject and
condition except Bird 149 on VIVIE 60:180, where the observed difference was
not significant.
Table 7.1:
Mean number of pecks per visit (excluding COD).
Sub j 120: 120 240: 30 60:180
Key 1 Key jZ Major Minor Major Minor
65 8 .67 2.45 29.5 3.55 9.71 5.00
8.53 2.14 56.5 2.46 9.64 .26
7.84 2.10 28.2 2.18 10.3 5.71
8.73 2.33 45.4 1.84 10.7 5.99
7.28 2.49 32.4 1.49 8.83 5.85
106 2 .97 1.74 75.0 1.00 6.93 2.27
3.01 1.78 162 1.00 7.00 2.32
4.47 3.50 908 M O O 7.80 2.74
5 .18 3.22 422 1.00 8.08 3.32
5.52 3.46 117 1.00 7.47 4.04
149 2 .37 3.51 9.95 3.21 7.18 7.50
2 .94 3.41 7.58 2.98 7.95 9.25
2 .97 3.92 11.1 2.94 8.01 9.05
2 .45 3.79 10.5 2.65 7.64 9.03
2 .45 3.65 9.96 2.82 8.73 8.10
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Table 7.2:
ANOVA for Number of Pecks per Visit (excluding COD).
Source Sum of Squares df F Tail
Mean 78310 1 7.81 <1%
Subject 78172 2 3.90 <5%
Condition 50738 1 5.6 <5%
Key 62315 1 6.21 <5%
Sub-Cond 84144 2 4.19 <5%
Sub-Key 84466 2 4.21 <5%
Cond-Key 57307 1 5.71 <5%
Sub-Cond-Key 81288 2 4.05 <5%
Error 481551 48
7.2.1.2 Rates of Responding
The patterning of responding under the various schedules is analysed in
detail in chapter 9. It is sufficient for our present purposes to note that the
results of those analyses show:
1. The data are in all cases parsimoniously described by exponential
distributions.
2. That in some cases the data are best described by combining more than
one distribution.
3. That the means of the distributions are insensitive to the schedule values.
7.2.2 Concurrent Fl
Linear regressions (BMDP Program 1R; Dixon et al 1983) were performed to
relate the post reinforcement pauses to the scheduled minimum
inter-reinforcement intervals, for the last two sessions of each condition for
each subject. Pauses briefer than one second were excluded from the analysis
on the grounds that they were more likely to form part of a bout of responding
during the programmed period of reinforcement (which, due to dead time in the
operation of the machinery was about .5s longer than the period during which
reinforcement was actually available to the subject). These amount to less than
4% of the total number of responses analysed. Results of this regression are
in table 7.3. Although the relationships are slight they are all significant (p<.1%
for t-tests on the gradients, and for regression ANOVAs).
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Table 7.3:
Regressions of Post Rf Pauses vs Schedule Values
Bird n Gradient Intercept r2
130 343 .0573 977.8 .038
144 224 .2616 1150.4 .059
100 322 -.0374 1615.4 .072
7.2.3 Concurrent Arithmetic VI
Similar linear regressions found the relationship between the post
reinforcement pauses on concurrent arithmetic VI and the programmed
minimum interval till next reinforcement (i.e. the next interval in the scheduled
cycle) was usually statistically significant though of very small magnitude. Table
7.4 gives the regression parameters for each subject pooled over the last two
sessions of each condition.
Table 7.4:
Regressions of Post Rf Pauses vs Inter-reinforcement intervals
Bird n Gradient Intercept R2 T(For- g
gradient) (2-tail)
100 293 .0494 733.7 .0762 4.90 <.1%
130 309 .0050 655.3 .009 1.67 <10%
144 300 .0849 898.3 .068 4.67 <•1%
65 317 .0687 471.0 .126 6.75 <. 1%
106 307 .0332 598.0 .101 5.85 <.1%
149 308 .0022 835.4 .001 .39 NS
7.3 Discussion
7.3.1 Concurrent Exponential VI
The above results suggest firstly that the birds are sensitive to the need to
control the length of their visits to a schedule, dependant on the context in
which the schedule is found. Secondly the changes in proportions of visits
during VIVIE 30:240 suggest that the subjects are first reducing the duration of
minor key visits to a minimum, but then towards the end of VIVIE 30:240, and
continuing into VIVIE 60:180 the ineffectiveness of visits shorter than the COD
causes the lengthening of minor key stay times. Since class 2 (COD plus 1
peck) covers a more limited range of possibilities than the other two stay time
classes, it is not surprising that, as the minor key stay times increase on the
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last condition, class 2 fails to increase its share of the visits {it can be seen
however from table 7.1 that the minor key visits are shorter than major key
ones). The absence of a significant difference between the major and minor key
run lengths for Bird 149 on VIVIE 60:180 is the only item against this argument.
An alternative explanation might be proposed that the subjects are making
all visits to the minor key as short as possible (class 1), but that their
perception of relative schedule values is dependant on how different the
schedules are. This would explain why the difference in run lengths (table 7.1)
is more pronounced for the VIVIE 240:30 condition than for VIVIE 60:180. It
could also account for the proportion of minor key visits in class 1 on VIVIE
60:180 being less than on VIVIE 240:30. However such an account would have
difficulty explaining why the proportion of visits in this class for the minor key
was no greater on the final condition than on VIVIE 120:120; nor can it account
for the consistency in major key proportions in class 3 from the second
condition to the third.
7.3.2 Concurrent Fl and Arithmetic VI
Although the minimum time till next reinforcement accounts for only a
small fraction of the variance in post reinforcement pausing on FIFI and VIVIA
(<13%), the effect is none the less statistically very significant in most cases.
This compares with = 80% variance accounted for in an analysis of variance for
Fl, using a more robust definition of post reinforcement pausing (Schneider
1969). If it is accepted that had the pausing here been defined by Schneider's
(1969) method, the same level of relationship would have been found, then it is
noteworthy that there appears to be no trend here in the r2s between
concurrent Fl and the two groups on VIVIA. This is very surprising since the
arithmetic VI requires the subjects to learn the relative values of twelve
intervals per schedule, whilst the Fl only involves one interval. The intercepts,
however, are smaller for the VIVIA conditions than for FIFI; suggesting that
pauses were on average shorter on the former condition than the latter (cf
Catania 8t Reynolds 1968). Although the idea of using linear regression in this
context seems new, previous research has shown that post-reinforcement
pausing is affected by the type of interval schedule (Catania 8* Reynolds 1968
[pigeons]; Harzem, Lowe 8t Priddle-Higson 1978 [rats]) to the extent that
pausing is greatest on Fl schedules, reduced but present on arithmetic VI
schedules, and absent on exponential VI schedules. Table 7.4 is the first
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evidence, however, that the length of a pause is dependant on the component
interval of the schedule that is currently elapsing. Experiments on memory for
time intervals in animals have usually been restricted to three intervals or less
(e.g. Church 1980). It is possible that the ability of birds to discriminate relative
durations of intervals presented repeatedly in the same order has been
seriously underestimated.
These results are in marked contrast to those of Lejeune 81 Richelle (1981),
who compared the performance of barbary doves, pigeons and rats on simple
Fl schedules. They found that the performance of the doves was much worse
than that of pigeons or rats, to the point that they claim that there was no
evidence of post-reinforcement pausing at all for some of their dove subjects.
There seems to be no obvious explanation of this difference in results: an
attempt at replicating their results would offer the only resolution.
7.3.3 General Discussion
Two different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive forms of optimality
analysis have been here applied to three different schedule types. In all cases
some sensitivity to the relevant dimensions has been demonstrated.
It has been found that under concurrent VIVIE the subjects reduce the
length of visits to the minor key, as predicted, but to such a great extent that
under early conditions they were making these visits shorter than the COD and
thereby totally ineffective. Rates of responding were widely variable.
Assessments of the magnitude of post reinforcement pausing in the
literature (e.g. Toal &. Leslie 1984; Harzem et al 1978; Catania 8< Reynolds 1968)
have not attempted regressing the pauses onto the inter-reinforcement
intervals. This method has shown up a slight but significant sensitivity of most
subjects on VIVIA to the twelve component intervals of that schedule. Although
the importance of such a slight effect must not be exaggerated, it does support
the suggestion in chapter 6 that the regularity in these schedules provides an
affordance for the subjects to interweave responding on the schedules
(producing under-matching) and stabilize performance more quickly.
The degree of agreement with optimality predictions found here is
insufficient to justify characterizing the behaviour as 'optimal'; this should not
be surprising. On the other hand the behaviour is more sensitive to the
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relevant dimensions than was found in the floor panel experiment in chapter 5.
This suggests that neither regular nor irregular replenishing patches are totally
alien to the phylogenetic history of the subjects used here. The following two







8.1 Introduction and Data Analysis Methods
Even if the optimality analysis in chapter 7 had accounted for all the
variance in the relevant data, this would still have given us no idea how the
doves were actually controlling their behaviour. Since, in fact, the comparison
against optimality considerations found quite a loose fit, the question that
remains unanswered is all the more substantial. How is the behaviour being
controlled? The matching analysis in chapter 6 has provided some clues, but
the number of degrees of freedom remaining unaccounted for in that form of
analysis are too great for it to be satisfying. In this chapter I consider two
theories that have been proposed to account for behaviour at a finer level of
description. These are momentary maximising and melioration.
8.1.1 Momentary Maximising
Perhaps the most demanding theory of mechanism in the literature (in
terms of processing requirements on the subject), is momentary maximising
(Shimp 1966; 1969; Staddon, Hinson & Kram 1981; Hinson 8t Staddon 1981;
1983). The decision rule for momentary maximising is that the subject should
respond on the alternative offering the highest momentary probability of
reward. In order to do this it has to be aware of the type of schedule it is on,
the nature of the relation determining reinforcement probability on the
schedule, and then somehow perform an operation equivalent to estimating the
probabilities of reinforcement on the options available. Since on Fl and
arithmetic VI schedules the reward probability functions are discontinuous, the
question of momentary maximising reduces to the problem of timing explored
in chapter 7. On concurrent exponential variable interval schedules (VIVIE),
however, momentary maximising is not so simple. Firstly, it may not be
obvious how momentary maximising differs from global optimisation discussed
in chapters 4 & 7. In general an optimisation (or global maximization) account
is looking for the pattern of responding that provides the greatest return of
reinforcement on responding by the end of a session. A momentary maximising
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strategy, on the other hand, requires that each response maximize the
immediate probability of reward. In this particular context Houston & McNamara
(1981, appendix 9) have demonstrated that changing over as soon as the
immediate probability of reward is higher on the alternative schedule leads to
briefer visits to the keys (more rapid switching) than would be found if subjects
changed over so as to maximize pay-off in the long term.
Shimp's (1966) method for testing momentary maximising involved the
production of tables of sequential probabilities "that are as difficult to interpret
as they are inconvenient to compile" (Hinson & Staddon 1983). A major
break-through for the analysis of momentary maximising was the recognition
that the probability of reinforcement at any moment in time on an exponential
VI schedule is fully determined by the time since last response to that schedule
(Houston 8i McNamara 1981; Staddon, Hinson 8t Kram 1981). On an exponential
VI then, the probability of reward at time t since last response to that schedule
is given by:
Equation 8.1
P(Rf|t) = 1 - e"Xt
where X is the mean rate of reinforcement (= 1/ scheduled inter-reinforcement
interval). By demanding that a subject respond on the alternative offering the
highest probability of reinforcement, momentary maximising is stipulating that
to respond on key 1 (say), the following condition be fulfilled:
Relation 8.2
P(Rf|t1) > P(Rf|t2)
1 - e"Vi > 1 ~ e'Vz
X -j 11 > ^2^2
k > *2. °r Ii
t2 x1 t2
where T= 1/X
This seems to imply the need for a substantial timing ability by the subject; the
criterion requires the comparison of the ratio of times since last response on
both keys with the ratio of the schedule values. However, if subjects
responded at a constant rate, momentary maximising would define the number
of responses that should be made to each schedule. Since, for typical schedule
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values, minor key visits under momentary maximizing should be instantaneous
(Houston & McNamara 1981) (as they would under optimisation), then a good
approximation to momentary maximising would require only a suitable length
of visit to the major key. This simplification would not appear to be available to
the subjects since they do not respond at a constant rate (chapter 9), and it
seems they are left with no alternative but to calculate the moment by moment
probabilities on the basis of the times since the last response on each
schedule, and then place their responses accordingly.
Hinson & Staddon (1981; 1983) argue that momentary maximising leads to a
simple measure, m that can be calculated for each session of an experiment, m
is the proportion of pecks placed on the key where the highest probability of
reinforcement was to be found at that moment in time, weighted by the
magnitude of the discrepancies between the probabilities of reward on the key
chosen, compared to the other key. For each response in a session the
absolute difference in probability between the two keys is calculated and
assigned to a cell of a 2 by 2 matrix, according to whether it was on key 1 or
key 2; and whether it was a correctly or incorrectly placed response, m is then
the proportion of the sum of the probability differences that was due to
correctly placed pecks.
Such a method has three drawbacks. Firstly, as mentioned above, one can
find very good momentary maximising from fixed patterns of responding;
Hinson & Staddon's method draws no distinction between different ways of
attaining a value of m. Secondly, it is not possible in principle to compare
probabilities of reward for the current key at this moment in time, with the
probability at the same time on the alternative key, because the alternative key
can only be reached after some time during which reinforcement is
unobtainable. Although Hinson & Staddon's study did not program a
changeover delay (COD), it is none the less apparent from inspection of their
figures 3 and 4 (Hinson Staddon 1983) that there was a minimum interval of
about .7 to .8s between the last peck on one key and the first peck on the
other. This interval cannot be simply incorporated in the calculation of the
reward probability on the alternative key, because the question then becomes
one of comparing a certain probability of reinforcement here and now, with
another probability of reinforcement after a delay. This is a subjective choice
and leads us into the realm of temporal discount functions (for a discussion of
discount functions in foraging see Real 1980).
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The third problem with this method is that it only assesses whether a peck
was placed on the correct key, not whether it was right to peck at all. The
variability in rate of responding makes some responses 'pointless', in the sense
that they occur so soon after the previous responses (relative to the average
rate of responding) that the increment in reinforcement probability on the
present schedule is totally insignificant.
The method that will be adopted here is to plot the ratios of the
probabilities of reinforcement on the two keys at the time of each response,
against the time of response. This time series approach, though it does not
yield a summary statistic for a benchmark of momentary maximising, does
enable one to identify the relative efficacy, in terms of reinforcement
probability, of responses at different points in time.
Data will also be presented in the form of Hinson & Staddon's (1981; 1983)
'Clock-space'. The clockspace was developed to display the temporal patterning
of responses so that the degree to which the data supported momentary
maximising could be easily seen. Since the critical factor (ignoring COD) in
momentary maximising is the time since last response to each key, the clock
space plots for each response, time since last key 1 peck (t-,) on the x-axis,
against time since last key 2 response (t2) on the y-axis. Figure 8.1 shows
three sample points plotted in the clockspace. Let us consider for simplicity
the case where the schedule values are equal. Point A represents a response
that occurs 7 sees after the last key 1 response, and 5 sees after the last key 2
response. Since t-] > t2 this response will momentary maximise only if it is a
key 1 response. Similarly point B, where t2 > t1( will only be momentary
maximising if it is on key 2. Point C, and all other points on the line t-j = t2,
represents the transition between the states where key 1 responding is
required for momentary maximising (below the line), and key 2 responding is
correct (above the line). Hinson & Staddon call this the 'switching line', and
from relation 8.2, it can be seen that its gradient is T1/T2.
Figure 8.2 (from Hinson 8i Staddon 1983 figure 2) shows how three
simulated patterns of responding appear in the clock space. The top row
shows responding that is indifferent to momentary probabilities of reward (but
that matches). Responding which fulfils the momentary maximising criterion -
always responding on the key offering the highest momentary probability of
reward is shown in the middle row, while the lowest panels show momentary
figure 8.1
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time since last key 1 response
figure 8.2
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maximising patterns, allowing a minimum time spent in changing over from one
key to the other. It should also be noted that responding that always occurs at
a constant ratio of reward probabilities can only arise through a constant ratio
of times since last response to each key, and so will fall along a line through
the origin of the clockspace. Pecks at a constant interpeck interval will form a
line parallel to the axis representing time since last peck to the alternative key.
8.1.2 Melioration
Recognizing that matching did not identify a process, but just a molar
average result, Herrnstein & Vaughan (1980; Vaughan 1981; Herrnstein 1982)
proposed a process of 'melioration' (meaning 'bettering') that would approach
matching as a molar result, and maintain the philosophy of matching
transposed to a more mechanistic level. A similar theory has also been
proposed within the ethological literature (Harley 1981; Harley & Maynard Smith
1983; Lester 1984) as a process to approximate optimal foraging.
In Herrnstein 8t Vaughan's formulation, a parameter RD is identified, which is
the difference in local rates of reinforcement.
Equation 8.3
Rd = " El
ti t2
where R and t are in this case the local numbers of reinforcements and times
spent responding on each of 2 alternative schedules. "Melioration requires a
subject to redistribute responses associated with lower to those with higher
local rates of reinforcement. Equilibrium is attained when the alternatives
reinforce at equal rates, which is formally equivalent to matching" (Herrnstein 8t
Vaughan 1980). That is to say RD should be minimized. Aside from predicting
matching as a molar finding, melioration is so vaguely stated that it is not at
all clear what its local level predictions are.
The theories of 'Dynamic Matching' (Lester 1984) and 'Relative Pay-off Sum'
(Harley 1981; Harley 8t Maynard Smith 1983) expand the same idea as
melioration, but with greater mathematical rigour. 'Dynamic matching' is
Lester's simplification of Harley's 'relative pay-off sum' model, and forms a link
between the sketchy formalization of the melioration account, and the elaborate
multi-parameter 'relative pay-off sum' theory.
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Harley suggests that an animal in an environment consisting of discrete
patches, allocates its time to each patch according to the proportion of
rewards it obtained in each patch in the interval since last decision:
Equation 8.4
where Ti n+1 is the time spent in patch i during the n+lth time bin; R, n is the
number of rewards obtained in patch i during time bin n, and k is the number
of patches.
In a two patch environment this implies that the ratio of time spent in the
two patches in the (n+1)th time bin is equal to the ratio of rewards obtained in
each patch in the previous time. bin.
It can be seen that as RD in equation 8.3 tends to zero, so that equation and
equation 8.5 become similar. There is, however, a difference. Lester's dynamic
matching rule contains subscripts that distinguish responding in the future,
from the rewards in the past that influenced it. Equation 8.3 contains no such
subscripts. From Herrnstein & Vaughan's written explanations of the theory it
would appear that this omission is an oversight. The section quoted above
from Herrnstein 8t Vaughan (1980) is certainly expressing the idea that future
responding is a consequence of past reinforcements. Henceforth in this account
I will assume melioration to be identical to Lester's dynamic matching rule.
Herrnstein 8< Vaughan's failure to mathematically characterize their model
correctly has led to confusion as to the predictions of the theory. Real &.
Dreyfus (1985), for example, found that local response proportion on concurrent
VIVI oscillated, rather than stabilizing to the session average value, and took
this to refute Herrnstein 8t Vaughan's statement that the subject should
equalize response and reinforcement proportions. Lester (1984) has shown
however that the model of equations 8.4 and 8.5 predicts oscillation of
preference as a consequence of present response proportion being based on
reward proportion in the past. If the patches deplete, then oscillation in





VI schedules used by Real & Dreyfus would not change in their payout, on
smaller timescales the availability of prey would certainly be expected to vary
substantially due to the stochastic nature of the schedule.
Harley's relative pay-off sum model can be obtained from Lester's dynamic
matching rule by substituting
for R| n in equation 8.4 (Lester 1984). b is a weighting parameter determining
the effect of more distant rewards (at lag j) on behaviour.
The right hand side of equation 8.4 thereby becomes:
That is to say, response proportion is now determined not just by reward
proportion in the previous time bin, but by the weighted sum of rewards over
all the previous time bins. These are weighted so that the most recent time
bins have the most substantial impact on response proportion.
To make the model stochastic rather than deterministic, Harley considers
the left hand side to be the probability of a patch i choice, Pj n+i, rather than
the proportion of patch i choices: mathematically these are equivalent.
The final elaboration that Harley introduces into the model is to include a
quantity e| representing the subjects prior expectation of gain in patch i. These
are constants that sum onto the effect of immediately previous feeding
experience. The complete model can now be expressed:
Lester shows that although Harley's model is more elaborate, its parameter
independent predictions are in line with those of the simpler
melioration/dynamic matching rule.
bn jR;j where 0<b<1
Equation 8.6
It might appear that a melioration type rule cannot be tested in a free
operant environment without difficult, perhaps critical assumptions about the
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interval between decision points. The general principle of whether the
distribution of reinforcements is influencing the moment to moment
distribution of responding in the future can be tested by the method of
cross-correlational analysis. Cross-correlation involves the correlation of each
point in a time series with points in another time series. These may be points
in the future (positive lags) or past (negative lags), and by exploring the
cross-correlation between two time series at a variety of lags we can see
whether one series is tending to recapitulate the same pattern as the other.
This method only has validity if each series does not have a significant
tendency to oscillate or cycle in its values. If the two series cycle, then
significant cross-correlation may occur just because the cyclings are
accidentally in phase at certain points. Autocorrelation provides a technique to
investigate cyclings in a series. In autocorrelational analysis each item in a
time series is correlated with its neighbour a certain number of items away
(these are best calculated after partialling out the effect of autocorrelations at
intermediary lags (partial autocorrelations)). If there are significant
autocorrelations this means that a series is tending to repeat itself (Chatfield
1975).
Following Real & Dreyfus (1985), we need firstly to identify the minimum
period over which a proportion of responding can be defined. This is, of course,
a cycle of a visit to one key, followed by a visit to the other key: i.e. two
consecutive change overs. We can then add together the pecks and
reinforcements occurring in different numbers of consecutive cycles and
calculate response and reinforcement proportions for different levels of
aggregation. In the present study aggregates of up to 40 cycles were
investigated. Autocorrelational analysis (BMDP Program 2T; Dixon et al 1983)
was employed to investigate cyclings within each series; and then
cross-correlations (ibid) were used to identify any tendency for changes in one




8.2.1.1 Time Series Analysis of Reward Probability Ratios
For reasons that will become clear, I firstly consider only those pecks that
initiated visits to a key. Figure 8.3 shows the ratios of the reward probability on
key 1, over the reward probability on key 2 (calculated from equation 8.1) at the
time of changing over, for ten minute segments from the first session of the
first condition, and the last sessions of all VIVIE conditions for subject 65.
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 present the same data for subjects 106 and 149. Logs have
been taken of these ratios to make them symmetrical. Circles identify key 1
responses; asterisks key 2. It can be seen that the reward probability ratios are
consistently on the correct side of the line representing equality of
probabilities, and therefore that the reward probability ratios at change-over
are different for the two keys.
Figures 8.6 - 8.8 contain all the responses occurring in 5 minute segments
from the same sessions as figures 8.3 to 8.5. This set of graphs is
characteristic of all sessions in that most responses fall the wrong side of the
line of equality of reinforcement probabilities. One subset of responses
however, the responses that were shown in figures 8.3- 8.5, the first responses
to a new key (identified in figures 8.6 - 8.8 by super-imposed squares), always
occurs on the correct side of the equality line. Noting that this study
programmed a COD but that responses within it were not recorded, it can be
seen that subjects are responding too rapidly for too long a time once on a
key (such that the probability of reward on the other key was higher); but that
by the time they do change over they always do so when the local
probabilities of reward strongly favour such an action. This is what one would
expect given the unquantifiable, but discouraging, impact of a COD on crossing
over.
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8.2.1.2 Clockspace
Figures 8.9 - 8.11 contain, for the same sessions as figures 8.3 to 8.5,
results presented in the clockspace format. Remember that, for momentary
maximising, key 1 responses should fall below the switching line, and key 2
responses above. Table 8.1 contains the mean percentage of responses on the
correct side of the switching line, for the first five sessions of VIVIE 120:120;
and the last five sessions of all VIVIE conditions.
Table 8.1:
Percentage responses on the correct side of the switching line.
Mean of five sessions






120:120 Major 43 39.6 37.6
End Minor 11.6 25 27
240:30 Major 12.2 2.8 46
End Minor 38.8 84.6 16.8
60:180 Major 29.2 24.6 27.4
End Minor 8.6 30.4 7.6
As could be predicted from figures 8.6 to 8.8 these proportions are small (with
the exception of the anomalous case of bird 106, minor key under VIVIE 240:30).
Figures 8.12 - 8.14, following figures 8.3 - 8.5, present in clockspace form just
the first responses to a new key (here, because there is so little overlap keys 1
and 2 are plotted on the same graphs, as circles and asterisks, respectively).
With the exception of the case with the most widely differing schedule values
(VIVIE 240:30), these responses are far more often on the correct side of the
switching line. Note that whereas from figure 8.3 to 8.5 we can only identify
that the first pecks to a key are at a fairly constant reward probability ratio,
from figures 8.12 - 8.14 it can be seen that this is achieved even though time
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8.2.2.1 Response and Reinforcer Proportions
As described in the introduction, response and reinforcer proportions were
calculated for different numbers of cycles aggregated together (where a cycle
was defined as two consecutive changeovers). For aggregates of less than 5
cycles the number of reinforcements occurring on either or both keys was too
often zero for the analysis to be worth proceeding with: aggregates of over 30
cycles usually smoothed out to the session average values. Figures 8.15 to 8.18
show the first 100 response and reward proportions (on key 1) for the last
sessions of a selection of conditions and subjects at aggregates of 5, 15 and
25 cycles. Figure 8.15 shows data from the last session of bird 130 on FIFI
120:120; 8.16 shows bird 65 VIVIE 240:30, last session; 8.17 shows bird 100
VIVIA 240:30, last session; and 8.18 shows the last session of VIVIA 120:120 for
bird 106. Aggregates are calculated for each cycle, so neighbouring data points
overlap substantially in the cycles they are calculated from. Response
proportions are circles joined by solid lines; reinforcement proportions are
triangles joined by dashed lines.
These four figures show clearly that there are fluctuations in both series.
These oscillations appear larger in the reinforcement proportion series,
especially at aggregates of 5 cycles where the absence of reinforcement on
one or other key forces the proportion to its boundary values.
8.2.2.2 Time Series Correlations
Figure 8.19 shows partial autocorrelograms and cross-correlation plots, as
described in section 8,2.1.1 for aggregates of 5 cycles from the penultimate
session under FIFI 120:120 for bird 130, and the last session under VIVIE
120:120 for bird 106. The value of the correlation on the y-axis is plotted
against lag (in cycles) on the x-axis. The 5% significance level for these
correlations is indicated by the dashed line. The graphs shown are typical in
that there are often a few significant autocorrelations, almost always at lag
one, and often scattered unsystematically at larger lags. The existence of the
significant autocorrelations means that the cross-correlations must be treated
with caution. Correlograms of more than 5 cycles produced graphs smoother
than these, usually with a maximum cross-correlation at lag zero. If as
melioration predicts, the previous reinforcement proportion is influencing the
figure 8.15
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future response proportion, then significant positive cross-correlations at
negative lags will be observed. In the graphs in figure 8.19 these can be
observed, and they imply that a particular value of reinforcement proportion
tends to be followed a certain number of cycles later by a similar proportion of
responses. However, the existence of significant cross-correlations at positive
lags means that a particular value of response proportion would tend to be
followed by a similar reinforcement proportion at some point in the future. This
is simply a result of the schedule payout being to some extent responsive to
the subject's behaviour, and does not contradict melioration. A problem arises
though, because if, as is often the case (see figure 8.19 upper panel), a
timeseries contains significant autocorrelations, and if, as is also common, the
series contains significant cross-correlations at positive lags (response ■*
reinforcement); then the existence of significant cross-correlations at negative
lags (reinforcement -> response) would be the necessary resultant and need not
imply that response proportion is tracking reinforcement proportion. In short
melioration is only supported by significant positive cross-correlations at
negative lags, in cases where there are not also both significant
cross-correlations at positive lags, and significant autocorrelations. In figure
8.19 the upper panels (subject 130) show a typical example of a case where
melioration effect could not be discerned because the the significant
cross-correlations at negative lags are clearly accounted for by the
cross-correlations at positive lags. The case of subject 106, shown in the lower
panels of figure 8.H shows clear evidence of a tendency for a significant
cross-correlation at negative lags in the absence of any substantial
cross-correlation at positive lags, and therefore this can be scored as a 'hit' for
melioration.
Table 8.2:
Number of 5% significant autocorrelations in the peck series





















120:120 9 3 13 9 16 6
240:30 3 3 4 4 4 2







































Table 8.3: Number of 5% significant cross-correlations
at positive lags (Response -» Reinforcement):
Last 2 sessions
Concurrent FIFI
Condition Bird- 144 130 100
120:120 0 3 7 8 0 1
240:30 0 1 1 0 2 1





















Condition Bird- 144 130 100
120:120 0 0 7 3 4 3
240:30 0 0 6 3 0 5
60:180 0 0 7 1 0 0
Condition Bird- 65 106 149
120:120 0 0 2 6 3 16
240:30 1 0 7 0 1 2
60:180 4 0 1 2 0 0
39/26
44/27
Table 8.2 gives the number of significant positive partial autocorrelations in
the response proportions of each subject on the last 2 sessions under each
condition. Table 8.3 shows the number of significant positive cross-correlations
at positive lags (response ■* reinforcement), and table 8.4 shows the same for
negative lags (reinforcement -*• response). Cases of significant negative lags in
the absence of both significant positive lag cross-correlations and
autocorrelations are underlined.
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Table 8.4: Number of 5% significant cross-correlations
at negative lags (Reinforcement -> Response):
Last 2 sessions
Concurrent FIFI
Condition Bird- 144 130 100
120:120 0 0
. 7 9 0 5
240:30 0 5 1 0 0 2
60:180 0 0 3 3 2 1
Concurrent VIVIE
Condition Bird- 65 106 149
120:120 14 6 5 8 0 2
240:30 0 0 6 13 1 0
60:180 5 0 6 5 8 8
Concurrent VIVIA
Condition Bird- 144 130 100
120:120 0 0 2 7 4 3
240:30 0 0 0 8 0 5
60:180 0 1 3 0 0 2
Condition Bird- 65 106 149
120:120 0 0 5 0 0 16
240:30 2 7 3 5 0 1





An additional complexity in these data is that 1 in 20 correlations significant
at the 5% level, would be expected by chance. Since, where the data were rich
enough, correlations were performed up to 30 lags, one or two false positives
would be expected in each set. The fraction in the bottom right corner of each
panel of tables 8.2 to 8.4 gives the observed number of significant correlations
for each group of conditions, over the number to be expected by chance.
The tendency of reinforcement patterning to influence future response
choice is not strong. Inspection of table 8.4 shows that there are many cases
where there are no more significant cross-correlations at negative lags than
would be expected by chance (subject 144 throughout; subjects 100, 130 & 65
under VIVIA). Most of the cases where cross correlations at negative lags do
occur correspond to where cross-correlations at positive lags and
autocorrelations are also found. We are left with only 8 cases (out of 64) that
The results of these analyses can be summarized as follows. For
momentary maximising the only evidence that responses were being placed on
the option offering the highest momentary probability of reward was for the
first response to a new option. Other responses were not well placed in th/ s
regard. Melioration received even less support. The use of cross-correlational
analysis did not find any significant tendency for past reinforcement proportion
to influence the proportion of responses to each option in the future.
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could support a melioration type process. A contingency table was
constructed from the number of underlined and non-underlined cells for each
subject in table 8.4. A chi-square was then performed to test whether the
occurrences of support for melioration were evenly distributed across the
subjects. The result for this test was non-significant (x 2 = 11-25; df 11; NS); as
was a test for differences between conditions (xz=1.54; df 2; NS).
T8.3 Discussion
Analysing each response for its momentary probability of reward has
shown that the vast majority of responses are poorly placed. Any statistic
intended to encapsulate these results would yield a negative assessment. Such
an approach would overlook however the fact that a certain subset of
responses - the first response to a new key, are consistently well placed with
high reliability. It might be suggested that this effect is an artefact of the
employment of a COD in this study. The COD, as mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter, will in some unquantifiable way, add a cost to
changing over, because it defines a 2 sec period during which the probability
of reward is zero. On a narrow interpretation of momentary maximising this
might be predicted to abolish changing over because the momentary
probability of reward on the alternative key is zero (Staddon 1983:240); it would
certainly tend to produce perseveration on a key. Thus the probability of
reward for the new key ignoring COD, when at last the subject chooses to
change over, is bound to be high. The constancy of reward probability ratios
at changeover shown in figures 8.3 to 8.5 appears to suggest that the subjects
have some capability to balance their time since last changeover against time
of last response to the same key, to maintain an advantageous momentary
probability of reinforcement. The question then arises as to why they do not
use this ability to guide all their responding. The analysis of patterning of
responding in chapter 9 was partly aimed at this question, but no answer was
forthcoming.
Hinson 8i Staddon's study did not identify any particular subset of
responses as being better placed than the rest. One would expect that the
effect might be less pronounced because their study did not program a COD. It
remains possible, however that in the calculation of their m statistic, the effect
of many slightly badly placed within-visit pecks was being offset by the
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occasional changeover response with markedly favourable reinforcement
probability. Though it is not possible to be precise, inspection of Hinson and
Staddon's (1983) figures 3 and 4 suggests that even where m is over .8 there
are still about 30 to 40% of pecks on the wrong side of the switching line -
that is to say, responses on the key offering the lower probability of
reinforcement. There is, unfortunately, no way of telling from these figures
whether these pecks are within-visit or changeover responses.
The analysis of melioration presented here differs from other attempts in
the psychological literature (with the exception of Shimp 1982c) to analyse
preference controlling mechanisms of this type, by recognizing the two
directions of relationship through which matching can be attained. One is the
inevitable (on stable schedules) chain of causation by which a certain choice
proportion tends to produce a related proportion of reinforcements. The other,
and more theoretically interesting direction of relationship, is between the
proportion of reinforcements and the future proportion of responding. It is the
failure to recognize these two ways in which response and reinforcement
proportions can become similar, that has led to the over-estimation, in my
opinion, of the matching relation as a description of behaviour. The evidence
presented here has suggested that in fact the tendency for reinforcement
proportion to influence future responding proportion is very small; although the
possibility that this effect occurs over very brief time lags (Horner 8i Staddon
1986) was not amenable to analysis by the method used here.
The fact that a relationship was found between response proportion and
future reinforcement proportions suggests that the breakdown of the session
time into cycles, defined by changing over, and aggregates of cycles, was not
the factor responsible for the failure to find an effect of reinforcement
proportion on response distribution.
In order to test melioration against literal optimisation theory Vaughan
(1981) developed a very elaborate form of concurrent schedule. I will call this
schedule a 'responsive' schedule, because one of its peculiarities is that it
reassess the payout of its two keys according to the response proportion of
the subject in the last 4 mins. The other peculiarity was that the VI timer for a
key only ran in the 2secs following each response, and not at all during
reinforcements. The response proportion was split into eighths, as shown in
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the right 0 -» 1/8 and 7/8 1) the left key paid off at 60 reinforcements per
hour (Rf/h), and the right at 180 Rf/h. Between 1/8 -► 2/8 and 6/8 -»■ 7/8 both
schedules paid out at the same rate, 180 Rf/h in the former case and 60 Rf/h in
the latter. In the range of right key proportion 2/8 -* 6/8 the keys moved
gradually in their pay out from the 180 Rf/h level to the 60 Rf/h level.
Assuming that the inter peck interval is always less than 2 sees so that the
programmed rates are actually experienced, this procedure offers two possible
response proportion ranges where matching of response and reinforcement
proportions is possible (1/8 -»> 2/8; 6/8 ->■ 7/8); one of which (1/8 -► 2/8)
provides the highest possible payout. On condition (a) the left key paid off
better than the right in the range of response proportion 2/8 ■* 6/8; for the
second condition this relation was reversed so that the right key paid out
better in this range. The point of this procedure was that under condition (b) a
meliorating subject whose relative time allocation fell within the middle range
would be expected to shift preference towards the right and then stabilize in
the 6/8 -»■ 7/8 range; which would not produce the level of reinforcement
available in the 1/8 ->■ 2/8 range.
Vaughan found that 2 out of 3 subjects produced response proportions
between 1/8 -»■ 2/8 for condition (a), and then changed to 6/8 -»> 7/8 for
condition (b), supporting his melioration account (the third subject evinced the
same preference under condition (a) but only changed to the 6/8 -* 7/8 range
on condition (b) after two manipulations of procedure making the 1/8 -*■ 2/8
equilibrium very unstable. Vaughan's argument that this subject was not
experiencing the 2/8 -+ 6/8 preference zone and therefore could not be aware
of the changed contingencies is refuted by careful inspection of his figure 2
[consider sessions 35, 37, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]).
Vaughan's experiment does not distinguish between melioration and any
other molecular level account of behaviour (except minimization of deviation
from matching, which he acknowledges to have no adherents). Although the
observation that two out of three subjects altered their behaviour away from a
global maximum as predicted by melioration would contradict a literal
optimising account, such a theory has few adherents either (except Rachlin,
Battalio, Kagel & Green 1981).
The real interest in this procedure lies in the use to which it was put by
Silberberg & Ziriax (1985). They employed a similar responsive form of
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scheduling where schedule parameters changed (less elaborately than
Vaughan's) according to response proportion. The crucial difference in
Silberberg & Ziriax's procedure was that they ran the first four conditions with
a timer assessing response proportions and resetting reinforcement timers over
just the last 6 sees; the last four sessions used a 4 min timer as in Vaughan
(1981). Their rationale for comparing these two timer values was to test the
position that the subjects were attempting to momentary maximize but that the
4 min timer was making it impossible for the pigeons to integrate their
behaviour over a long enough time period to maximize reinforcement
probability effectively. Under Vaughan's condition (b) a subject with relative
time to the right in the mid-range (2/8 -* 6/8) would, they point out, have to
increase time allocation to the left key for four minutes despite its lower
reinforcement rate in order to maximize. With a 6 sees timer Silberberg & Ziriax
predicted that the birds would be able to maximize because they would be able
to integrate their behaviour over time intervals as long as those being used by
the experiment controlling computer.
Although melioration in this case was not supported for the 6 sees timer
(Rd) varied with response proportion) this is as likely to be due to the small
number of sessions run with each of 4 subjects (range 14- 20), and the
absence of any attempt to manipulate schedules post hoc to produce
melioration, as to the change in timer value. Momentary maximization was
supported to some extent in 3 out of 4 subjects under the 6secs preference
timer, though the data presented are for only 2 out of 8 conditions and do not
permit a very clear comparison. Their figure 4 shows individual subject relative
time allocation frequencies for condition 1 (one of the 6 sees timer conditions),
but summed data for condition 6 (the equivalent condition with a 4 min timer).
Inspection of this figure suggests that if the data had been presented summed
for both conditions, the difference between them would not have appeared so
large. Perhaps if all the results had been presented as separate subject data the
difference suggested might also have been less marked.
Though Silberberg & Ziriax interpret their results in a manner consistent
with the present study (some support for momentary maximising; none for
melioration), I am reticent to give much weight to data from such a peculiar
set of scheduled contingencies. No hard and fast distinction can be drawn
between 'natural' and 'unnatural' experiments. None the less, conditions where
the payout of the schedules is itself continuously reassessed on the basis of
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the subjects' responses, produces a disruption in the basic relation between
behaviour and environmental effect, that is extremely unlikely to have any even
approximate natural analogue. In this account I have followed the original
authors in assuming a high and constant rate of response, so that the
programmed contingencies are those experienced. However, because the
schedules are responsive to the subjects' behaviour in a quite elaborate way,
what is really needed is a thorough analysis of the relation between different
response patterns and their net returns, and to deduce the optimal strategy.
Such an analysis is beyond the competence of the present author.
A preferable method for testing rules of thumb in behaviour is Lester's
(1984) employment of a very simple foraging paradigm, placing a small group
of goldfish into a tank containing two compartments into which different
amounts of food had previously been introduced. This method reduces the
impact of behaviour on the environment to the very ecologically plausible
process of depletion. Although Lester's study suffers somewhat because it was
not possible to test individual subjects, and the level of food remaining in a
patch could only be estimated from the time the fish had spent in it, it is none
the less a neat paradigm. Lester found cyclings in the preference of the group
of fish with the period predicted by melioration ('dynamic matching').
Momentary maximising was not considered, but in this condition would predict
a rapid switching of preference as soon as a patch had been depleted below
the level of its alternative. Although this pattern is not found in Lester's
results on the average, his preference data (presented averaged for the group)
do contain small, rapid fluctuations (see his figure 5) which might have been
due to individual subjects switching patches more rapidly as their assessment
of present patch quality fell below their memory of food availability in the
alternative patch.
Kacelnik 8t Krebs (1985) report some results from a study in press (Kacelnik,
Krebs 8i Ens 1986) utilizing starlings foraging in an aviary containing two
operant feeding devices activated by perching on the feeder. They were
interested in the starlings' response to a sudden change in the availability of
resources. This was done by having each feeder pay out initially at a different
probability. There were two conditions, reward probabilities of .75 and .08, and
probabilities of .25 and .08. On the second day of testing the payout of the
better feeder was abruptly stopped without any signal. Kacelnik 8i Krebs report
that the falloff in preference for the originally better option was too rapid to be
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accounted for by any melioration type ('linear operator' in their terminology)
model. Unfortunately the data they present (leastways in Kacelnik & Krebs;
1985) are averaged over three birds and ten replications. It would be very
interesting to see to what extent the starlings' response to the sudden
depletion had changed with increasing experience. None the less this is a
study with substantial external validity that raises real problems for a
completely melioration type of account. Kacelnik & Krebs suggest a two
process model which adds to the melioration (linear operator) theory a process
representing the subjects 'confidence' that the reward probability in the patch
has not fallen to zero. The authors acknowledge that this amounts to allowing
that the birds 'know' that the profitability of a patch may drop to zero.
Incorporating a factor assessing the probability that abrupt patch depletion has
taken place, brings their model closer to a momentary maximising theory. The
difference that remains is that this probability is calculated from the organisms
experience of reward or non-reward, whereas the momentary maximising
model under discussion here considers the a priori probability of reward.
In conclusion, this analysis has found no support for melioration in barbary
doves, but some for the momentary maximising found in pigeons in operant
experiments by Hinson & Staddon (1981; 1983) and Silberberg & Ziriax (1985).
This momentary maximising, however, is only for the first peck to a new
schedule, and responses within a visit were found to be unreliably timed. These
results contradict Vaughan's (1981) claim that melioration is the choice
controlling mechanism on concurrent schedules. It also disagrees with Lester's
(1984) study suggesting melioration as the rule of thumb used by goldfish; but
may not be inconsistent with Kacelnik 8t Krebs' (1985) results from starlings.
Melioration is a much simpler process than momentary maximising. To
respond on the option having the highest momentary probability of reward, a
subject has to have some understanding of the process setting up rewards;
whereas to meliorate, all that is required is to shift responding towards the
higher local density of prey. It is possible that foragers, where they can (i.e.
where the system offers affordances to which they are sensitive), will attempt
to forage on the site offering the highest momentary probability of reward. As
the environment becomes less stable, less characterized by temporal and
spatial regularity, and as the integrative capabilities of the organisms under
study become smaller, then all they are left with as a pointer to higher
probability of food, are the local rates of reward, and so momentary maximising
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reduces to melioration.
Although it would be premature to claim that the process controlling
foraging in general is momentary maximising (it is not even clear that
momentary maximising [certainly of a priori probabilities], can be defined in all
possible contexts); none the less there does appear to be good evidence that
some subjects (birds, at least) can integrate information about the environment
more elaborately than the simple 'reward tracking' espoused by melioration






Twice above the need for an analysis of the fine temporal patterning of
responding has arisen. In chapter 7 it was mentioned that McNamara &
Houston (1983) had shown that optimal responding on variable interval
schedules demanded a single inter-response time (IRT), and that any mixture of
IRTs was bound to reduce foraging efficiency. In chapter 8 I suggested that a
direct analysis of IRTs might shed light on why changeover (CO) responses
were placed on the key offering the highest momentary probability of reward,
but subsequent pecks were not. Local response patterning is also central to
any analysis inspired by the paradigm of 'Variation 8t Selection' outlined in
chapter 3. If the processes of 'blind variation' and 'selective retention' do occur
in behaviour we cannot expect to observe them until we have established the
units of behaviour that are under the subjects' control.
Molar psychological theories of behaviour have tended to ignore or
down-rate the local patterning of responding in operant environments. Shimp
(1979) has pointed out that even the gearing of event recorders standard in
operant research, has been designed to suppress local irregularities and make
the cumulative curve of responding appear smooth. He has further (Shimp
1982c) catalogued a number of cases where molar theorists have ignored
interesting response patternings and relationships at more microscopic levels.
Rachlin (1978), for example, assumes that the steady state IRT distribution is
random, even though he acknowledges that there is evidence this is not so.
Nevin (1969; 1979); Heyman (1979); Weiss, Laties, Siegel 8t Goldstein (1966);
Tustin 8i Davison (1978) and Leslie (1981) have all published data purporting to
show that at the local level behaviour on concurrent schedules is indifferent to
the pattern of reinforcement. Shimp (1982c) has particular quarrels with Nevin's
(1969; 1979) analyses, but also points out that in any case, to demonstrate that
local effects are random or negligible by any one form of analysis does not
prove in general that local patterns of responding are trivial.
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There is now a growing body of data, discussed above (chapter 7) showing
that the local patterns of one form or another, are legitimate entities for
analysis, even on standard concurrent schedules (e.g. Hinson 8< Staddon 1981;
1983; Real 1983; Real & Dreyfus 1985). Shimp has himself demonstrated in a
series of experiments that pigeons can be trained to emit shorter or longer
IRTs (1968; 1970); different short patterns of responding across two keys
(1982b; 1982c) and can remember the behaviour they emitted a short time
before (1982a; 1982b).
The argument from Evolutionary Epistemology (chapter 3) demands more
than just that local response patternings should be trainable; they should also
arise spontaneously. Lashley (1951) was very concerned about natural rhythms
of behaviour, he felt that they would be a consequence of the reverberatory
cycles he envisaged operating in the nervous system. He suggested;
I can best illustrate this conception of nervous action by
picturing the brain as the surface of a lake. The prevailing
breeze carries small ripples in its direction, the basic polarity of
the system. Varying gusts set up crossing systems of waves,
which do not destroy the first ripples, but modify their form, a
second level in the system of space coordinates. A tossing log
with its own period of submersion sends out periodic bursts of
ripples, a temporal rhythm
Lashley 1951
Lashley's poetry seems, for the most part, to have fallen on deaf ears - at
least so far as comparative psychology is concerned.
Some early authors noticed a tendency for responding on operant
schedules to occur in bouts. Mecher (1958) noted that under extinction after
responding on a variable ratio schedule, rats tended to respond in distinct
bouts or runs of high response rate, rather than continuously responding at an
intermediate rate. Blough (1963) developed an interesting method of displaying
IRTs on a cathode ray oscilloscope. He found clear non-uniformities in the
patterning of a pigeon's IRTs produced by two different schedules. Under VI 4
min two peaks in the IRT record were noted (at approx ,4secs and 2->-3secs);
when the schedule was changed to FR30 these two peaks came close together
(.4secs & .7secs). Blough concluded:
Certain of the responses that contribute to the 'rate' on VI and
149
DRL [Differential Reinforcement of Low rate] schedules are almost
entirely controlled by prior responses; their probability does not
vary with extinction, stimulus change, etc., except indirectly
through changes in the probability of the responses on which
they depend.
In other words Blough found strong evidence for bouting of responses.
More recently the work of Schwartz (1980; 1985) has provided another form
of support for Lashley's notion. He gave pigeons a panel of 36 lights that they
had to illuminate in any order from top left to bottom right. They did this by
pecking on two keys; one of which moved the illumination one row downwards,
and the other moved it one column to the right. The birds received
reinforcement when the bottom right light was illuminated, independent of the
sequence of lights that had been passed through. The only restriction was that
they should not attempt, by pecking the two keys, to push the illumination
beyond the boundaries of the array. Schwartz observed that although many
patterns of movement of the light through the array were possible, only certain
patterns were observed; and in most cases a small subset of patternings
dominated all the birds' attempts.
In ethology the subjective impression of spontaneous patterning in
behaviour is a commonplace. Slater (1973) and Machlis (1977) review the
attempts to make these subjective Gestalten (Lorenz 1971/1959) into rigorous
mathematical descriptions of behaviour. In the context of very stereotyped
behaviours such as pecks, this question resolves itself into the problem of
trying to find a rigorous mathematical justification for the natural tendency of
ethologists to clump observations of responses into bouts. Early definitions of
the bout emphasized a period of pecking uninterrupted by other activity (e.g.
Feekes 1972; Wiepkema 1968), or IRTs shorter than some 'bout criterion
interval' (BCI) chosen by inspection (e.g. Zeigler, Green 8t Lehrer 1971; Andrew
1964). As Machlis (1977) points out, these definitions served their authors'
purposes.
An early step towards a more rigorous definition of bouts was Nelson's
(1964) recognition, analysing the courtship of glandulocaudine fish, that if the
intervals between events are statistically independent, then the cumulated sum
of intervals greater than a particular value (the survivorship plot) will describe a
negative exponential curve; and so if the ordinate is plotted logarithmically (the
log survivorship plot) the result will be a straight line of negative slope. When
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Nelson did this he found that for some actions of the male fish, a convex curve
was found. However, when occurrences of these actions were separated out
according to whether a spot on the underside of the fish's body was black or
not, it was found that the two new sets of intervals each produced a straight
line in the log survivorship graph. The convenience of a chameleon spot on a
subject to identify which intervals between events belong to which underlying
process is not readily available, and so other methods have been developed to
disambiguate mixtures of interval generating processes.
Heiligenberg (1965) analysing mouthing actions of fish compared the
distribution of progressively larger intervals between events, until he found the
point at which the distribution departed from what would be expected on the
assumption of a Poisson process. Most subsequent research on this problem
has followed Nelson (1964) in centring on the log survivorship plot and
attempting to deduce the optimal BCI from there. If two processes of different
rates are generating the intra-bout and inter-bout intervals then the log
survivorship function will be convex (Wiepkema 1968; Delius 1969; Duncan,
Home, Hughes & Wood-Gush 1970).
Duncan et al (1970), following Wiepkema (1968), looked for a discontinuity in
the survivorship plots as an estimate of the BCI. This method is still common
(Clifton 1979; Culshaw & Broom 1980; Petersen 1976; 1978; Slater 1974a; 1974b;
1975).
Machlis (1977) outlined a method intended to make the determination of a
BCI more rigorous. She suggested that a computerized procedure be used that
worked from the left of the cumulative survivorship plot. Firstly a negative
exponential was fitted to the intervals longer than the present point (x), and
tested against the data with a chi-square statistic. If the null hypothesis that
the intervals greater than x were distributed as a negative exponential could be
rejected at the 5% level, then a new value of x further to the right along the
survivorship curve was chosen. This process was repeated until the null
hypothesis could not be rejected at 5%. The value of x at which a fit occurred
was defined as the BCI. In the second part of Machlis' study she subtracted out
of the survivorship curve the first negative exponential fitted to the data; and
then repeated the procedure to see if a second break point (third distribution)
could be fitted to the intervals. In this way she found evidence for
'meta-bouts'; a tendency for the bouts themselves to be grouped into clusters.
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The problem with this method, as Machiis (1977) acknowledges, is that the
parameters of the negative exponential function fitted to the intervals are
dependant on the probability level chosen for the chi-square test (Slater &
Lester 1982), and no formal justification is given for taking the point where the
curve departs from the negative exponential fitted to the longer intervals as the
BCI.
Fagen 8t Young (1978) suggested firstly, that the parameters of the mixture
of exponential distribution fitting the mixture of intervals should be estimated
by a maximum likelihood procedure. Then they proposed that the point of
intersection of these exponentials, fitting the top and bottom parts of the
survivorship curve, should be considered the BCI. The interval at which this
occurs, t' is given by:
Equation 9.1.1
l\i l' = l\lue~^J'^wc w b
where X and n are the rates and numbers of intervals in the Poisson processes
describing intervals falling within (subscript w) or between (b) bouts. (Note that
for a exponential distribution the variance is equal to the mean, which are both
1/rate [e.g. Cox 8t Lewis 1966]). Slater & Lester (1982) claim (but do not
demonstrate) that this is the point where the smallest amount of time is
misclassified as between bout when really within, and vice versa. Equation 9.1.1
can be solved for the Fagen 8t Young BCI t'F thus:
Equation 9.1.2
Slater 8» Lester go on to suggest that the point at which the smallest amount
of time is misclassified is not actually the best BCI. They propose that the BCI
should misclassify a minimal number of intervals, not a minimal amount of
time. These are not equivalent, simply because within bout intervals are shorter
(by definition) than between bout intervals. Therefore if a minimal amount of
time is being misclassified, more within bout intervals than necessary will be
misassigned so as to ensure the correct identification of a relatively small
number of between bout intervals.
Slater 8t Lester (1982) demonstrate that the BCI that minimizes the number
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of intervals misclassified, t's is given by:
Equation 9.2
t's = I In Myy^-w
The problem with Slater & Lester's criterion is that by minimizing the number
of intervals misclassified it is implicitly weighting the criterion to emphasize
the correct classification of within bout intervals, at the expense of between
bout intervals. Bearing in mind that within bout intervals are more plentiful
than between bout intervals, and that each one of the former occupies less
time; Slater & Lester's method pushes the BCI towards the longer end of the
spectrum of intervals to ensure the correct classification of as many within
bout intervals as possible.
This becomes clearer when we consider the proportion of intervals of
different types correctly classified by each criterion. The proportion of
intervals classified as within bout is given by:
Equation 9.2.2
1 " Mb eW\)
for Fagen & Young's BCI: and
Equation 9.2.2
1 - \b/Xw Nbe(W\)
for Slater & Lester's method. The proportion of intervals classified as between
bout is given by Fagen & Young's method as:
Equation 9.3.1
Nwe"(VXw"\)




It can be seen that these are identical except for a weighting factor (Xb/Xw) in
the formulations based on Slater & Lester's BCI. As the between bout rate is
always slower (mean interval longer) than the rate of the within bout process
this weighting factor will always be less than one. Therefore the proportion of
intervals classified as within bout by Slater & Lester's method will be closer to
unity than that from Fagen & Young's method. Similarly Slater & Lester's BCI
will classify fewer intervals as between bout than Fagen & Young's. The
methods would only assign the same proportions of intervals as within and
between bouts in the degenerate case where \w = \b.
9.2 Method
It has been mentioned above (chapter 6) that this study recorded neither
responses that occurred within ,3s of each other, nor pecks during the
changeover delay (COD). For an IRT analysis, therefore, the COD initiating
response (first response to a new key), and also the first peck after the COD,
were excluded from calculations. On the basis of a few sessions where
complete responding up to the limits of the recording equipment
(approximately .05s) was available, it was decided to interpolate the missing
very short intervals on the assumption that the peak IRT was at .3s -*• ,4s and
that the fall off in the IRT histogram was fairly rapid and linear below that level.
A FORTRAN program was employed here (kindly made available by
D. I. Sales of the AFRC Poultry Research Centre, Roslin, Midlothian), to find the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a mixture of exponential
distributions (mean [=variance; =1/rate], proportion in mixture). Rather than
producing cumulative numbers of Intervals longer than a certain duration, and
fitting negative exponential distributions to these, it was felt that the scope for
error in calculation (both simple rounding error, and programming mistakes)
would be reduced if exponential distributions were fitted to the frequencies of
intervals falling into a time interval. In other words, fitting distributions to the
frequency histogram rather than the survivorship curve. The program enabled
the comparison of mixtures of up to four distributions, and provided a residual
deviance for each mixture, by which the null hypothesis that adding an
additional distribution did not reduce the residual deviance, could be tested
(through a chi-square test). The program was based on a maximum likelihood
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algorithm by Agha & Ibrahim (1984), that was itself founded on the methods of
Hosmer (1973) and Hasselblad (1966,1969). This method is in line with the
procedure advocated by Fagen & Young (1978). it was run on data in the form
of frequencies of intervals falling into .1s IRT bins. Analyses were performed
repeatedly, starting with one distribution and adding in more, one at a time,
until the difference in residual deviance between the current model, and a
model with one fewer distributions, was not significant at 5%. Although the
number of distributions considered present in the mixture was a consequence
of the probability level chosen for the chi-square comparison of residual
deviances, the parameters of each component distribution were optimal and
not affected by the initial estimates supplied by the user.
The BCI was then calculated by the method of Slater & Lester (1982)
(equation 9.2 above), and also by the method of Fagen & Young (1978)
(equation 9.1). Since the numbers of intervals in each exponential process only
enter these equations as their ratio, proportions were substituted for total
numbers in both equations.
9.3 Results
Data from the last session of each condition, and the first session of the
first condition are presented graphically in figures 9.1 •* 9.8. Figures 9.1 and 9.2
show, for bird 100 under FIFI and VIVIA, the cumulated frequency of intervals
between pecks longer than x, i.e. survivorship plots; figures 9.3 and 9.4 show
the same data in the form of semi-logarithmic survivorship plots. The data for
subject 65 under VIVIE and VIVIA are shown in the same form in figures 9.5 •*
9.8. In the log survivorship plots the BCI if applicable, as defined in equation 9.1
is marked by F, and that of the method of equation 9.2 by S. The variation
within these subjects' data appeared to be as great as that between subjects.
The very steep drop off in intervals surviving the first .5s, followed by a lower
rate of decay up to about 2s, and then a downward curving, negative
exponential falloff in survivorship above that level, are typical features of all
subjects' data.
Table 9.1 gives the parameters of the two best fitting exponential
distributions to the first two sessions of the first condition, and the last two
sessions of all conditions for concurrent FIFI. The columns show condition; key;
number of observations (pecks); Number of .1s classes into which the data fall;
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mean intervals (in seconds) and proportion in mixture for the two best fitting
distributions; BCI from Slater & Lester 1982; BCI from Fagen & Young 1978.
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 give the same data for VIVIE and VIVIA respectively. Where
the two distribution fit was not significantly better than that for one
distribution, the mean of that one distribution is presented. Also marked in
these tables are the BCIs calculated by the method of Slater 8t Lester (1981;
equation 9.2) and from equation 9.1 (Fagen & Young's 1978 method). In no case
were more than two distributions required to fit the interval data.
Table 9.1:
Parameters of two best fitting exponential distributions:
Concurrent Fixed Interval
Bird 100
Cond key No No Meai
Obs Class 1
120:120 1 122 50 .61
Begin 2 1147 83 .79
120:120 1 315 57 .86
Begin 2 925 88 .85
120 :120 1 36 15 .54
End 2 158 63 .82
120:120 1 56 15 .51
End 2 516 62 .83
30:240 1 1920 68 .66
End 2 31 34 .68
30:240 1 2069 59 .62
End 2 112 45 .58
180:60 1 247 29 .43
End 2 2135 52 .74
180:60 1 312 24 .41
End 2 2223 57 .72
ppn mean ppn BCI BCI
12 2 S F
Bird 130
Cond key No No Mean ppn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 43 48 .71
Begin 2 28 58 .82
120:120 1 1 1 insufficient
Begin 2 58 105 .71
120 :120 1 104 30 .48
End 2 261 64 1.22
120:120 1 157 12 .46
End 2 358 76 a.06
30:240 1 1885 103 .49
End 2 136 31 .41
30:240 1 2318 99 .47
End 2 72 20 .42
180:60 1 793 59 .42
End 2 592 31 .40
180:60 1 607 76 .41




Cond key No No Mean ppn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 12 2 S F
120:120 1 0 0 insufficient data
Begin 2 206 145 .17
120:120 1 7 17 .60
Begin 2 273 132 .18
120:120 1 91 19 .67
End 2 1726 64 .79
120:120 1 158 28 .68
End 2 2884 51 .68
240:30 1 0 0 insufficient data
End 2 982 98 .78
240:30 1 0 0 insufficient data
End 2 511 74 .65
60:180 1 218 38 .45
End 2 1004 44 .62
60:180 1 160 35 .48
End 2 1149 49 .45 .79 1. 34 .21
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Table 9.2: Parameters of two best fitting
exponential distributions: Concurrent Exponential VI
Bird 65
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 134 50 1.03
Begin 2 415 90 1.12
120:120 1 239 61 .68
Begin 2 153 46 1.14
120:120 1 13 16 .54
End 2 1573 80 .62
120:120 1 44 25 .54
End 2 1004 92 .67 .97 3.50 .04 4.01 2.64
240:30 1 89 5 .28
End 2 3241 96 .40
240 :30 1 254 15 .29
End 2 2956 91 .40 .90 2.24 .10 1.91 1.07
60:180 1 1838 44 .40
End 2 741 33 .44
60:180 1 1440 40 .42
End 2 542 34 .44
Bird 106
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120 :120 1 53 31 .27
Begin 2 159 108 1.17
120 :120 1 106 54 .57
Begin 2 150 71 1.01
120:120 1 32 46 1.21
End 2 806 58 .46
120:120 1 43 , 30 .97
End 2 840 66 .50
240:30 1 0 1 insufficient data
End 2 2057 106 1.12
240:30 1 0 1 insufficient data
End 2 2277 97 1.02
60:180 1 1597 84 .41
End 2 248 17 .54
60:180 1 1351 89 .41









Cond key No No Mean ppn mean ppn
Obs Class 112 2
120:120 1 816 101 .38 .85 1.95 .15
Begin 2 1 1 insufficient data
120:120 1 366 85 .50 .90 2.22 .10
Begin 2 11 27 .66 .
120:120 1 476 28 .44
End 2 903 65 .61
120:120 1 242 40 .47
End 2 436 58 .73
30:240 1 68 97 1 .12
End 2 169 43 .45
30:240 1 1062 103 1 .00
End 2 140 32 .51
180:60 1 1501 27 .45
End 2 1147 30 .50
180:60 1 1305 26 .45
End 2 1106 30 .49
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Table 9.3a: Parameters of two best fitting
exponential distributions: Concurrent Arithmetic VI
Bird 100
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 3123 58 .53
End 2 358 38 .50
120:120 1 3420 56 .54
End 2 387 39 .49
240:30 1 202 11 .38
End 2 3011 65 .69
240:30 1 159 9 .39
End 2 2868 74 .65
60 :180 1 2841 58 .51
End 2 583 38 .51
60 :180 1 2445 62 .51
End 2 490 42 .52
Bird 130
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 1081 57 .39
End 2 204 33 .42
120:120 1 1410 46 .40
End 2 423 28 .43
240:30 1 590 24 . 38
End 2 595 57 .41
240:30 1 471 18 .39
End 2 505 48 .43
60:180 1 2306 83 .40 .82 1.62 .18 1.55 .81
End 2 251 16 .42
60 :180 1 1858 72 .40 .84 1.60 .16 1.62 .88
End 2 356 13 .41
Bird 144
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean ppn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 48 23 .53
End 2 3314 68 .64
120:120 1 1278 48 .42 . 81 1.22 .19 1.61 .93
End 2 116 26 .48
240:30 1 2 6 insufficient data
End 2 3165 99 .66
240:30 1 11 6 insufficient data
End 2 3051 95 .51 .50 .89 .50 .67 0
60:180 1 87 18 .42
End 2 1349 49 .42 .81 1.16 .19 1.62 .74
60:180 1 79 14 .43
End 2 1278 48 .42 .81 1.22 .19 1.62 .74
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Table 9.3b: Parameters of two best fitting
exponential distributions: Concurrent Arithmetic VI
Bird 65
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean PPn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 452 28 .41
End 2 2608 71
.
.49
120:120 1 302 21 .41
End 2 2763 70 .49
240:30 1 190 10 .40
End 2 3004 80 .45
240:30 1 404 11 .38
End 2 2923 70 .45
60:180 1 1814 27 .39
End 2 984 29 .40
60:180 1 1726 23 .39
End 2 1068 39 .42
Bird 106
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean PPn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 1433 57 .45 .96 1.58 .04 2.69 1.79
End 2 368 42 .58
120:120 1 1241 51 .43
End 2 705 44 .59
240:30 1 317 13 .39
End 2 2039 75 .69
240:30 1 327 12 .38
End 2 1891 79 .65
60:180 1 1320 51 .39
End 2 625 34 .52
60:180 1 1648 55 .40
End 2 680 30 .52
Bird 149
Cond key No No Mean PPn mean PPn BCI BCI
Obs Class 1 1 2 2 S F
120:120 1 2019 50 .49
End 2 878 13 .45
120:120 1 2256 47 CNID
End 2 936 26 .45
240:30 1 909 22 .48
End 2 2047 44 .47
240:30 1 1068 27 .50
End 2 1825 50 .45
60:180 1 2357 64 .55
End 2 967 15 .44
60:180 1 2356 63 .53
End 2 1065 15 .43
Tables 9.1 to 9.3 contain data from 168 individual sessions. Twelve cases
arose where the program could not fit a mixture of distributions to the data. All
of these were simply because there was insufficient data in the session. The
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remaining 159 cases can be arranged according to the number of distributions
fitted as in table 9.4.
Table 9.4: Number of distributions fitted grouped by bird
and session
Condition bird Distributions - 1 2
FIFI 100 16 0
130 15 0
144 12 1
VIVIE 65 12 2
106 14 0
149 13 2
VIVIA(A) 100 12 0
130 14 0
144 6 4
VIVIA(B) 65 12 0
106 11 1
149 12 0
Ax2 analysis to test if the differences in numbers of distributions fitted to
sessions from different subjects and conditions was greater than would be
expected by chance, was significant (x2 = 24.43, df= 11, p<2.5%). The
proportions in each class did not however differ significantly between
experimental groups (x2= 8.01, df=3, NS), nor between subjects when data from
the same subjects on different conditions were grouped together (x2= 9.33, df=
5, NS). It can be seen from table 8.4 then, that on average the proportions of
sessions most parsimoniously fitted by mixtures of 1 or 2 exponential
distributions are 92% and 8% respectively. There is thus a substantial
predominance of one distribution fits.
9.3.1 Optimality considerations under VIVIE
In chapter 7 it was shown that optimal responding on VIVIE required a
single, constant IRT, and that any mixture of IRTs would reduce foraging
efficiency. The data in table 9.2 and figures 9.5 and 9.7 clearly refute this
prediction. Not only are the IRTs well described by the most variable of
distributions, the exponential; but also, on occasion, more than one distribution
is required to fit the data. It was further predicted in chapter 7 that the IRT
would be directly proportional to the programmed mean interval between
reinforcements.
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Table 9.5 gives the results of linear regressions of the mean IRT onto the
schedule value for the three subjects run under VIVIE. For the 12 cases where
more than one distribution was fitted to the data, this fact was ignored for the
purposes of the present analysis, and the overall mean, averaged over the two
processes, was used
Table 9.5: Regression of mean IRT onto schedule values
Subject Intercept Gradient E d
65 .72 -.0009 NS .04
106 .91 -.0017 NS .06
149 .86 -.0020 <5% .39
Group .83 -.0016 <5% .11
The only significant results in table 9.5 are for bird 149, and for the group data
taken as a whole; these show a very slight tendency for mean IRT to decrease
with increasing schedule value. This is exactly the opposite result from that
predicted from optimality considerations. Although the evidence that mean IRT
decreases with increasing schedule value is too weak to deserve any attention
in its own right, it is none the less a clear refutation of the optimality
prediction.
9.3.2 Bout Criterion Intervals
Tables 9.1 to 9.3 include the BCIs calculated from Fagen & Lester's (1978)
method, and also from Slater & Lester (1982). It can be seen that, as predicted
in the introduction to this chapter, the BCI from Slater & Lester's formulation is
always larger than the result of applying Fagen 8t Young's equation. This is
because it contains an additional weighting factor pushing the BCI towards the
longer, between-bout, intervals, and usually producing a criterion that is longer
than the mean of either process. Fagen & Young's BCI also occasionally
produces a value in excess of the between-bout mean, but is less prone to do
so. Fagen 8i Young's criterion also sometimes produces a figure less than the
mean of the within bout process, but only when the proportions of intervals
falling into the within-bout and between-bout processes come very close to
each other. On balance the Fagen 8i Young criterion is more consistent with
intuition, because it falls in most cases between the means of the two
component exponential processes and thereby produces proportions of
intervals in each group closer to the true values.
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9.3.3 Video Analysis
As noted in chapter 6 occasional video tape records of sessions were
analysed for the occurence of a number of behaviour patterns. From these I
gained the impression that the birds would lower their heads and peck
repeatedly at a key for up to about 2 seconds, then cease pecking and raise
their heads slightly. At this point they often looked in the food hopper,
apparently to see if their actions had brought any reward; they might walk over
to the other key; or, less commonly, stroll around the experimental chamber.
Quite often they simply looked around, and then lowered their head again to
attack the same key one more. Since these observations are not quantified it
would be unwise to attach too much importance to them, but they certainly
gave the subjective impression that the pecks could be grouped into bouts,
which is not, in general, born out by the statistical analysis above. There are
two possible conclusions to draw from this fact. Either subjective impressions
should be dismissed in favour of putting all one's trust in mathematics; or the
mathematical analysis should be rejected. I am inclined to take the latter
course, not because the analysis presented in this chapter was not rigorous,
but because it was limited by the fact that very brief IRTs, shorter than ,3secs
were not recorded. From Machlis' (1977) data we would expect the mean of
the within bout process to fall around 1/3 sec, and thus the absence of short
intervals (except in so far as I interpolated them) was probably critical to the
program's inability to disambiguate a process of within bout intervals from one
of between bout intervals in most cases. Where two process have been found
at least the problem that Machlis had in trying to attach meaning to her bouts
in a simple two-manipulandum experiment, that between bout intervals did not
necessarily define crossings over from one manipulandum to the other, could
not arise here, simply because the two keys in this experiment were very much
further apart than in Machlis' (18cm compared with ,2cm and ,7cm).
9.4 Discussion
The analysis presented in this chapter adopts a method that has been used
extensively in the ethological study of animal behaviour, shows its applicability
to the traditional operant paradigm of key pecking in a Skinner box, and also
attempts to improve its rigour as a tool.
As reviewed in the introduction to this chapter, the analysis of the temporal
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patterning of brief stereotyped behaviours has a substantial history to it, and
yet the present study is the first to make use of a maximum likelihood
procedure to produce optimal estimates of the parameters of the component
distributions in the data. The fact that the present study was not initially
designed with this form of analysis in mind has meant that the data contain a
substantial problem. Events occurring within ,3secs of each other could not
be recorded, because to do so would have meant reducing the duration of each
session (in order to avoid exceeding the memory capacity of the computer),
and this was incompatible with the original purpose of the experiment.
Ironically, at the time of writing, for the cost of the machines used in this
experiment, micro-computers with four times as much memory space are now
available. Because of this shortcoming the failure in general to find
within-bout and between-bout processes should not be treated as definitive,
especially since it was contrary to the impression gained from observation. It
is due to this shortcoming that it has not been possible to pursue the question
of momentary maximising with respect to bouts.
The absence of this analysis means that the BCIs deduced from both Slater
& Lester's (1982) and Fagen & Young's (1978) methods have not, after all, been
put to any use. In some ways this is how it should be. Where at all possible
analyses should be based on the objectively defined, optimally extracted
parameters of the mean and proportion in mixture of each component
distribution. The BCI will always depend, not just on the means of the
processes , but also on the proportions they happen to be in in the mixture
being considered. Although Slater & Lester's BCI is optimal in its partitioning
of intervals, in the sense that it minimizes the number of IRTs misclassified, I
feel that it misses the point. The purpose of a BCI is not to optimally partition
intervals, but to summarize the series of intervals into its component bouts. In
this respect Slater & Lester's criterion, as discussed above, would produce very
few bouts of great length. I am therefore in favour of Fagen & Young's criterion
because it keeps closer to the true proportions of between and within bout
intervals, and therefore the true number of bouts in the series of events.
The major pretext for this analysis was McNamara 8t Houston's (1983)
demonstration that anything but a single interresponse time on a VI schedule
must be suboptimal. They have subsequently argued (Houston 8i MciMamara
1985) that in general variability in behaviour runs contrary to the predictions of
optimal foraging models. These models generally make predictions of a quite
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unvarying character (Houston & McNamara 1985 consider the fixed giving up
time of a predator feeding on depleting patches according to the marginal
value theorem of Charnov 1976), which are then tested against average
performance of real predators. Houston & McNamara suggest that the
observed variability of behaviour be incorporated explicitly as a constraint into
the optimality model. They show that the results of an analysis constrained in
this way will differ from those of an unconstrained optimal foraging model, and
caution that if the variability in behaviour is not taken into account in an
optimality analysis then the predictions from that model should not be
compared to the averaged observed behaviour.
This post hoc incorporation of constraints to make data fit the theory was
rejected as unscientific in chapter two. Is there any good functional reason to
expect variability in behaviour? One argument that has often been proposed to
account for variability in behaviour is that it keeps the organism's options open
to notice and respond to changes in the environment. Given that the costs of
variability in behaviour can be estimated (Houston & McNamara 1985), and that,
in principle at least, the variability of the environments in which a subject
regularly finds itself might be estimated, then an overweening optimality model
might be constructed to balance the costs of behavioural variability in the
present environment, with the long term benefits of variability in
responsiveness to a variety of environments. In practice, in the present
context, it is very difficult to see any plausible context related reason for not
just one exponential distribution, but the two distributions found on occasion
(and, I feel, probably more widespread than could be demonstrated in these
data).
If we accept that bouting of pecks is the result to expect here, then I
submit that the most parsimonious way to account for this would be to view
the bouting of pecks as a form of behavioural structure that is part of the
organisms response to some part of the experimental situation. It may perhaps
be a somewhat optimal manner to attack hard, food related objects; but I feel it
is more likely, given the appearance of behaviour of this type in Machlis' chicks,
to be a physiological constraint on the pecking movement, that rapid pecking
must be regularly interspersed with longer pauses.
My point is not that subjects are not responsive to schedule values, it was
shown in chapters 6, 7 and 8 that in various ways they are. The argument from
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evolutionary epistemology is that, if a behaviour is to be modifiable with
experience, then it must first be variable; and then it must be placed in the
presence of a selection pressure to which it is vulnerable. The investigation
presented in this chapter is just a first step towards an analysis in terms of
variation and selection as developed in chapter 3. Had it proved possible to
state with confidence the temporal structure of the pecking, it would have been
interesting to have asked How (if at all) does this structure respond to the
present experiment? That is to say, which aspects (if any) of the experimental
procedure constitute a selection pressure on the pecking structure? These
might include the key as peckable object; the temporal pattern of
reinforcement, the confinement of the experimental chamber, the light behind
the key, the grain given as reinforcement, etc. etc. Would the pecking structure
have been the same at the beginning at the experiment as at the end? These
questions await the combination of rigorous methods of data analysis, with
more detailed recording of pecks. One thing, at least, is certain from these






One result that has certainly not been found here is optimal behaviour.
This is not surprising. The experiments described in this thesis have numerous
artificialities to them. Additionally the optimality analysis used was
exceptionally rigorous, and was applied critically. Although results from these
unnatural experiments might be dismissed just because they were collected in
an unnatural environment, I have tried to argue, particularly in chapter 5, that a
priori, it is not at all obvious what makes the present experiments so much
more artificial than experiments that have been accepted just because they
produced results which were (or, at least, which were presented as being) in
line with predictions from optimal foraging theory. There is a danger here of
defining the artificiality of an experiment post hoc, according to whether or not
subjects foraged optimally in it. In any case, the birds used in these
experiments spend their days in boxes of roughly the same dimensions as the
experimental chambers, and simply peck up the grain that is put in. I note with
interest that of the two experiments reported here, the one giving the better
agreement with optimality predictions was the traditional operant psychology
key pecking experiment, and the attempt to develop a new foraging
environment with a simpler response requirement, only reduced the degree of
agreement with prediction.
But, as I have discussed in chapter 2, failure to forage optimally should be
the rule, not the exception. Failures to forage optimally do not refute the
theory of evolution by natural selection - it is perfect optimisation that would
be difficult to account for through natural selection. In the psychological
literature there is no shortage of cases of animals failing to behave optimally (a
recent case is responding on concurrent VI:VR [variable ratio] schedules,
Herrnstein & Heyman 1979), however these have been easy to dismiss since
they were collected in situations that paid little explicit attention to the
organisms natural environment. Very recently, however, a few examples of
sub-optimal behaviour have become apparent under conditions that are less
easy to dismiss. The experiment of Shettleworth (1985b) discussed in chapter
4 showed that pigeons have a strong preference for many small items of food
over a few large items, even when the energetic value of the smaller items is
substantially less than that of the larger ones. Shettleworth & Jordan (1986)
have further shown that rats, given a choice between seeds with husks on, and
seeds without husks presented after a delay equal to the time required to
remove the husk, strongly prefer to dehusk the seeds themselves. This
imposes on them an energetic cost with no compensating energetic gains.
These results might be dismissed because they were collected in psychological
choice procedures under schedules of reward drawn from the psychological
literature. However they appear to have been well controlled studies and
possess no obvious artificialities of procedure.
A study using wild born starlings in an aviary is reported by Inglis &
Ferguson (1986). They gave each bird a choice between meal worms that were
available in a bowl, and meal worms hidden in holes made in a board. These
holes were all covered by flaps, but only 31 out of 126 holes contained worms.
From an optimal foraging perspective there was no reason why the starlings
should waste effort searching the board while identical prey were freely
available in the bowl. Inglis & Ferguson found that a substantial proportion of
worms were taken from the holes in the board (72% average for undeprived
subjects), and that the proportion of worms taken from the holes decreased
with increasing deprivation. These results are unaccountable from an
optimality perspective, though they merely replicate a number of results in the
psychological literature that Inglis 8t Ferguson cite.
I strongly suspect that more examples of sub-optimai behaviour will soon
become apparent. The danger then may be that there could be a backlash
against the use of optimality considerations in the study of animal behaviour.
The point that has to be emphasized is that, as I argued in chapter 2, optimal
foraging theory is not a theory of behaviour - we should not expect to observe
globally optimal behaviour - however, that does not mean that optimal foraging
theory does not have a role to play. This role includes pointing towards
functional factors behind behaviour, and, by comparison with what animals
actually do, suggesting the rules of thumb that may be guiding their behaviour.
10.2 Rules of Thumb
As for rules of thumb - the data presented in chapter 8 have not provided
a great deal of support for them either. Advocates of both momentary
maximising and melioration have been able to find more support for their
theories than I have here. Perhaps part of the reason for that is implicit in the
previous sentence - advocates are always better at finding supportive evidence
than those indifferent to an issue. Melioration, however, has never before been
tested on simple concurrent interval schedules as presented here, so the
dismissal of this attractively simple theory does not stand in contradiction to
any published work. I would not want to claim on the basis of these data that
melioration never happens - as I suggest in chapter 8, it may well be a
'reserve' strategy for organisms capable of more complex assessments of their
environment; and there may be organisms with limited cognitive capacities who
use it as a strategy of 'first choice'.
My results from testing momentary maximising do stand in opposition to
those of Hinson & Staddon (1983). Aside from the difference in species used
here, two differences of procedure stand out as important. One is the use of a
COD in the study reported in chapters 6 to 9. Momentary maximising does not
cope very clearly with CODs. Any activity that has a zero probability of reward
should not be engaged in according to a literal interpretation of momentary
maximising. If, as I did, we choose to ignore COD and work round it in our
estimation of momentary maximising, then subjects are likely to be discouraged
from changing over by the COD in a manner that we have not accounted for in
the momentary maximising analysis.
The second difference of procedure was that I did not attempt to calculate
an averaging figure (a 'figure of merit'), for momentary maximising. I feel that
the use of such devices is unwise because it hides the different ways in which
momentary maximising can be achieved, and allows responses that are well
placed with regard to momentary maximising to cancel out, to some extent,
those that are misplaced.
Even if I were willing to dismiss my own results and concede that
momentary maximising is the response controlling rule on these schedules, it
could still not be a general process controlling choice in natural environments,
simply because prior probabilities of reward cannot, in general, be defined. If
we were to generalize momentary maximising to be a rule demanding that a
subject respond on the option possessing the highest subjective likelihood of
reward, then we would have a notion possessing a wider area of applicability.
The problem in applying such a rule would lie in defining 'subjective likelihood'
without reference to the behaviour observed. The dynamic between
considering expectancy based rules of thumb, of the momentary maximising
type, and past reward 'linear operator' type rules, of the type to which
melioration belongs, will I expect, form a constructive dialectic.
10.3 Variation and Selection
A personal disappointment in these experiments was the failure to find any
way of assessing, let alone provide support for, the notions of blind variation
and selective retention developed in chapter 3. As I mentioned at the end of
that chapter, experiments investigating optimal foraging theory are not well
suited to researching variation and selection of behaviour because of their
excessive duration. However, if it had been possible to identify a rule of thumb
confidently as the behaviour controlling rule under these conditions, a foothold
would have been gained, such that a variation and selection analysis might
have proved possible. In the event it was not even possible to determine with
confidence the temporal patterning of responding, and so, as discussed in
chapter 9, the many interesting questions that a blind variation and selective
retention viewpoint brings to the fore, could not be addressed.
The consolation to these disappointments is that a great many interesting
questions remain open for future research.
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